ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or
Court) pursuant to the appeal of Carlos Dennison, an inmate incarcerated with
the Department of Corrections (Department). Appellant Dennison was convicted
of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 822, Sexual Misconduct. As a result of
his conviction, Dennison lost thirty (30) days of “good-time” credit. Dennison
filed a grievance with the Department and received the Department’s final decision
on November 29, 2004. On December 17, 2004, Dennison filed this appeal.
BACKGROUND
On July
2, 2004, Officer Brown was conducting an inmate count on Unit A-wing at
Ridgeland Correctional Institution. When she approached cell # 38, Officer
Brown observed the Appellant sitting on the toilet with his penis exposed
masturbating. When Officer Brown looked at the Appellant, he was looking
directly back at her “with a big smile on his face.” After the incident, Officer
Brown completed an Incident Report and the Appellant was charged with violating
SCDC Disciplinary Code § 822, Sexual Misconduct. The Appellant received
written notice of the charge on July 6, 2004.
On July
22, 2004, a Major Disciplinary Hearing was held before a Department
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) concerning the Sexual Misconduct charge. At
the Appellant’s request, he was provided a counsel substitute. Additionally,
at his request, Officer Brown was present at the hearing. During the hearing,
the DHO read a narrative of Officer Brown’s Incident Report into the Record and
received testimony from the Appellant and Officer Brown as evidence. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the DHO found the Appellant guilty of Sexual
Misconduct and sanctioned him with the loss of thirty (30) days of good-time
credit. After the hearing, the DHO completed a Major Disciplinary Report and
Hearing Record which documented the DHO’s findings.
The
Appellant filed a grievance appealing his conviction of violating SCDC
Disciplinary Code § 822. After reviewing his allegation, the Warden denied the
Appellant’s grievance. Appellant Dennison then appealed the Warden’s decision
asking that the Department reverse his loss of “good-time” credits. The
Department denied his grievance, stating that the evidence supported the
conviction and that the sanction imposed was appropriate for the violation committed.
This appeal followed. In his Appeal Brief, the Appellant argues that:
1. The
evidence failed to establish that he committed the above infraction; and
2. He was not provided due process because his counsel
substitute and the DHO did not fully question his accuser
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The
Court’s jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision
of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C.
354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). The Court’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate
appeals is limited to state created liberty interests typically involving: (1)
cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated
his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in
which an inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary hearing as a
result of a serious rule violation. Id.
When
reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the Court
sits in an appellate capacity. Id. at 756. Consequently, the review in
these inmate grievance cases is limited to the Record presented. An
Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment for that of an agency
“as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1‑23‑380(A)(6)
(Supp. 2003). Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may not reverse or
modify an agency’s decision unless substantial rights of the Appellant have
been prejudiced because the decision is clearly erroneous in view of the
substantial evidence on the whole Record, arbitrary or affected by an error of
law. See Section 1-23-380(A)(6); See also Marietta
Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety, 337 S.C. 133, 522
S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1999); South Carolina Dept. of Labor, Licensing and
Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 503 S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1998).
“‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence
viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering
the Record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion
that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify
its action.” Lark v. Bi‑Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306
(1981). Accordingly, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from
being supported by substantial evidence. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Additionally,
in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 456, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the
relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could
support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” In making that
determination, the Court is not required to examine the entire record,
independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or weigh the evidence. Id.
Moreover, in Al-Shabazz,
the Court underscored that since prison officials are in the best position to
decide inmate disciplinary matters, the Courts and therefore this tribunal
adhere to a “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and
procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz at
757; See also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d
779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of South Carolina
courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy).
In this case, the Appellant alleges that the Department
should not have revoked his thirty (30) days of accrued good time. Inmates
have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when, as here, the Department
revokes an inmate’s good-time credits as punishment in a “major disciplinary
hearing” involving “more serious rule violations,” prison officials must
provide that inmate with “minimal due process.” Al-Shabazz at 750.
Consequently, specific administrative procedures must be followed before
depriving an inmate of statutorily granted earned credit, including adequate
advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in which the
inmate can present witnesses and documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing
officer who prepares a written statement of all the evidence presented and the
reasons for his decision. Id. at 751 (citing Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974)).
DISCUSSION
Due
Process
I
find that the Appellant was afforded all process due him pursuant to Al-Shabazz.
The Record indicates that the Appellant received written notice of the charges
against him in excess of twenty-four (24) hours prior to a hearing that was
held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. At the hearing, the
Appellant was given the opportunity to offer evidence, call witnesses, and
confront his accuser. In addition,
although not constitutionally required, the Appellant was afforded a counsel
substitute who assisted him in his defense. After the DHO determined that the
Appellant was guilty of the charged offense, he prepared a written report stating
the evidence he relied upon and the penalty assessed in finding the Appellant
guilty of the disciplinary infraction. Finally, as evinced here, the Appellant
was permitted to appeal the DHO’s decision through the inmate grievance
process.
Substantial
Evidence
I also find that there is substantial evidence to support the
Appellant's conviction of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 822, Sexual
Misconduct. In evaluating the evidence presented at the hearing, “[t]he fact
finder is imbued with broad discretion in determining credibility or
believability of witnesses.” Small v. Pioneer Machinery, Inc., 329 S.C.
448, 465, 494 S.E.2d 835, 843 (Ct. App. 1997). A Section 822 violation is: “(1)
Engaging in sexual acts or intimate physical contact of a sexual nature alone
or with others; or (2) indecent and/or unnecessary exposure of private body
parts; or (3) soliciting sexual acts from others.” Here, the Record
clearly supports the facts recited in the “Background” portion of this Order.
Those facts establish that the Appellant was engaging in a sexual act and indecently
exposed a private body part. Consequently, the Record establishes substantial
evidence that the Appellant violated Code Section 822.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE
ORDERED that the appeal of the Appellant is DISMISSED and the Final
Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED;
AND IT IS SO
ORDERED.
_________________________________
Ralph
King Anderson, III
Administrative
Law Judge
April 21, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina |