South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
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SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
Sahar Abdullah-Wasi vs. SCDSS

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Social Services

PARTIES:
Petitioner/Appellant:
Sahar Abdullah-Wasi

Respondents:
South Carolina Department of Social Services
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
97-ALJ-18-0142-AP

APPEARANCES:
Milton G. Kimpson, Esquire, for Appellant

Celeste Moore, Esquire, for Respondent
 

ORDERS:

REVERSED

This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division ("Division") pursuant to the appeal of Sahar Abdullah-Wasi ("Appellant") from a decision of the Fair Hearing Committee of the South Carolina Department of Social Services ("Department") which denied Appellant's application for benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program for her nephew, Dawud Tarleyb, on the ground that Appellant had not provided sufficient documentation of her relationship to her nephew. A hearing was conducted on July 21, 1997, at which time oral arguments were heard on the merits of the appeal. For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the Fair Hearing Committee is reversed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Department is the state agency charged with administering the AFDC program, as provided for in Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, in the State of South Carolina. On September 25, 1996, Appellant applied for AFDC benefits for her nephew, Dawud Tarleyb, who was residing with her. As part of the application process, the Department's caseworker requested that Appellant furnish documentation relating to the birth and custody of the child, as well as documentation of Appellant's relationship to the child. In response to this request, Appellant furnished the Department with copies of her nephew's birth certificate, showing that he was the son of Zaimah Hasan; a notarized statement from Zaimah Hasan, giving Bertha Merrick power of attorney in all matters concerning Dawud; a court order awarding custody of Dawud to Bertha Merrick, his great-aunt; a copy of Bertha Merrick's birth certificate, and a copy of the birth certificate of Appellant's mother, Etta Mae Merrick, showing that Bertha Merrick and Etta Mae Merrick were sisters; two signed and notarized statements by Bertha Merrick, giving temporary custody of Dawud Tarleyb to the Appellant and stating that Appellant is Dawud's aunt; and a copy of Appellant's birth certificate. The birth certificate submitted by Appellant shows that her birth name was Cecelia Ann Cassemere and that her mother was Etta Merrick. The birth name was stricken through and the name "Sahar Abdullah-Wasi" was handwritten in above the birth name. However, there were also other notations on the face of the birth certificate concerning the name change--a partially stamped, partially handwritten notation stating "Child name changed by court order 9/28/84," with the name "W. Price Deputy City Registrar," and another stamped notation stating "Changes Approved By Comm'r of Health." The name change was the only change on the face of the certificate.

The Department's caseworker informed Appellant that she could not accept the birth certificate as verification of Appellant's relationship to her nephew, because the certificate appeared to have been altered. The Appellant stated that the alterations had been made by officials in New York, and that the certificate in the form submitted to the Department was exactly as she had received it from the Department of Health of the City of New York. In support of her assertion, she brought the original document to the Department, which bore the same alterations and notations mentioned above, as well as the raised seal of the Department of Health of the City of New York. The Department maintained that this birth certificate was insufficient evidence of Appellant's relationship with her nephew, and requested that Appellant furnish collateral statements of people who knew her before and after her name change. Appellant refused to provide any such statements because she felt that she had already provided sufficient information to establish her eligibility for benefits.

The Department denied Appellant's request for AFDC benefits on October 15, 1996. Thereafter, Appellant requested a fair hearing from the Department. The hearing was held on December 20, 1996, and the Fair Hearing Committee of the Department upheld the denial of Appellant's application in its Final Administrative Decision, received by Appellant on March 24, 1997. Appellant's notice of appeal of the Department's decision was filed with the Division on March 27, 1997.



STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the findings and conclusions of an agency, the Administrative Law Judge Division is limited to determining whether substantial rights of the Appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6)(e) (Supp. 1996). In accordance with the foregoing provision, the Department's decision may only be set aside if unsupported by "substantial evidence." "'Substantial evidence' is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action." Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981).

DISCUSSION

In this case, the Fair Hearing Committee concluded that the Department acted properly in determining that Appellant's birth certificate, along with the other documentation she had furnished the caseworker, was insufficient evidence of her relationship to her nephew, and that the Department properly denied Appellant's application for AFDC benefits. I find that this determination is not supported by the substantial evidence in the record. The AFDC/FS Policy Manual, which is used by the Department in determining eligibility for benefits, provides that documentary evidence is the preferred method of verification for eligibility, and that collateral contacts should be used only when documentary evidence cannot be obtained or is insufficient. AFDC/FS Policy Manual, Section 1.16.01. The Committee's decision is based solely on the Appellant's refusal to provide collateral statements of persons who knew her before and after her name change, without consideration of the adequacy of the documentation provided by Appellant in support of her application.

A review of the evidence before the Committee indicates that Appellant had provided undisputed documentation that Dawud Tarleyb was the great nephew of Bertha Merrick, and that Bertha Merrick and Etta Mae Merrick were sisters. The only disputed document was the Appellant's birth certificate, which provided that Etta Mae Merrick was Appellant's mother. In rejecting the birth certificate as proof of Appellant's identity as the aunt of Dawud Tarleyb, the Department focused on the fact that the Appellant's birth name had been stricken through and her present name had been written in. The Department totally ignored the other notations on the face of the certificate, which stated "Child Name Changed by Court Order 9/28/84" and "Changes Approved by Comm'r of Health." The existence of these notations is wholly inconsistent with the Department's apparent conclusion that the name change was not part of the original certificate. In addition, the Department disregarded the fact that the original document provided by the Appellant, which contained the handwritten name change as well as the other notations, bore the raised seal of the Department of Health of the City of New York and stated that it was a true copy of a record on file with that department. Therefore, the birth certificate, along with the other documents provided by the Appellant, was sufficient documentation of Appellant's relationship to her nephew, and collateral statements were not required. The Appellant's refusal to provide statements which were not necessary to establish her eligibility for benefits is accordingly of no consequence and the Department improperly denied the Appellant's application. I therefore find that the decision of the Fair Hearing Committee is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record of this case.

ORDER

Based upon the record and the applicable law, the Order of the Fair Hearing Committee is reversed and the Department is ordered to approve Appellant's application for AFDC benefits as of September 25, 1996.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.







___________________________________

Marvin F. Kittrell

Chief Judge



Columbia, South Carolina

September 25, 1997


Brown Bldg.

 

 

 

 

 

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