ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
This
matter is an appeal by the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (“Department”)
from a Final Order and Decision of the South Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle
Hearings (“DMVH”) issued May 24, 2007. The DMVH’s Final Order and Decision was
issued following an administrative hearing held pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §
56-1-1030 (Supp. 2007). The Department contends that the DMVH Hearing Officer
erroneously determined that Respondent Mike B. Hollingsworth (“Hollingsworth”) had
not been convicted of three separate traffic violations in a three-year time
period, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 (2006). The Administrative Law
Court (“ALC”) has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann.
§ 1-23-660 (Supp. 2007). Upon consideration of the briefs, the DMVH’s Final
Order and Decision is reversed.
background
By letter dated February 5, 2007, the Department
notified Hollingsworth that he was being declared a habitual offender, pursuant
to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1030, based on Hollingsworth’s having committed three
major traffic violations within a three-year period. In accordance with S.C.
Code Ann. § 56-1-1090(a) (Supp. 2007), Hollingsworth’s driver’s license was
suspended for a five-year period beginning March 7, 2007, and ending March
7, 2012.
On
March 6, 2007, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1030, Hollingsworth filed a
petition with the DMVH contesting his habitual offender suspension. As
evidence of
Hollingsworth’s three traffic violations, the Department submitted a copy of Hollingsworth’s
ten-year driving record, as well as copies of the three tickets for each of
Hollingsworth’s alleged traffic violations. One of the three tickets, dated
January 9, 2005, for the offense of Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”),
contained ambiguous markings, including one checked box indicating “not guilty,”
and another checked box indicating that the hearing for that particular ticket
was held in family court.
An
administrative hearing regarding Hollingsworth’s petition was held on April 5,
2007. On May 24, 2007, the DMVH Hearing Officer issued a Final Order and
Decision in which she ordered that Hollingsworth’s driver’s license be reinstated.
Specifically, the DMVH Hearing Officer stated:
[T]he evidence does not show that the
Respondent, Mike B. Hollingsworth . . . committed three (3) separate and
distinct major traffic violations within a three (3) year period . . . . In
this case, ticket number 1805DE that was submitted by the DMV as their evidence
to declare the Respondent an habitual offender can not be used to declare him
as a habitual offender, in that, it is clearly marked as a not guilty verdict.
As well as, it is not clear what tribunal presided over the matter, whether the
Respondent appeared or whether the matter was decided by a trial officer or jury.
There is no certified documentation from the Petitioner or the presiding court
of any clerical errors, if any, or any certified explanation as to the notation
that was written on the back of said ticket. Therefore, I find the
Petitioner’s evidence is not competent evidence.
The Department
now appeals.
ISSUE
ON APPEAL
Did the DMVH Hearing Officer err in rescinding Hollingsworth’s
habitual offender suspension because of the ambiguous copy of the ticket evidencing
Hollingsworth’s third traffic violation?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
DMVH is authorized by law to determine contested cases arising from the
Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2007). Therefore, the
DMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review
governs appeals from decisions of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A) (Supp. 2007); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385
(1995). The standard used by appellate bodies—including the ALC—to review
agency decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2007) (directing administrative law judges
to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in § 1-23-380(A)). This section provides:
The court may not
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency
or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify
the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are:
(a) in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in
excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made
upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected
by other error of law;
(e) clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary
or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(5).
Thus,
pursuant to the APA, this court’s review is limited to deciding whether the
DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is
affected by an error of law. Bass v. Kenco Group, 366 S.C. 450, 457,
622 S.E.2d 577, 581 (Ct. App. 2005). Substantial evidence is not a mere
scintilla of evidence, nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the
case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow
reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the agency reached in order to justify
its action. Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 360 S.C. 276, 289, 599
S.E.2d 604, 611 (Ct. App. 2004). The possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency’s findings from being
supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 290, 599 S.E.2d at 611. The
party challenging an agency’s decision has the burden of proving convincingly
that the agency’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters
v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm’n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d
913, 917 (1996).
DISCUSSION
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 provides
that an individual will be found to be a habitual offender where the individual
has received three convictions within a three-year period for violations
consisting of the following:
a. Voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter or
reckless homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;
b. Operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotics or drugs;
c. Driving or operating a motor vehicle in a reckless manner;
d. Driving a motor vehicle while his license, permit, or
privilege to drive a motor vehicle has been suspended or revoked, except a
conviction for driving under suspension for failure to file proof of financial
responsibility;
e. Any offense punishable as a felony under the motor vehicle
laws of this State or any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is
used;
f. Failure of the driver of a motor
vehicle involved in any accident resulting in the death or injury of any person
to stop close to the scene of such accident and report his identity.
S.C.
Code Ann. § 56-1-1020. The Department argues that the ticket
evidencing Hollingsworth’s January 9, 2005 DUI charge appeared ambiguous only
because the ticket had been made using carbon copies, and not all carbon copies
were aligned at the time it was filled out, causing check boxes to appear empty
or the checks to appear in the wrong box on the form. To further demonstrate
this, the Department submitted a copy of the reverse side of this ticket, ticket
number 1805DE, which contained a handwritten notation of “should be guilty,”
which was signed by the presiding magistrate and dated March 14, 2005—the date
of Hollingsworth’s hearing for this ticket. The copy of this ticket also shows
that Hollingsworth was required to pay a $1025 fine, which would clearly not have
been imposed if Hollingsworth had been found not guilty of the offense. Moreover,
the certified copy of Hollingsworth’s ten-year driving record unequivocally
states that Hollingsworth was convicted of his January 9, 2005, DUI offense on
March 14, 2005. The Record also contains a written statement from
Hollingsworth, in which he states that his “first offense was the DUI in March
of 2005.” Hollingsworth goes on to describe the sanctions he received for that
offense, such as a provisional license, counseling, and SR-22 insurance.
Thus,
the only reasonable conclusion from the evidence presented, viewing the Record
as a whole, is that Hollingsworth was convicted of the January 2005 offense.
The DMVH Hearing Officer erred in finding that Hollingsworth had not been
convicted of three traffic violations within a three-year period in that she
ignored Hollingsworth’s admission of the March 2005 conviction and the certified
copy of Hollingsworth’s ten-year driving record; even if the Hearing Officer
rejected the evidence of the ticket for the March 2005 conviction due to its
apparent ambiguity, her decision failed to consider all of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence in the Record. Viewing the Record thusly,
the only reasonable conclusion is that the Department met its burden of proving
Hollingsworth’s violations. For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is REVERSED and Hollingsworth’s
suspension is reinstated.
IT
IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Paige J. Gossett
Administrative
Law Judge
May 22, 2008
Columbia, South Carolina
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