ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court
(“ALC” or “Court”) pursuant to the
Petitioner’s request for a contested case hearing filed January 5, 2004. Petitioner appeals the
decision of the Lexington County Board of Assessment Appeals (“Board”) to deny an agricultural
use classification on a portion of his real property (one acre on which a barn and parking lot sit) for
the tax year 2003. A hearing was held on April 6, 2004 at the ALC in Columbia, South Carolina.
Both parties were represented by counsel.
For the reasons set forth hereinafter, this Court affirms the decision made by the Board and
the Lexington County Assessor (“Assessor”) to deny the agricultural exemption for that portion of
Petitioner’s real property.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Having carefully listened to and observed the demeanor of the witnesses during the hearing,
having carefully reviewed the entire record, and having weighed the credibility of all the evidence
and the witnesses, taking into account the burden of proof imposed on the parties, I make the
following findings of fact:
General
1.The ALC has personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
2.Notice of the date, time, place and nature of the hearing was timely given to all parties.
3.Petitioner is the owner of property located at 3152 Augusta Highway in Lexington County,
South Carolina, TMS# 004100-05-034, known as Harmon Tree Farm, LLC.
4.The farm consists of approximately seventy acres. Petitioner owns approximately thirty six
acres of the farm and his father owns the remainder.
5.Petitioner’s primary business on the farm is the growing and selling of Christmas trees. In
addition to operating the Christmas tree farming business, Petitioner grows vegetables and has a
small pumpkin patch. Petitioner also conducts educational school tours at the farm and holds some
holiday events, as well as other activities.
Barn
6.In 1997, Petitioner constructed a barn on an approximate seven acre tract of the farm. This
tract is contiguous to other property that is deemed agricultural by the Assessor. The barn and its
parking lot sit on approximately one acre of land and front on the Augusta Highway.
7.Petitioner originally built the barn to house the Christmas trees he sells and to use as an
assembly area for school tours. The barn also houses the office for the farming operations.
8.At the time the barn was built, it consisted of a 50' by 50' enclosure and had a dirt floor. The
zoning permit issued when the building was constructed designated it as “group assembly.”
9.Since 1997, several improvements have been made to the barn. In 1998, a pine floor was
installed, and in 2000 Petitioner doubled the size of the barn and added a stage.
10.The barn is fully enclosed and is heated and cooled. The inside is decorated with antiques
hanging from the walls and ledges, and there is a partition which can be used to divide the inside area
of the barn in half. The facility has a stage and is equipped with a sound system. The barn also has
a snack bar inside where items such as homemade ice cream, hot dogs, and drinks are sold from time
to time.
11.A parking lot for customers who use the facility is also located on the tract on which the barn
is located.
12.Petitioner utilizes the barn and opens it to the public for different events during the months
of October through December of each year. The snack bar is open to the public during this period
too.
13.In October, Petitioner operates several events for children, including a “Boo” house, a
haunted hay ride to a pumpkin patch and a corn maze. Petitioner charges admission to participate
in each of these events. During these events, Petitioner sells excess vegetables and pumpkins in the
barn.
14.From Thanksgiving Day through December 15 of each year Petitioner uses the barn to house
Christmas trees for sale. The cash register for tree sales is located inside the barn during this time.
15.In addition, Petitioner operates a Christmas House in a separate facility away from the barn
in which he sells such items as ornaments, collectibles, artificial trees, and decorations. Petitioner
sometimes brings discounted items from the Christmas House to sell in the barn.
16.When not in use by him, Petitioner rents the barn on an hourly basis for parties, weddings,
reunions, etc. It is rented approximately four to five times per month and the proceeds from these
rentals account for approximately 16% of the farm’s income. Petitioner’s income from the barn
rental for the year 2003 was approximately $28,000.
17.For the years 1997 through 2002 Petitioner received an agricultural exemption for the barn;
it was deemed to be a utility building. In 2003 Petitioner applied for and was denied an agricultural
assessment by the Assessor’s Office for the one acre on which the barn and a parking lot are located.
Petitioner appealed the denial of the agricultural exemption by the Assessor to the Board. After a
hearing, the Board determined that the property did not quality for the agricultural use designation.
A request for a contested case hearing with the ALC followed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, applicable law, and the evidence, this Court
concludes, as a matter of law, the following:
1.S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2540 (Supp. 2003) authorizes the Administrative Law Court to hear
this contested case pursuant to Chapter 23 of Title 1 of the 1976 Code of Laws, as amended.
2.The standard of proof in weighing the evidence and making a decision on the merits of a
contested case hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence. Anonymous v. State Board of Medical
Examiners, 329 S.C. 371, 796 S.E.2d 17 (1998); National Health Corp. v. South Carolina
Department of Health and Environmental Control, 298 S.C. 373, 380 S.E.2d 841 (Ct. App. 1989).
3.An agency decision must be reached utilizing reasoned judgment and must be based upon
adequate determining principles and a rational basis. City of Columbia v. Board of Health and
Environmental Control, 292 S.C. 199, 355 S.E.2d 536 (1987).
4.The trier of fact must weigh and pass upon the credibility of the evidence presented. S.C.
Cable Television Association v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 308 S.C. 216, 417 S.E.2d 586
(1992).
5.A court construing a statute must first seek to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.
Koenig v. South Carolina Dep’t of Public Safety, 325 S.C. 400, 480 S.E.2d 98, 99 (Ct. App. 1996).
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to give words used in a statute their plain and ordinary
meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction. Id. The language must be read to
harmonize its subject matter with its general purpose. Id. “In construing statutory language, the
statute must be read as a whole, and sections which are part of the same general statutory law must
be construed together and each one given effect, if it can be done by any reasonable construction.”
Higgins v. State, 307 S.C. 446, 449, 415 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1992). However, our courts have also
held that statutes, as a whole, must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation, consonant
with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers. TNS Mills, Inc., v. South Carolina Department
of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 503 S.E.2d 471 (1998); Gildstrap v. South Carolina Budget and Control
Board, 310 S.C. 210, 423 S.E.2d 101 (1992).
6.S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-230(a) (2000) provides in part that:
..."agricultural real property" shall mean any tract of real property which is used to
raise, harvest or store crops, feed, breed or manage livestock, or to produce plants,
trees, fowl or animals useful to man, including the preparation of the products raised
thereon for man's use and disposed of by marketing or other means. It includes but
is not limited to such real property used for agriculture, grazing, horticulture, forestry,
dairying and mariculture. In the event at least fifty percent of a real property tract
shall qualify as "agricultural real property", the entire tract shall be so classified,
provided no other business for profit is being operated thereon....
(Emphasis added).
7.Further, S. C. Code Ann. § 12-43-230 (a) requires the South Carolina Department of Revenue
to promulgate a regulation designed to provide a more detailed definition of “agricultural real
property” and to exclude from the use assessment any real property not used for a bona fide
agricultural purpose.
8.Pursuant to this mandate, Regulation 117-114 was promulgated. Regulation 117-114
provides that, “[r]eal property is not used for agricultural purposes unless the owner... has, in good
faith, committed the property to that use. Real property which is ostensibly used for agricultural
purposes, but which is in reality used for other purposes is not agricultural real property. The
agricultural use of the property must be genuine in nature as opposed to sham or deception.” 27 S.C.
Code Regs. 117-114 (Supp. 2003).
9.An agricultural use classification is granted to agricultural real property “actually used for
agricultural purposes.” S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(d)(2000). Furthermore, “...[i]n no event shall
real property be classified as agricultural real property when such property is not used for bona fide
agricultural purposes.” 27 S.C. Code Regs. 117-114 (Supp. 2003).
10.While no single factor is controlling in determining if real property is used for a bona fide
agricultural purpose, consideration may be given to:
(1) the nature of the terrain;
(2) the density of the marketable product (timber, etc.) on the land;
(3) the past usage of the land;
(4) the economic merchantability of the agricultural product;
(5) the use, or not, of recognized care, cultivation, harvesting and like practices applicable
to the product involved, and any implemented plans thereof; and
(6) the business or occupation of the landowner...however, the fact that the tract may have
been purchased for investment purposes does not disqualify it if actually used for agricultural
purposes.
27 S.C. Code Regs. 117-114 (Supp. 2003).
11.In cases in which the real property is committed to uses in addition to agricultural uses, the
agricultural activity must comprise the most significant use of the property in order for it to be
classified as agricultural real property. 27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-114 (Supp. 2003) (Emphasis
added).
12.Prior to the tax year 2003, Petitioner was given an agricultural exemption for taxation
purposes on the one acre on which the barn and parking lot sit.
However, the mere fact that
Petitioner’s property received the agricultural exemption in past years does not entitle it to that
classification for the tax year 2003.
13.Other property owned by Petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of S.C. Code Ann. §§
12-43-232(1)(a) & (1)(b). It is a Christmas tree tract which contains five acres or more. It would
also appear that such farmland acreage would meet the income requirements of S.C. Code Ann. §
12-43-232(3)(a).
14.Petitioner argues that farming is the most significant use of this one acre of land because the
barn is the only outlet used by Petitioner for the sale of its farming products. Petitioner uses the
barn for three months out of each year as a sales outlet for his Christmas trees grown on the farm and
purchased elsewhere. A snack bar is operated from the kitchen inside the barn during these three
months and Petitioner also sells any overflow of vegetables which he is unable to sell elsewhere.
During the other months of the year, the barn is used as a rental facility for recreational and
educational activities. Even during the three months that Petitioner uses the barn for the sale of his
agricultural products, its primary use is commercial activity.
The barn is fully enclosed, with a pine floor, and is fully heated and cooled unlike other barns
that are used for agricultural purposes. Although this property was granted an agricultural use
classification in past years, that does not entitle it to that classification for the tax year 2003.
In this matter, Petitioner has a large tract of land which comprises the farm. Part of it is used
for Christmas tree farming, part for raising produce and vegetables, and part of it is used for the sales
of the trees and produce raised on the farm as well as that purchased elsewhere. When there is a
multiple use of a property, the general rule is that “the value of the total piece of property must be
allocated on some equitable basis.” 27 S.C. Code Regs. 117-124.8 (1976). This general rule is not
applicable to multiple use property seeking agricultural classification, however.
The applicable rule for classification of multiple use agricultural property depends upon the
expansiveness of the non-agricultural use. There are two categories:
(1) First, there is a co-extensive use when the agricultural use and the “other use” encompass
the entire property so as to be co-extensive (e.g. raising timber and operating a hunting
preserve both on the full extent of the land). In such cases, the entire property will receive
agricultural use classification so long as the agricultural use is the most significant use. If
it is not the most significant use, then none of the property will qualify as agricultural use.
27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-114 (Supp. 2003). This is not applicable in this case since
both tree farming and the sale of farm products does not exist on all the farm acreage.
(2) Second, there is a segregated use when the “other use” of the property is segregated from
the agricultural use. However, if at least fifty percent of the property qualifies as “agricultural
real property”, then “the entire tract shall be so classified, provided no other business for
profit is being operated thereon.” (emphasis added). S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-230(a)(2000).
It would appear at first blush that the second category might be applicable in this case and
would qualify the Petitioner for the agricultural exemption for the entire farm. There is no argument
that more than 50 % of his farm is used for agricultural purposes (growing Christmas trees and some
vegetables for sale). However, there is the issue of whether there is another business being operated
on the property for a profit.
When a business is operated for a profit on the property, the part that is agriculture receives
agricultural use while the non-agricultural use property is classified according to the requirements
of S.C. Const. Art. X. In such cases, 100% of the property cannot receive the agricultural use
classification; only that portion which is actually used for agricultural use. For example, “if a farmer
uses eighty percent of his land for agricultural purposes and twenty percent for vacant land, his entire
tract would qualify for agricultural use provide no other business for profit is operated on the twenty
percent vacant land. If the twenty percent vacant land were used for business for profit, the entire
tract would not qualify but only the eighty percent actually used agriculturally.” Jasper County Tax
Assessor v. Westvaco Corp., 305 S. C. 346, 409 S. E. 2d 333 (1991).
Reviewing our case at hand, only that portion of the farm allocated to the raising of
Christmas trees and vegetables is qualified to receive the agricultural exemption. It is clear that the
one acre which contains the barn and the parking lot is a separate business for profit. Not only does
Petitioner sell Christmas trees grown on the property in that business, he also purchases some from
North Carolina for resale. Further, the sale of Christmas trees only occurs during approximately one
month each year. During the other months of each year Petitioner uses the barn as a social events
business, renting it out for parties, using it to host parties and certain events at various times of the
year, and for selling other items. There is a kitchen inside the building that can be used for setting
up catered events. Petitioner has also added a partition whereby he can close off part of the barn.
It has been created by Petitioner to generate revenue from events throughout the entire year.
Accordingly, this court concludes that the one acre on which the barn and its adjoining
parking lot sit does not qualify for the agricultural exemption for the tax year 2003.
ORDER
Accordingly, based on the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby
ORDERED that the one acre of Petitioner’s property on which the barn and its adjoining
parking lot sit does not qualify for and will not receive the agricultural exemption for tax year 2003.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
MARVIN F. KITTRELL
Chief Administrative Law Judge
May 19, 2004
Columbia, South Carolina |