ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This
matter comes before the Administrative Law Court (“ALC” or “Court”) pursuant to
the notice of appeal filed by inmate Cecil Mitchell (“Inmate” or “Appellant”),
an inmate incarcerated with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”
or “Department”) since January 12, 1994, after he was convicted of armed
robbery. In his grievance, Appellant specifically requests “the prevailing
wages at the rate of eleven to fourteen dollars”, overtime pay, and return of
all funds removed for victim assistance.
The
Department denied Inmate’s grievances at the Step1 and Step 2 levels based on
the contention that Inmate is not an “employee” of Kwalu as defined in Section
24-3-430 because Inmate’s labor was performed “in this prison industries project
inside the walls of Ridgeland CI.”
DISCUSSION
The
Court's jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision
of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C.
354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). The Court's appellate jurisdiction in inmate
appeals is limited to state created liberty interests typically involving: (1)
cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases
in which an inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary hearing as a
result of a serious rule violation. Id. However, the South Carolina Supreme
Court recognizes a limited Administrative Law Court jurisdictional exception
“where inmate claims deprivation of property interest.” Slezak v. SC Dep’t
of Corr., 361 S.C. 327, 330, 605 S.E.2d 506, 507 (2004) (citing Wicker
v. SC Dep’t of Corr., 360 S.C. 421, 602 S.E.2d 56 (2004)). This case
involves an inmate claiming deprivation of a property interest. The facts of
this case are similar to the facts in Wicker. Therefore, this Court has
jurisdiction over this appeal.
Prevailing
Wage
Inmate
claims he is entitled to the prevailing wage at a rate of eleven to fourteen
dollars per hour for the time he worked for Kwalu. Wicker makes it
clear “that there is nothing in the statutory scheme authorizing the DOC to
pay…a training wage less than the prevailing wage.” Wicker, 360 S.C. at
425, 602 S.E.2d at 58. S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-430(D) (Supp. 2004) states, “No
inmate participating in the (prison industry) program may earn less than the
prevailing wage for work of similar nature in the private sector.”
The
Department denied Inmate’s grievances at the Step 1 and Step 2 levels based on
the contention that Inmate is not an “employee” of Kwalu as defined in Section
24-3-430 because Inmate’s labor was performed “in this prison industries
project inside the walls of Ridgeland CI.”
The
Department admits that Kwalu was a prison industries project when it denied the
inmate the prevailing wage. The Department was incorrect in denying inmate the
prevailing wage for the above stated reason because such a situation is clearly
contemplated by the statute. Section 24-3-430(B) provides:
The director may
enter into contracts necessary to implement this program. The contractual
agreements may include rental or lease agreements for state buildings or
portions of them on the grounds of an institution or a facility of the
Department of Corrections and provide for reasonable access to and egress from
the building to establish and operate a facility.
S.C. Code Ann. §
24-3-430(B) (Supp. 2004). Therefore, the Department owes Inmate the difference
between the prevailing wage and the wage actually received for time Inmate worked
for Kwalu. The prevailing wage is $5.25 per hour, not the eleven to fourteen
dollars per hour that Appellant requests. Wicker at 360 S.C. at 426,
602 S.E.2d at 56.
Overtime
There
is no language in S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-430 (Supp. 2004) authorizing or
requiring the payment of overtime wages. Wicker does not address this
issue either. See Wicker, supra. The intent of Section
24-3-430 is to prevent unfair competition. Adkins v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr.,
360 S.C. 413, 418, 602 S.E.2d 51, 54 (2004). This intent is satisfied without
the payment of overtime wages. Therefore, Inmate is not entitled to overtime
wages.
“Room
and Board” and “Victim Assistance”
Inmate
requests that he be reimbursed for the wages deducted for room and board and
victim assistance. Inmate claims these deductions were made in violation of
Article 12, Section 2 of the South Carolina Constitution. However, these
deductions are allowed and required by the South Carolina Code. S.C. Code Ann.
§ 24-3-40 (Supp. 2004). Therefore Inmate will not be reimbursed for the wages
deducted for room and board and victim assistance.
ORDER
IT
IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department determine from its records the
number of hours Inmate was paid a training wage for hours worked in the Prison
Industries System.
IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department calculate the wages owed to
Inmate at the prevailing wage ($5.25 per hour) and to pay Inmate the difference
between the wages owed and the wages paid within thirty (30) days of the date
of this Order.
IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department provide proof to this Court that
payment to Inmate has been made within five (5) days of the date of payment.
IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the Department denies payment to Inmate Edwards,
that the Department provide documentation to the Court within thirty (30) days
of the date of this order substantiating the denial of payment.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
John D. McLeod
Administrative Law Judge
January 9, 2006
Columbia, South Carolina |