ORDERS:
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This matter is before me upon Launeil "Neil" Sanders' (Sanders) request for a contested case hearing to challenge the
anticipated reissuance of NPDES permit # SC0003042 by the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) to
Respondent Sonoco Products Company (Sonoco). Both DHEC and Sonoco have filed Motions to Dismiss on the ground
that DHEC has yet to reissue the permit in question and, therefore, the case is not ripe for adjudication.
The Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD) has only that jurisdiction as is expressly conferred by statute. See Triska v.
Department of Health and Environmental Control, 292 S.C. 190, 355 S.E.2d 531 (1987). In disputes originating from
actions by DHEC, the ALJD has jurisdiction if a contested case is presented. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(B) (Supp. 1998).
A"contested case" is defined as a proceeding in which "the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to
be determined by an agency after an opportunity for a hearing[.]" S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310 (Supp. 1998). Therefore,
ALJD jurisdiction arises only in those cases in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be
determined by an agency.
In this case, I find that Sanders has presented a claim that is not ripe. Thus, Sanders' legal rights are not required by law to
be determined at this point in time and the ALJD has no jurisdiction over this matter.
A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon "contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may
not occur at all." Texas v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1257 (1998). The ripeness doctrine is designed
'to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements
over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has
been formalized and its effect felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.'
Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 118 S.Ct. 1665 (1998).
In this case, DHEC has not yet reissued the permit in question. Indeed, it is mere speculation to assume that DHEC will in
fact reissue the permit. Accordingly, Petitioner's challenge to the reissuance of this permit is not yet ripe for adjudication,
and thus, Sanders' legal rights are not required by law to be determined at this point in time. Cf. Orr v. Clyburn, 277 S.C.
536, 290 S.E.2d 804 (1982) ("The existence of an actual, justiciable controversy is essential to jurisdiction to render a
declaratory judgment. A justiciable controversy is a real and substantial controversy which is ripe and appropriate for
judicial determination, as distinguished from this dispute of a contingent, hypothetical or abstract character."). Accordingly,
no justiciable controversy existing, the ALJD has no contested case jurisdiction over Sanders' current challenge. S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 1-23-310 and 1-23-600(B) (Supp. 1998).
The Motion to Dismiss is granted, but is granted without prejudice. Sanders has the right to challenge the reissuance of the
NPDES permit # SC0003042 by DHEC to Sonoco if such a reissuance occurs and if that challenge is made as prescribed by
law.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: March 31, 2000
Columbia, South Carolina |