ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant
to the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d
742 (2000). Appellant Scott Sperico appeals the calculation of the time he has served on his sentences
by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department). Having reviewed the record,
applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the
Department must be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On December 31, 2002, Appellant filed two grievances with the Department regarding the
calculation of the time he has served on his sentences. Because, as of May 7, 2003, the Department had
not responded to his grievances, Appellant requested that this tribunal review the sentence-related issues
raised in his grievances. In this matter, Appellant contends that the Department has failed to properly
credit him with approximately 950 days of time served. In particular, Appellant argues his service credits
should include:
(1)157 days for time served in jail between June 1995 and November 1995 prior to his conviction;
(2)35 days for time served on probation from November 1995 to December 1995;
(3)334 days for time served while constructively in South Carolina’s custody in Florida between January 1996 and December 1996;
(4)148 days for time served on probation in the Spartanburg Restitution Center between April 1997 and August 1997; and
(5)275 days for time served while constructively in South Carolina’s custody in Florida between December 1997 and September 1998.
See Appellant’s Brief at 1. While the Department concedes that Appellant is entitled to some of the
service credits he claims, and has granted Appellant appropriate credit for that service, the Department
has denied certain other claims made by Appellant. This Order will address each claim.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final
decisions of the Department in certain “non-collateral” or administrative matters by appealing those
decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act. Al-Shabazz, 338
S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. The Court further found that the Division’s jurisdiction to hear such
matters is “typically” limited to cases where an inmate is disciplined and the punishment imposed affects
the inmate’s state-created liberty interests and cases where an inmate believes the Department has
erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status. Id. at 369-370, 527
S.E.2d at 750. Subsequently, in Sullivan v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrections, 355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124
(2003), the Court held that, under Al-Shabazz, the ALJD also has jurisdiction to hear cases where an
inmate challenges a condition of his confinement that implicates a state-created liberty interest.
Id. at
443, 586 S.E.2d at 127. In the case at hand, Appellant contends that the Department improperly
calculated the time he has served on his sentence; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this
matter.
When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an
appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal’s
review of inmate appeals is confined to the record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is
primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has granted aggrieved inmates the process they
are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750; Sullivan, 355 S.C.
at 443, 586 S.E.2d at 127. Further, recognizing that prison officials are in the best position to decide
inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional “hands off” approach to internal
prison disciplinary policies and other internal prison affairs when reviewing inmate appeals under the
APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266
S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of South Carolina courts regarding
internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this deferential standard of review, this
tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department’s actions to ensure that inmate grievances
are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at
757.
In the case at hand, the Department agrees that Appellant is entitled to credit for the time he
served in the Pickens County Jail between his arrest on June 11, 1995, and his conviction on November
14, 1995, and has properly credited him with 153 days of credit for that time.
Further, the Department
finds that Appellant is entitled to credit for the time he served in jail in Florida on a violation of probation
warrant from South Carolina between December 8, 1997, and September 10, 1998,
and, additionally,
for time served in the Pickens County jail between September 10, 1998, and December 1, 1998, prior
to his probation revocation hearing. For the time Appellant was held in custody for the violation of his
probation, but prior to the revocation of his probation, the Department has credited Appellant with 353
days of service. This credit exceeds the 275 days requested by Appellant, who only sought credit for
the time he was in custody in Florida on his probation violation warrant.
Despite the agreement between Appellant and the Department on the service credits discussed
above, the Department denied Appellant’s other claims for service credits, and properly so. The
Department has correctly determined that Appellant is not entitled to service credits for the time he was
on probation, as his sentence was suspended during that time. See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-410 (Supp.
2003) (“[T]he judge . . . may suspend the imposition or the execution of a sentence and place the
defendant on probation.”). Similarly, Appellant is not entitled to service credit for the time he spent on
probation in the Spartanburg Restitution Center. See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-480 (Supp. 2003) (“The
judge may suspend a sentence for a defendant . . . and may place the offender in a restitution center as
a condition of probation.”); see also Affidavit of Dennis R. Patterson at 3. Therefore, the Department
properly rejected Appellant’s claims for 35 days of credit for his time on probation between November
14, 1995, and December 12, 1995, and for 149 days of credit for his time in the Spartanburg Restitution
Center between April 1, 1997 and August 28, 1997.
Finally, while the Department agrees that Appellant is entitled to 52 days of service credit for the
time he was in custody in Florida both on Florida charges and on a South Carolina violation of probation
warrant (i.e., January 19, 1996, to March 11, 1996), it correctly determined that Appellant should not
be credited for the additional time he served in the custody of the State of Florida on his Florida criminal
conviction (i.e., from his conviction on March 11, 1996, to his transfer from Florida to South Carolina
authorities on December 19, 1996). See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-40 (1989). Therefore, the Department
properly credited Appellant with only 52 of the 334 days of service credit Appellant seeks for the period
he was in custody in Florida.
Therefore, as the Department has now properly determined Appellant’s service credits,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant’s request for injunctive relief is DENIED.
AND IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
March 5, 2004
Columbia, South Carolina |
