ORDERS:
ORDER
Grievance No. KER-0232-00
This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division (“Division”) pursuant to the
appeal of Charles L. Highfill, Jr. (“Appellant”), an inmate incarcerated with the South Carolina
Department of Corrections (“Department”). On September 14, 1994, after a jury trial, Appellant was
found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and kidnapping and received a sentence of twenty four (24)
years in prison. The Hon. John Earnest Kinard, Jr., presiding judge over the trial, recommended the
earliest date for parole release for Appellant.
In his efforts to obtain such early release, Appellant participated in classes provided at the
Department from 1994 through 1999 and received certificates of completion. Also, the record is
clear that Appellant volunteered to serve as a state witness in a murder and armed robbery trial
presided over by the Hon. Daniel Pieper in July 2000. After hearing two inmates talking at the
Kershaw Correctional Institution (where he was incarcerated at the time) about killing a man in
Charleston, Appellant agreed with the Charleston, South Carolina solicitor’s office to testify against
them at trial. The solicitor promised that Appellant would be transferred to an institution in the
Columbia area. He wished to be transferred to either the Goodman or Walden Correctional
Institution, both located in the Columbia area. Apparently, Appellant wanted to be closer to his
family (his father had severe health problems) and was frightful for his safety where he was
imprisoned. Appellant alleged in his grievance that it became known to fellow inmates that he had
testified at the trial and he was being hit upon by fellow inmates for being a snitch. The issue
therefore was the request for a hardship transfer to a correctional institution in the Columbia area
where Appellant could be closer to his family and also have a more secure place to serve the
remainder of his sentence.
In its response, the Department noted that according to its policy (“SCDC Policy/Procedure
“Inmate Classification Plan”), it can advance, reduce, or maintain an inmate’s security level. OP-21.04. The Department, in its legal brief filed November 1, 2000, stated that Appellant has a recent
disciplinary conviction and that his request for a hardship transfer to an institution in the Columbia
area does not meet the criteria for those institutions. The Department apparently applied the strict
guidelines of its policy, which it has authority to do, and made no waiver for Appellant based upon
his situation.
Thereafter, the Department filed a Motion to Dismiss on August 14, 2001, alleging that
Appellant has since been transferred to the Manning Correctional Institution as of May 24, 2001 and
thus Appellant’s claim is now moot. Also, the Department argued that the Manning correctional
institution is located in the Columbia area. On August 22, 2001 this court issued an Order requiring
Appellant to respond to the Department’s Motion to Dismiss. Appellant filed a response on
September 6, 2001, acknowledging his transfer to the Manning correctional institution. However,
Appellant was afraid the Department might transfer him elsewhere. He wishes to remain at Manning
or be transferred to an institution at Columbia for safety reasons as agreed to with the solicitor from
Charleston.
It appears that the relief sought by Appellant has been complied with by the Department.
Nonetheless, it appears to this court that for safety reasons, the Department must maintain Appellant
in an institution near or in the Columbia area (where he will remain safe from any injury from fellow
inmates; to do otherwise could be a danger to the life of Appellant and could well put a damper on
any future attempts by our state to solicit testimony from inmates in criminal trials. The safety of
inmates who provide such testimony must be guaranteed where possible. Further, there has no been
no allegation by the Department that it cannot comply with the agreement reached between the
solicitor and Appellant nor that such would create an unduly difficult problem for the Department.
Since Appellant has now been transferred to the Manning correctional institution, that issue
is now moot. Our Supreme Court has held that:
“This court will not pass on moot and academic questions or make an adjudication
where there remains no actual controversy. [citation omitted]. A case becomes moot
when judgment, if rendered, will have no practical legal effect upon the existing
controversy. This is true when some event occurs making it impossible for a
reviewing court to grant effectual relief. [citation omitted].
Jones v. Dillon-Marion Human Resources Development Commission, 277 S. C. 533, 291 S. E. 2d
195 (1982), Dodge v. Dodge, 332 S. C. 401, 505 S. E. 2d 344 (Ct. App. 1998). Our courts do not
issue advisory opinions on questions for which no meaningful relief can be granted. Gainey v.
Gainey, 279 S. C. 68, 301 S. E. 2d 763 (1998).
This court concludes that justice would be served if Appellant serves the remainder of his time
for his conviction at an institution in the Columbia area, pending of course no further charges or
convictions which would mandate his incarceration elsewhere.
ORDER
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Department must keep Appellant at an institution in the general area of
Columbia, South Carolina pending service of his sentence and it is further
ORDERED that the Department must exercise all caution to ensure the safety of Appellant
during his continued confinement; and it is further
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________________
Marvin F. Kittrell
Chief Administrative Law Judge
April 29, 2003
Columbia, South Carolina |