ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
This appeal by the South Carolina Department of Motor
Vehicles (Department) arises from an Order of Dismissal of the South Carolina
Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings (DMVH) issued following a hearing held
pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-351 (2006). The Department claims that the
DMVH hearing officer erroneously rescinded the suspensions of Respondent’s driving
and registration privileges. The Administrative Law Court (ALC) has
jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp.
2006). Upon review of this matter, the DMVH’s Amended Order of Dismissal is reversed,
and this matter is remanded to the DMVH for a new hearing.
BACKGROUND
On March
17, 2006, the Department sent Respondent written notice that, as a result of a
motor vehicle accident that occurred on March 8, 2005, his driving and registration
privileges in South Carolina would be suspended pursuant to Section 56-9-351. Respondent
requested a hearing to challenge the suspension, which was held on May 16,
2006. On May 16, 2006, the DMVH hearing officer issued an Order of Dismissal,
pursuant to ALC Rule 23, in which he rescinded Respondent’s suspension. Specifically,
the DMVH hearing officer found that “[t]here was no evidence/testimony
corroborating that the Respondent’s vehicle had been involved in an
accident/collision.” The Department appeals the DMVH’s Order of Dismissal.
ISSUE
ON APPEAL
Did the DMVH hearing officer err by
dismissing this case on the grounds that “[t]here was no testimony/evidence
corroborating that the Respondent’s vehicle had been involved in an
accident/collision”?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
DMVH is authorized by law to determine contested cases arising from the
Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Therefore, the
DMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review
governs appeals from decisions of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380 (Supp. 2006); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385
(1995). The standard used by appellate bodies, including the ALC, to review
agency decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006).
This section provides:
The court may not
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency
or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify
the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are:
(a) in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in
excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made
upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected
by other error of law;
(e) clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006).
DISCUSSION
The statute at issue
here, Section 56-9-351, provides:
Within sixty days of
receipt of a report of a motor vehicle accident within this State which has
resulted in bodily injury or death or damage to the property of any one person
in the amount of two hundred dollars or more, the Department of Motor Vehicles
shall suspend the license of each operator or driver if he is the owner of the
motor vehicle involved in the accident and all registrations of each owner of a
motor vehicle involved in the accident. If the operator or driver is a
nonresident, the privilege of operating a motor vehicle within this State and
the privilege of the use within this State of a motor vehicle owned by him is
suspended unless the operator, driver or owner, or both, deposits security in a
sum not less than two hundred dollars or an additional amount as the department
may specify that will be sufficient to satisfy a judgment that may be recovered
for damages resulting from the accident which may be recovered against the
operator or owner. Notice of the suspension must be sent by the department to
the operator and owner at least ten days before the effective date of the
suspension and shall state the amount required as security.
S.C. Code Ann. §
56-9-351 (2006). Here, the Department argues that the DMVH hearing officer
erred by rescinding the suspensions of Respondent’s driving and registration
privileges. Specifically, the Department argues that the hearing officer erred
by shifting the burden of proof to the Department and failing to access
appropriate documents. While I find those arguments unavailing for the same
reasons fully set forth in numerous orders of the ALC in other cases where this
issue has been raised, I find the matter must nonetheless be reversed based on
the letter from Wilber & Associates as attorney for Motors Insurance Group
for the insured Hampton Auto. This letter was contained in the file and
clearly before the DMVH hearing officer. DMV’s file erroneously lists Wilber
& Associates as attorneys for Martin, when they clearly were not but
instead requested that the Department pursue suspension against his license and
registration. Interestingly, the Department’s brief does not even argue this letter
or mention it. Respondent has not retained counsel and has not filed a brief
with this court.
This
item in the Record clearly demonstrates that the DMVH received the letter on January
30, 2006, which showed that a vehicle belonging to Respondent had been involved
in an accident on March 8, 2005 that caused $18,262.76 worth of damage that the
insurance company had paid. The letter requests the Department to advise
whether there was liability insurance and, if not, to proceed to suspend
license and/or registration. Therefore, the DMVH hearing officer’s finding
that “there was no evidence/testimony corroborating that the Respondent’s
vehicle had been involved in an accident/collision” was clearly erroneous. While
scant, this letter provides some evidence that the accident occurred, and that
Sean Martin was the owner/driver, albeit the address provided for him on the
letter is different from that provided on the notice and all other documents.
However, at that point, the burden of proof shifted to Martin to prove, if he
could, that he had not been involved in the accident at issue. The date of the
accident on the letter is the same as the date of accident in the notice of
suspension.
Accordingly,
the DMVH’s Amended Order of Dismissal is reversed and, because this case was
summarily dismissed without a full hearing, this matter is remanded to the DMVH
for a new hearing.
ORDER
IT
IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the DMVH’s Amended Order of Dismissal is REVERSED,
and that this matter is remanded to the DMVH for a new hearing.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
JOHN D. GEATHERS
October 15, 2007 Administrative
Law Judge
Columbia, South Carolina 1205
Pendleton Street, Suite 224
Columbia, South Carolina 29201-3731
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