ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division (Division) pursuant to the request of
Crenco Food Stores, Inc., d/b/a Crenco Food Store (Respondent) for a contested case hearing pursuant
to an administrative violation regarding the off-premise beer and wine permit for the Respondent's
premises at 3028 Lancaster Highway, Richburg, South Carolina 29729 (location). Respondent was
cited for a violation of 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-9(B) (Supp. 2000), for allegedly permitting or
knowingly allowing a person under the age of twenty-one (21) years to purchase a beer on April 26,
2000. Based upon this alleged violation and two prior violations at this location against this permit held
by Respondent, the South Carolina Department of Revenue (Department) is seeking to impose a forty-five (45) day suspension of the Respondent's off-premise beer and wine permit.
After notice to the parties, a contested case hearing was held at the offices of the Division in Columbia,
South Carolina, on April 17, 2001. After a thorough review of the file and the evidence presented at the
hearing, I find and conclude that a ten-day suspension of the Respondent's off-premise beer and wine
permit is the appropriate penalty in this case.
Any issues raised in the proceedings or hearing of this case but not addressed in this order are deemed
denied. ALJD Rule 29(B). Furthermore, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is not a prerequisite
to any party filing a notice of appeal of this order. ALJD Rule 29(C).
FINDINGS OF FACT
Having observed the witnesses and exhibits presented at the hearing and closely passed upon their
credibility, taking into consideration the burden of persuasion by the parties, I make the following
Findings of Fact by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. The Division has personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
2. Notice of the date, time, place and nature of the hearing was timely given to all parties.
3. The Respondent holds an off-premise beer and wine permit for the store located at 3028 Lancaster
Highway, Richburg, South Carolina 29729.
4. On April 26, 2000, SLED agent Stacy Snow made a "controlled buy" at the Crenco Food Store in
Richburg, South Carolina. An underage cooperating individual (UCI), Benjamin Rudy, assisted in the
controlled buy. The UCI, who was born on November 15, 1980, was nineteen (19) years old at the time
of the purchase. He held a valid South Carolina driver's license which showed his birth date and
contained in the upper right hand corner the statement: "Under 21 until 11-15-2001."
5. On the date of the hearing before this court, the UCI's physical appearance accurately reflected his
physical appearance on the date in question. He appeared sufficiently youthful so as to merit an inquiry
as to his correct age before allowing him to purchase a beer. Based upon this court's observation of the
UCI at the hearing, a reasonable person would conclude that the UCI was under twenty-one (21) years
of age on the date the purchase of the beer was made.
6. Before the UCI entered the location, Agent Snow searched him and found him to be in possession of
only his valid South Carolina driver's license and a $5.00 bill. The UCI entered the store, went to the
beer cooler, selected a 24 ounce Bud Light beer, and proceeded to the cash register with the beer.
7. The clerk, Jennifer Gregory, sold the UCI the beer without asking for his identification. The UCI
exited the store and gave the beer to Agent Snow.
8. Agent Snow issued a citation to Ms. Gregory for violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-90 (Supp.
2000), for transferring beer to a person under the age of twenty-one, as well as an administrative citation
to the Respondent Crenco Food Stores, Inc., for violation of 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-9(B) (Supp.
2000), for permitting the purchase of beer by a person under twenty-one years of age.
9. This violation constitutes the third violation of S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-9(B) written against the beer
and wine permit for this location. The first violation report is dated October 14, 1997. The Respondent
paid a monetary penalty of Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) for that violation. The second violation
report is dated December 11, 1998. The Respondent paid a monetary penalty of Eight Hundred Dollars
($800.00) for that violation.
10. According to the owner of the Respondent, Harold H. Crenshaw, Jr., the Respondent has its home
office in Lancaster, South Carolina, and operates convenience stores in York, Lancaster and Chester
counties. Mr. Crenshaw has been in the convenience store business for twenty-one years. I found him
to be a very credible witness.
11. The Respondent has an extensive training program for new employees. Respondent has an
Operations Manager, Mr. Terry Thompson, who has been with the Respondent for fourteen years and
who is in charge of overseeing training for all of Respondent's stores. Each new employee undergoes a
three to four day training process, which is conducted by the store manager at each location. During the
training process, each employee is required to read the Respondent's policy manual and to sign a
statement indicating that he or she has read the manual and agrees to abide by all rules or regulations
therein. The policy manual contains the general policy that no beer or wine is to be sold to minors, and
that cashiers must obtain proper identification on all sales unless they are certain of the customer's age;
the policy that the only acceptable identifications are either a valid driver's license or a state-issued
identification card; and a statement that selling beer or wine to a minor constitutes grounds for
termination of employment. In addition, new employees are shown a film about alcohol and cigarette
sales, and are shown the procedures for checking identification by the store manager.
12. Neither Mr. Crenshaw nor Mr. Thompson was in the Respondent's Richburg store at the time of the
incident on April 26, 2000.
13. Jennifer Gregory, the clerk who made the sale in this case, had been employed with the Respondent
since 1998. She signed a statement indicating that she had read Respondent's policy
manual and agreed to abide by all rules and regulations therein. Following the incident on April 26,
2000, Ms. Gregory's employment with the Respondent was terminated.
14. Since April 26, 2000, the Respondent has instituted additional policies which are designed to
prevent sales of beer or wine to minors. Each employee of Respondent is now required to read and sign
a "Liquor Liability Employment Agreement" in which the employee agrees, inter alia, not to sell any
alcoholic beverages to minors; not to purchase any alcoholic beverages for minors; not to give away any
alcoholic beverages to minors; to accept only the forms of identification authorized by Respondent from
anyone purchasing alcoholic beverages; to request acceptable identification from anyone who does not
appear to be at least thirty (30) years old; and to verify that a customer is of legal age before making any
sale of alcoholic beverages. In addition, each new employee is required to sign a statement which sets
forth the legal ages for purchasing alcoholic beverages and tobacco products, and which states that the
employee is responsible for identifying all customers purchasing these items. Furthermore, during the
summer of 2000, Respondent installed a new electronic verification system in all of its stores. When a
customer attempts to purchase alcoholic beverages, the clerk is prompted to enter the customer's birth
date into the register. If the person is under the age of twenty-one, the register will not permit the sale
to go through.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, I conclude, as a matter of law, the following:
1. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600 (Supp. 2000) grants jurisdiction to the Administrative Law Judge
Division to hear contested cases under the Administrative Procedures Act.
2. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-260 (Supp. 2000) provides that contested case hearings arising under the
provisions of Title 61 must be heard by an Administrative Law Judge with the Division.
3. A permit is subject to revocation or suspension if the holder or an employee on the permitted
premises knowingly sells beer or wine to any person under the age of twenty-one years. S.C. Code Ann.
§ 61-4-580(1) (Supp. 2000).
4. 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-9 (B) (Supp. 2000) prohibits a permittee from permitting or knowingly
allowing a person under twenty-one years of age to purchase or possess or consume beer or wine in or
on the licensed premises. Such an act is a violation against the permit and constitutes grounds for the
suspension or revocation of the beer and wine permit.
5. For a violation of any provision contained in Chapter 4 of Title 61, S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-250
(Supp. 2000) authorizes discretion in the trier of fact to impose a monetary penalty on the holder of a
beer or wine permit in lieu of suspension or revocation.
6. All regulations promulgated by the Commission (now Department), effective on the date of the
Government Restructuring Act of 1993, remain in force until modified or rescinded by the Department
or SLED. 1993 S.C. Acts 181, § 1604.
7. Permits and licenses issued by the State of South Carolina for the sale of liquor, beer, and wine are
not rights or property, but are privileges granted in the exercise of the police power of this state to be
used and enjoyed only so long as the restrictions and conditions governing them are complied with. The
Administrative Law Judge Division, as the tribunal authorized to grant the issuance of a permit, is
likewise authorized to revoke or suspend the permit for cause. See Feldman v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 203
S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22 (1943).
8. A party manifests consent and knowledge to allowing a person under twenty-one years of age to
purchase beer if, from the appearance of the person or otherwise, the party had sufficient information
that would lead a prudent man to believe the person was under twenty-one, especially where simple
inquiry would have confirmed such fact. Feldman, supra; S. C. Atty. Gen. Op. 3395 (1972); see 58
Am.Jur.2d Notice § 14 (1989). A person has no right to shut his eyes to avoid information clearly
before him. 58 Am.Jur.2d Notice § 13 (1989).
9. A licensee may be held liable for violations of liquor statutes and regulations committed by his agent
while pursuing the ordinary business entrusted to him. The licensee is liable even though the violations
are committed in his absence and without his knowledge, consent, or authority. See 48 C.J.S.
Intoxicating Liquors § 276 (1981).
10. If an agent is doing some act in furtherance of the principal's business, he will be regarded as acting
within the scope of his authority. On the other hand, a principal generally is not liable when an agent is
acting for his own independent purposes, wholly disconnected from furtherance of his employer's
business; such conduct falls outside the scope of his employment. Crittenden v. Thompson-Walker Co.,
288 S.C. 112, 341 S.E.2d 385 (Ct. App. 1986).
11. The record is clear that the clerk, Jennifer Gregory, was acting within the scope of general authority
placed in her by her principal, the Respondent, in selling beer and wine at the location. No evidence
was entered into the record that Ms. Gregory was not authorized to be at the location or to make sales of
beer and wine. In addition, the evidence is overwhelming that she did sell a beer to the UCI.
12. The evidence in the record clearly shows that the Respondent, through its employee, permitted the
sale of beer to a person under twenty-one years of age. Despite the youthful appearance of the UCI, the
Respondent's employee neglected to ask the UCI for identification. In this case, the UCI's
identification would have shown that he was nineteen years of age at the time of the purchase.
13. Based upon the evidence, I conclude that the Respondent violated S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-580
(Supp. 2000) and 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-9 (B) (Supp. 2000) on April 26, 2000, by selling a beer to
a person under twenty-one years of age.
14. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-250 (Supp. 2000) authorizes, for any violation of any regulation
promulgated by the Department pertaining to beer and wine, in lieu of a suspension or revocation of the
beer and wine permit, the imposition of a monetary penalty not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00)
and not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).
15. It is a generally recognized principle of administrative law that the fact finder has the authority to
impose an administrative penalty, as established by the legislature, after the parties have had an
opportunity to have a hearing and be heard on the issues. Walker v. S.C. ABC Comm'n, 305 S.C. 209,
407 S.E.2d 633 (1991); see also City of Louisville v. Milligan, 798 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1990); Matter of
Henry Youth Hockey Ass'n, 511 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Shadow Lake of Noel, Inc. v.
Supervisor of Liquor Control, 893 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Ohio Real Estate Comm'n v. Aqua
Sun Inv., 655 N.E.2d 266 (Ohio 1995); State Police v. Cantina Gloria's, 639 A.2d 14 (Pa. 1994);
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. Duranleau, 617 A.2d 143 (Vt. 1992).
16. Based upon the evidence presented and after considering the credibility of the witnesses, the
Respondent's policies regarding the adherence to ABC statutes, and the Respondent's efforts to comply
with the laws regulating the sale of beer and wine, I conclude that a ten-day suspension of Respondent's
off-premise beer and wine permit is the appropriate penalty in this case.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent, Crenco Food Stores, Inc., d/b/a Crenco Food Store,
is in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-580 (Supp. 2000) and 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-9(B) (Supp.
2000) for selling a beer to a person under the age of twenty-one years on April 26, 2000.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the off-premise beer and wine permit issued by the Department to
the Respondent at 3028 Lancaster Highway, Richburg, South Carolina 29729, is hereby suspended for a
period of ten (10) days, to begin on the fifteenth day from the date of this order.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_____________________________________
Marvin F. Kittrell
Chief Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
May 2, 2001 |