SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant Master Mackey appeals the calculation of his sentence by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department). Having reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department must be affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was convicted of second degree burglary and began serving a four year sentence with the Department on September 17, 1999. Accordingly, without the inclusion of any sentence-related credits, Appellant's sentence would run until September 17, 2003. But, if from the start of his sentence Appellant had earned and retained the maximum amount of good-time credit available to him, he could have been released much earlier. The Department informed Appellant of this best-possible projected release date at the start of his sentence. However, while incarcerated with the DOC, Appellant has been convicted of several disciplinary violations, and consequently, he has failed to earn 80 days of good-time credit and has had an additional 140 days of good-time credit revoked. Therefore, as of January 29, 2001, the Department projected Appellant's release date as June 11, 2002.

Appellant filed a grievance regarding the Department's calculation of his sentence. The Department found his sentence to have been accurately calculated, and Appellant now appeals to this tribunal. On appeal, Appellant argues that the Department has improperly increased the length of his sentence by revising his projected release date to reflect his failure to earn, and loss of, good-time credits.

ANALYSIS

In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department in certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, a majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand, Appellant contends that the Department improperly calculated his sentence; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.

When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the Department granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off" approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's actions to ensure that inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at 757.

In the instant case, Appellant has apparently misunderstood the meaning of the projected release dates communicated to him by the Department. A projected release date is exactly that-a projection. It is not a computation of an inmate's actual sentence. The projected date is based on the assumption that the inmate not only will earn the maximum amount of sentence-related credits available to him, but also will not have those credits revoked for disciplinary infractions. Therefore, as an inmate fails to earn credits or has credits revoked as a result of disciplinary violations, his projected release date will change, and will approach the release date of his full, original sentence. By projecting an inmate's release date, the Department is merely apprising an inmate of his current status, not setting an actual release date. Thus, when the Department amends that inmate's projected release date, it is simply updating the inmate's status, not actually increasing the length of his sentence. Such is the case here. The Department has not affected the duration of Appellant's actual sentence by revising his projected release date; rather, it has merely made Appellant aware of his current status. Appellant's claim that these revised projections have impermissibly increased the length of his sentence must fail. ⁽¹⁾

Further, while Appellant has no ground upon which to challenge these revisions to his projected release date, he does have the right to challenge the disciplinary actions taken by the Department that have resulted in the loss of his good-time credits and that have caused his projected release date to change. However, as Appellant is not challenging his disciplinary convictions in this appeal, the merits of those convictions and resulting revocations of good-time credit are not before this tribunal. Appellant's only ground for appeal is that the Department has improperly increased his sentence by amending his projected release date, and, as shown above, this argument is without merit.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department's denial of Appellant's grievance is AFFIRMED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

JOHN D. GEATHERS

Administrative Law Judge

April 3, 2002

Columbia, South Carolina

1. Moreover, it is clear that Appellant has no liberty interest at stake in these revisions to his projected release date, as an inmate has no liberty interest in sentence-related credits that have not yet been earned. See Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), and holding that the mere opportunity to earn good-time credits does not constitute a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to trigger the protection of the Due Process clause).