ORDERS:
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
I. Introduction
By Order dated November 28, 2000, Danmark, Inc. (Danmark) was found liable for a $400 fine for violating S.C. Code Ann. § 61-6-2600 (Supp. 1999). Danmark filed a Motion for Reconsideration due to "misrepresentation by the adverse party."
II. Analysis
A Motion for Reconsideration will not be granted unless the requirements for a reconsideration are satisfied. See Bennett v. City of
Clemson, 293 S.C. 64, 358 S.E.2d 707 (1987). The requirements to be met are established by ALJD Rule 29(D) and Rule 60(B),
SCRCP with the specific ground alleged in this case as being SCRCP Rule 60(B)(3). That provision explains that "the court may
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment" if the court finds a ". . ., misrepresentation, . . . of an adverse party."
Here, the alleged misrepresentation is that a witness for the South Carolina Department of Revenue intentionally misstated the truth
on two occasions. Danmark asserts a SLED Agent gave improper testimony when the agent testified that he explained the citation to
Danmark on February 9, 2000, and that he served the citation on Danmark on February 23, 2000. I cannot agree with Danmark.
The evidence in this case does not establish these two items as intentional misrepresentations.
Dan Beavers, a witness for Danmark, testified that the SLED Agent on February 9, 2000 did in fact explain that a violation had
occurred. Further, Mr. Beavers testified that he knew from the SLED Agent's explanation on February 9, 2000 that SLED believed
illegal bottles were on the premises. Thus, Danmark had an explanation on February 9, 2000 of the violation.
The confusion arises from Mr. Beavers' understanding of the explanation. Mr. Beavers believed the explanation related only to a
criminal violation. He did not comprehend that a civil sanction would also flow from the presence of the bottles. Thus, the evidence
establishes that the SLED Agent explained the violation, but apparently not in a manner that would allow Mr. Beavers to grasp the
fact that the violation would give rise to both a criminal and civil sanction.
Therefore, I find that a misunderstanding of the SLED Agent's explanation occurred on February 9, 2000. Accordingly, I find that the
testimony of the SLED Agent and of Mr. Beavers each confirms their respective views of the explanation given that night, that the
testimony of each is consistent with that misunderstanding, and that the testimony is not a misrepresentation.
The same is true for the alleged intentional misrepresentation of service of the citation on Danmark on February 23, 2000. Mr.
Beavers testified that on February 23, 2000, he in fact signed the citation. Certainly, one who signs a document is considered to have
notice of what he is signing. Thus, while Mr. Beavers may not have physically received the document until a later date, no intentional
misrepresentation arose when the SLED Agent testified that Danmark was served with the citation on February 23, 2000. One
signing a citation could be understood by some as having been served.
Thus, just as with the February 9, 2000 "explanation" issue, a misunderstanding also arose on the February 23, 2000 "service" issue.
Again, I find that the testimony of the SLED Agent and of Mr. Beavers each confirms their respective views of the service issue, that
the testimony of each is consistent with their misunderstanding, and that the testimony is not a misrepresentation.
Finally, and in any event, while Danmark has not shown a misrepresentation, even if a misrepresentation could be shown, the two
areas presented in this motion are insufficient to produce a reconsideration. Indeed, the November 28, 2000 Order deciding this case
specifically held that the notice issues (such as the explanation and the service matters sought to be raised here) were not material to
a decision in this case. Rather, the evidence established that Danmark had ample notice of the charges and was not prejudiced.
Since the notice issues were not factors in deciding this case, any alleged misrepresentations as to notice do not warrant granting a
reconsideration.
III. Order
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: December 15, 2000
Columbia, South Carolina |
