ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (“ALJD”) pursuant to S.C.
Code Ann. §12-60-2540 (2000) and S. C. Code Ann. §§1-23-310 et seq. (Supp. 2003) for a contested
case hearing. The Petitioners, Furman T. and Shelvy G. Peterman (“Petitioners”), contests the
Spartanburg County Assessor (“Assessor”)’s valuation of certain real property, identified as Tax
Map No. 7-13-14-040.00, for the 2003 tax year. After notice to the parties, a hearing was conducted
on April 5, 2003. Based on the evidence, I find that the proper valuation of Petitioners’ property for
the 2003 tax year is $204,000.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the evidence presented and taking into account the credibility of the witnesses, I
make the following findings of fact:
1.Notice of the date, time, place, and nature of the hearing was timely given to all
parties.
2.Petitioners own property located at 115 Pheasant Drive in Spartanburg, South
Carolina, Tax Map No. 7-13-14-040.00.
3.Jeff Parris, (“Appraiser”), an appraiser for the Assessor, prepared an appraisal of
Petitioners’ property and valued it at $204,000 for the 2003 tax year. Petitioners appealed the
assessed value of $204,000 to the Spartanburg County Board of Assessment Appeals (“Board”). The
Board found that the property should be assessed at $204,000.
4.Petitioner appealed the Board’s decision to the ALJD. Petitioners do not argue the
fair market value of the property; rather, Petitioners argue that houses in Spartanburg are not
appraised in a uniform fashion, and that their house has been inequitably assessed much higher than
houses in the surrounding area. Petitioners request that the assessed value of their property be
reduced to a value between $173,000 and $186,000.
5.Petitioners presented data regarding the assessed values of a number of other homes
in their neighborhood, reflecting that other homes had less of an increase for improvements as well
as less of an overall increase in value than their home. In Petitioners’ opinion, Petitioners’ home
should not reflect as much of an increase in value for improvements as the homes of many of their
neighbors.
6.The Uniform Residential Appraisal Report prepared by the Assessor describes the
three most comparable sales to the subject property. The Assessor properly gave consideration to
site, construction quality, age, condition, size, and heat type in his estimate of market value of
Petitioner’s property as of December 31, 2002. According to the Assessor, other homes in
Petitioners’ neighborhood which were not noted in Petitioners’ data have increased in assessed value
more than Petitioners’ homes. Although the Assessor did not prepare a Uniform Residential
Appraisal Report for the homes Petitioners pointed to in order to compare their values with
Petitioners’ value, the Assessor testified that differences in values can be attributed not only to the
age and style of a particular home, but also to the manner in which a home is maintained and whether
or not it is kept in good repair.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2540 (2000) authorizes the South Carolina Administrative
Law Judge Division to hear contested cases arising from controversies involving the valuation of real
properties by county assessors.
2.S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-210 (2000) defines property subject to taxation in South
Carolina as “all real and personal property in this State.” All such property must be assessed uniformly
and equitably throughout the State pursuant to regulations promulgated by the S.C. Department of
Revenue. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-210(A) (Supp. 2003). “All taxes upon property, real and personal,
shall be laid upon the actual value of the property taxed.” S.C. Const. Art. III § 29.
3.S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-217 (2000) provides, in part, that “once every fifth year each
county or the State shall appraise and equalize those properties under its jurisdiction. Property
valuation must be complete at the end of December of the fourth year . . . .”
4.“While our constitution requires equality and uniformity in tax assessments,
‘[a]bsolute accuracy with respect to valuation and complete equality and uniformity are not
practically attainable.’” Reliance Ins. Co. v. Smith, 327 S.C. 528, 537, 489 S.E.2d 674, 679 (Ct.
App. 1997) (quoting Wasson v. Mayes, 252 S.C. 497, 502, 167 S.E.2d 304, 306-07 (1969)).
5.A taxpayer may appeal a property tax assessment made by a county board of
assessment by requesting a contested case hearing before the ALJD. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2540(A) (2000). As the party contesting the assessing authority’s valuation, the taxpayer has the
burden of proving the actual value of the property at issue. See Reliance, 327 S.C. at 534-35, 489
S.E.2d at 677. Thus, in this case, the Petitioners have the burden of proving the correctness of the
valuation they are seeking, which is a figure between $173,000 and $186,000. Because this
proceeding is in the nature of a de novo hearing, the Administrative Law Judge is not sitting in an
appellate capacity and therefore is not restricted to a review of the decision below. Id. at 534, 489
S.E.2d at 677. Findings of fact shall be based exclusively on the evidence and on matters officially
noticed. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-320(i) (Supp. 2003).
6.S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-90 (2000) provides that all counties shall have an assessor,
whose responsibility is appraising and listing all real property. One of the duties of the assessor is to
“determine assessments and reassessments of real property in a manner that the ratio of assessed
value to fair market value is uniform throughout the county.” S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-90(d) (2000).7.In S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 12-37-930 (Supp. 2003) the legislature set forth how property
must be valued as follows:
All property must be valued for taxation at its true value in money which in all cases
is the price which the property would bring following reasonable exposure to the
market, where both the seller and the buyer are willing, are not acting under
compulsion, and are reasonably well informed as to the uses and purposes for which it
is adapted and for which it is capable of being used.
Therefore, fair market value is the measure of true value for taxation purposes. Lindsay v. S.C. Tax
Comm’n, 302 S.C. 504, 397 S.E.2d 95 (1990).
8.The purchase price of property, while not conclusive, is some evidence of its value.
Belk Dep’t Stores v. Taylor, 259 S.C. 174, 179, 191 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1972).
9.While not conclusive, market sales of comparable properties present persuasive
evidence of fair market value of similar property. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 512 (2001).
10.In estimating the value of property, all of its elements or incidents which affect market
value or would influence the mind of a purchaser should be considered, such as location, quality,
condition, and use. 1969-70 Op. S.C. Att’y Gen., No. 3045 at 337; see also 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 511
(2001). Appraisal, of course, is not an exact science, and the precise weight to be given to any one
factor is necessarily a matter of judgment.
11.The Petitioners in this case did not present any argument as to what the fair market
value of the property in question is. Rather, Petitioners’ argument is that their property has been
inequitably assessed on the high side in comparison to houses in the surrounding area.
12.With regard to Petitioners’ assertion that Assessor is treating them inequitably,
Petitioners have the burden of proving that Assessor intentionally and systematically undervalued
other properties while theirs is valued at fair market value. See Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield
Tp, 247 U.S. 350 (1918). The burden of proving an intentional and systematic undervaluation rests
with the complaining party. Id. To meet the taxpayer’s burden, more than a mere showing that other
properties are undervalued must be shown. Owen Steel Co. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 287 S.C. 274,
278-79, 337 S.E.2d 880, 882-3 (1985). The evidence must establish that the undervaluation is not
the result of a mere judgment call, but rather that the undervaluation is the result of an intentional
and systematic undervaluation. Petitioners have failed to establish that other properties in the
general area of their own property are undervalued due to Assessor’s intentional and systematic
undervaluation of them.
ORDER
Based on the above findings of fact and conclusions of law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the 2003 tax year, the value of Petitioners’ property
at 115 Pheasant Drive in Spartanburg, South Carolina, is $204,000.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
________________________________________
C. DUKES SCOTT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
April 20, 2004
Columbia, South Carolina |
