ORDERS:
ORDER
I. Statement of the Case
A. Introduction
This is a contested case matter brought by Boston Financial Management Company as the Petitioner
(hereinafter referred to as "taxpayer") against the Spartanburg County Assessor (hereinafter referred
to as "assessor") concerning property valuations for property tax year 1994. The property owner
exhausted the prehearing remedies with the assessor and the Spartanburg County Board of
Assessment Appeals and is now seeking a contested case hearing before the Administrative Law
Judge Division (hereinafter referred to as "ALJD"). This matter was heard on September 20, 1995,
at 10:00 a.m.
The issue for determination is the fair market value of three apartment complexes owned by the
taxpayer. I conclude I am unable to reach the merits on the valuation dispute since the matter must
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The result of this decision is that the assessor's value of
$672,900 for New Madera Apartments, $1,432,500 for New Spartan Villa Apartments, and
$1,448,660 for New Tudor Woods Apartments remains in effect.
B. Motion To Reopen
The taxpayer did not appear at the 10:00 a.m. hearing. However, an appearance was entered at 2:00
p.m. The taxpayer explained that it was aware that two hearings on its properties were to be held on
September 20, 1995, but was under the mistaken belief that both hearings would be held jointly at
2:00. At the 2:00 p.m. hearing the taxpayer made an oral motion to reopen the 10:00 a.m. hearing
to allow it to present its evidence either then or at a subsequent date. Since I find I have no
jurisdiction to hear this case, I find it unnecessary to rule on the Motion.
Any issues raised in the proceedings or hearing of this case but not addressed in this Order are
deemed denied. ALJD Rule 29(B). Further, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is not a
prerequisite to any party filing a notice of appeal of this Order. ALJD Rule 29(C).
II. Issues
Does the Administrative Law Judge Division have subject matter jurisdiction in this matter?
III. Analysis
1. Positions of Parties:
In a letter dated November 8, 1994, to the property tax division of the South Carolina Tax
Commission, the taxpayer admits it did not appeal within the "ten day appeal deadline." The taxpayer
requests that an exception be made for its lateness.
2. Findings of Fact:
I find, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following facts:
1. The first property that is the subject of this dispute is a 100 unit apartment complex
identified as Tax Map No. 6-25-05-099.00 located in Spartanburg County known as New
Madera Apartments.
2. The second property in dispute is a 200 unit apartment complex identified as Tax Map No.
7-09-00-013.03 located in Spartanburg County known as New Spartan Villa Apartments.
3. The third property in dispute is a 100 unit apartment complex identified as Tax Map No.
7-08-11-168.01 located in Spartanburg County known as New Tudor Woods Apartments.
4. The only tax year in dispute is the 1994 tax year, with a valuation date of December 31,
1993.
5. The properties are built and operated as HUD 236 housing programs.
6. The assessor valued New Madera at $672,900 by use of an income approach.
7. The assessor's value is based upon a stream of net income of $74,014 at a capitalization rate
of 11% yielding a value of $672,855 rounded to $672,900.
8. The taxpayer asserts the property has no value since it has no market.
9. The assessor valued New Spartan Villa at $1,432,500 by use of an income approach.
10. The assessor's value is based upon a stream of net income of $157,579 at a capitalization
rate of 11% yielding a value of $1,432,536 rounded to $1,432,500.
11. The taxpayer asserts the property has no value since it has no market.
12. The assessor valued New Tudor Woods at $1,448,600 by use of an income approach.
13. The assessor's value is based upon a stream of net income of $159,346 at a capitalization
rate of 11% yielding a value of $1,448,600.
14. The taxpayer asserts the property has no value since it has no market.
15. The Spartanburg County Board of Assessment Appeals (County Board) on October 14,
1994 rendered a written decision on the value of the taxpayer's properties.
16. The County Board found the properties had the same values as those asserted by the
assessor.
17. Also on October 14, 1994, the County Board mailed three written decisions, one for each
property, to the taxpayer.
18. A notice of appeal dated November 8, 1994, was filed by Boston Financial Group with the
South Carolina Tax Commission.
19. The notice states the taxpayer knew it had missed the ten day time period for filing an
appeal and requested an exception.
20. The taxpayer did not file the appeal notice within ten days of the County Board's decision.
3. Discussion
The issue of jurisdiction is determined by examining three factors. The first is whether the current
matter is controlled by the Revenue Procedures Act (Act), 1995 S.C. Act No. 60, or statutes and
regulations previously operative but subsequently displaced by the Act. The second, after
determining whether the Act or S.C. Code Regs. 117-4 (1976) controls, is determining the time
period required for challenging the action of the County Board. Finally, a determination of the effect
of not adhering to a time requirement is needed.
The Act became effective on August 1, 1995. Thus, before the Act can apply in the instant case a
retroactive application is required. While statutes, such as the Act, that are procedural and remedial
are generally applied retroactively, such acts cannot be applied retroactively when doing so will
validate proceedings which are invalid under prior law. 82 C.J.S. Statutes §422 (1953). The appeal
here was filed well beyond ten days in that the Board's decision was both issued and mailed on
October 14, 1994 and the appeal by the taxpayer was not made until November 8, 1994. If the ten
day time limit of Regs. 117-4 is a jurisdictional element, a retroactive application of the Act would
have the effect of reviving a matter which was defective under the prior law. An ALJ has no
authority to revive a defective appeal. The authority of reviewing officers is strictly confined to the
limits set by the statutory provisions that give them their existence and any actions that exceed their
jurisdiction are void. S.C. Tax Comm'n v. S.C. Tax Bd. of Review, 278 S.C. 556, 299 S.E.2d 489
(1983). Properly promulgated regulations of state agencies shall have the full force and effect of law.
S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-160 (Supp. 1994). Here, Regs. 117-4 is properly promulgated, and requires
that an appeal from the finding of the County Board must be made within ten days from the date of
the Board's finding. In the instant case, the Board's decision was both issued and mailed on October
14, 1994. However, the appeal by Boston Financial Group was not made until November 8, 1994.
In addition, the taxpayer admits in its appeal letter that the appeal was not timely filed. Accordingly,
under Regs. 117-4 the appeal is not timely.
Since the ten day limit of Regs. 117-4 applies, the issue becomes deciding whether failure to meet that
requirement is a jurisdictional element. In general, time limits for appeals are considered jurisdictional
limitations by our courts. Mears v. Mears, 287 S.C. 168, 337 S.E.2d 206 (1985); Burnett v. S.C.
Highway Dep't, 252 S.C. 568, 167 S.E.2d 571 (1969); S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Spann, 239
S.C. 437, 123 S.E.2d 648 (1962). Accordingly, I conclude the ten day requirement of Regs. 117-4
is a jurisdictional element denying me authority to hear this matter.
4. Conclusions of Law
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Discussion, I conclude the following as a matter of law:
1. For matters such as the instant matter which are not governed by the Revenue Procedures
Act, a challenge to a valuation appeal from the finding of the County Board must be made
within ten days from the date of the Board's finding. S.C. Code Regs. 117-4 (1976).
2. The ten day requirement of Regs. 117-4 is a jurisdictional element. See Mears v. Mears, 287
S.C. 168, 337 S.E.2d 206 (1985); Burnett v. S.C. Highway Dep't, 252 S.C. 568, 167 S.E.2d
571 (1969); and S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Spann, 239 S.C. 437, 123 S.E.2d 648 (1962).
3. While the Act is procedural and remedial and while such statutes are generally applied
retroactively, the Act cannot be applied retroactively in the instant case since to do so will
validate proceedings that were invalid under prior law. 82 C.J.S. Statutes §422 (1953).
4. An ALJ has no authority to revive a defective appeal since the authority of reviewing officers
is strictly confined to the limits set by the statutory provisions that give them their existence
and any actions that exceed their jurisdiction are void. S.C. Tax Comm'n v. S.C. Tax Bd.
of Review, 278 S.C. 556, 299 S.E.2d 489 (1983).
5. Properly promulgated regulations of state agencies have the full force and effect of law. S.C.
Code Ann. §1-23-160 (Supp. 1994).
6. For matters such as the instant one not governed by the Revenue Procedures Act, Regs. 117-4 limits the authority of an ALJ to hearing only those matters which are appealed from the
County Board within ten days.
7. The ALJ lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the instant action since the appeal was not
filed within ten days of the County Board's decision.
IV. ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, Discussion and Conclusions of Law, the following
ORDER is issued:
Due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Petitioner's challenge is dismissed. The assessor's
values of New Madera at $672,900, New Spartan Villa at $1,432,500 and New Tudor Woods at
$1,448,600 for the 1994 tax year remain in effect.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
This 22nd day of September, 1995 |
