SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

I. STATEMENT OF CASE

This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division ("Division") pursuant to the appeal of Robert Campbell, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections ("Department") off and on since 1979. After he was returned to the custody of the Department from Georgia's Department of Corrections, Campbell filed a grievance challenging the calculation of his sentence on September 9, 2000. On January 11, 2001, Campbell received the Department's Final Decision denying his grievance. On January 18, 2001, Campbell filed this appeal. On September 14, 2001, Campbell sent a letter to this tribunal complaining that the Department was violating its policy regarding inmate property. For the reasons set forth below, the Department's Final Decision is affirmed.

II. BACKGROUND

In 1987,Campbell was paroled to the state of Georgia after serving eight years for crimes committed in South Carolina. On February 4, 1988, Campbell began serving a sentence in Georgia for crimes committed after he was paroled by South Carolina in 1987. That same day, the predecessor to the South Carolina Board of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services ("PPPS") issued a warrant for Campbell's arrest for violating parole. At some point prior to June 24, 1988, PPPS filed a detainer against Campbell regarding the warrant. ⁽¹⁾ On December 3, 1991, Campbell was served with the warrant. On January 31, 1992, after completing his sentence in Georgia, Campbell was returned to the Department to serve the remainder of his 1987 sentence.

On October 12, 2000, Campbell filed a grievance, alleging that he was entitled to jail-time credit for the period between February 4, 1988, and December 3, 1991. In his grievance, Campbell alleged that at one point, he had been advised that he would receive credit for such time but that he had not yet received credit. On October 6, 2000, the warden responded to Campbell's grievance, stating that the Records Analyst who informed him he would receive jail-time credit was mistaken and that the time between February 4, 1988 and December 3, 1991 is "dead time," for which he could not receive credit. Campbell appealed the warden's decision in a Step 2 grievance, alleging that he was in the constructive custody of the Department during the period he was under detainer. On January 5, 2001, the Department denied his grievance. In this appeal, Campbell argues that, although the Department alleges that it was unaware of his location until he was brought to Perry Correctional Institution on January 31, 1991, he was under a detainer issued by the state as of June 24, 1988. In addition, Campbell argues that he is entitled to jail-time credit, if not from the date of the warrant, from the date of the detainer to December 3, 1991, when the warrant was served.

III. ANALYSIS

The Division's jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). On September 5, 2001, the Division issued an En Banc Order in McNeil v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP (September 5, 2001), interpreting the breadth of its jurisdiction pursuant to Al-Shabazz. The decision holds that the Division's appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is limited to two types of cases: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing.

In this case, Campbell alleges that he is entitled to jail-time credit for service of his Georgia sentence. In a subsequent letter, Campbell alleges that the Department is violating its inmate property policy. With respect to his sentence calculation claim, I find that this tribunal has jurisdiction to hear Campbell's appeal. However, Campbell's September 14 allegations involve property. Such is not a challenge to the calculation of a sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; neither does it arise from a prison disciplinary hearing. As such, I find that this tribunal is without jurisdiction to address Campbell's property-related complaints. ⁽²⁾

As in all cases subject to appellate review by the Division, the standard of review in these inmate grievance cases is limited to the record presented. An Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment for that of an agency unless the agency's determination is affected by error of law or is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 1999); Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 380, 527 S.E.2d at 756; Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981). Moreover, to afford "meaningful judicial review," the Administrative Law Judge must "adequately explain" his decision by "documenting the findings of fact" and basing his decision on "reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record." Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 380, 527 S.E.2d at 756. In a miscalculated sentence case, the grievance procedure established by the Department, in which an inmate has the opportunity to raise the matter to prison officials and in which a reviewable record is created, satisfies the requirements of due process. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 375, 527 S.E.2d at 753. I find that the Department afforded Campbell all process that was due in these circumstances. Campbell raised the issue of his sentence calculation by filing a grievance, in which he stated his belief that he should be given credit for serving his Georgia sentence. After verifying Campbell's sentence calculation, the Warden responded by explaining that the time from February 4, 1988 to December 3, 1991 was "dead time" for which he could not be given credit. Campbell was then permitted to appeal the Warden's decision to the Department level. Afterwards, Campbell appealed the Warden's decision to the Department. In its Final Decision denying Campbell's grievance, the Department informed Campbell that he could appeal the Department's final decision to the Division. As such, I find that the Department complied with the minimal due process required in this case. Moreover, I find that there is substantial evidence that the Department correctly calculated Campbell's sentence when it refused to give him jail-house credit for service of his Georgia sentence. In his brief, Campbell argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. State, 329 S.C. 65, 495 S.E.2d 433 (1998), supports his position. ⁽³⁾ In Robinson, a convicted felon out on appeal bond left the state and, after his conviction was affirmed, was arrested and convicted of gang-related federal charges in Chicago, his federal sentence to run concurrently with his state sentence. While incarcerated in federal prison, Robinson filed a PCR application seeking credit in South Carolina for time served in federal custody. The Court held that, for purposes of calculating credit for time served, persons released on appeal bond commence service of their sentences when they submit to the custody of the Department. In addition, the Robinson Court also stated in dicta that

[a] convict may also receive credit for time served in another jurisdiction by notifying the [Department] that he is unable to personally submit to South Carolina custody to commence the service

of his sentence. Upon such notification, the [Department] will place a detainer on the convict. While the convict is subject to a South Carolina detainer, he is constructively in South Carolina custody. As a result, a convict will receive credit for time spent in another jurisdiction while subject to a South Carolina detainer.

329 S.C. at 71, 495 S.E.2d at 436-37.

Campbell argues that this passage requires the Department to credit him for the years he spent in Georgia custody because the state knew he was paroled to Georgia and was later subject to an arrest warrant and detainer of PPPS. Campbell further argues that his inability to request a speedy trial pursuant to the Interstate Detainers Act should not prevent him from receiving jail-house credit. However, the facts of Robinson are clearly distinguishable from the facts present in this case. Unlike Robinson, Campbell was not commencing his sentence, but completing his sentence after his parole was revoked. More importantly, however, there is no evidence before this tribunal that Campbell's Georgia sentences ran concurrently with his South Carolina sentence.

In short, it is clear that Robinson would apply only when a convicted felon who is absent with leave from the Department is later convicted of criminal charges in another jurisdiction and is given a sentence to run concurrently with his state sentence. Here, Campbell fails to meet at least one of these requirements; there is no evidence that the sentences he received for his Georgia crimes were to run concurrently with his South Carolina sentence. Consequently, Campbell did not resume serving his South Carolina sentence until he was returned to state custody in January 1991 and is not entitled to any jail-house credit for the period between February 4, 1988 and December 3, 1991.

IV. ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Final Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Campbell's appeal is DISMISSED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

C. DUKES SCOTT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

December 4, 2001

Columbia, South Carolina

1. Campbell attached to his Brief a copy of a document by which the state of Georgia acknowledged PPPS' detainer against him, dated June 24, 1988.

2. In addition, Campbell has produced no evidence that he has exhausted his administrative remedy with respect to the September 14 letter. He has included no Step 1 or Step 2 grievance. This tribunal may only hear an inmate's appeal of a final decision rendered by the Department. See Al-Shabazz v. State, supra.

3. Campbell also asserts that the Supreme Court's decision in Blakeney v. State, 339 S.C. 86 (2000), supports his position. However, Blakeney addresses whether a PCR applicant was entitled to jail-house credit from the date one county with a warrant for his arrest placed a "hold" on him while another county held him on unrelated charges. Given the facts of this case, Robinson, not Blakeney, is controlling.