ORDERS:
ORDER
I. STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division ("Division") pursuant to the appeal of Ronnie Swofford, an
inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections ("Department"). On November 29, 2001, Swofford was convicted
of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code 3.11, Abuse of Privileges, after pleading guilty to the charge. As a result of his
conviction, Swofford lost 30 days of "good-time" credit. Swofford filed a grievance with the Department and received the
Department's final decision on February 4, 2002. On March 1, 2002 Swofford filed this appeal.
II. BACKGROUND
On November 20, 2001, Chaplain Otijele was passing out greeting cards to inmates with the help of Swofford, a clerk in
the chaplain's office, when the chaplain discovered that the greeting card envelopes contained tobacco. After being
questioned, Swofford admitted to placing the tobacco in the cards. In addition, Swofford signed a written statement
admitting his guilt.
After the incident, Lt. Tim McCoy completed an Incident Report and submitted it to his supervisor. Swofford charged
with violating SCDC Code 2.04, Possession of Contraband. Swofford was placed in PHD on November 21, 2002, and
received written notice of the charge that same day. The hearing was held on November 29, 2002, before a Disciplinary
Hearing Officer ("DHO"), who read into the Record Swofford's written statement admitting guilt. In response to the
DHO's request for his plea to the charge 2.04, Swofford, who had waived counsel substitute, asked to have his charge
reduced to a minor. After recessing, the DHO informed Swofford that he could not reduce Swofford's charge to a minor.
However, the DHO offered to reduce Swofford's level 2 charge to a level 3 charge. After Swofford waived his twenty-four
hour notice, the DHO reduced the charge to 3.11, Abuse of Privileges. Swofford then pleaded guilty to the charge of 3.11.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the DHO informed Swofford that his guilty plea had been accepted and that he would be
sanctioned with the loss of 30 days of good time credit.
After the hearing, the DHO completed a Major Disciplinary Report and Hearing Record ("Hearing Record"), which
documented the DHO's findings based on Swofford's guilty plea. In addition, the Hearing Record reflects that Swofford
lost only 30 days of good-time credit because it was his first major charge in six years.
Swofford filed a grievance on December 12, 2001, appealing his conviction of violating SCDC 3.11, asking to have his
major charge reduced to a minor. On January 8, 2002, the Warden denied his grievance, citing the seriousness of
Swofford's offense. On January 11, 2002, Swofford appealed the warden's decision, alleging that Department officials
failed to investigate his first appeal. The Department denied his grievance, stating that no reason was found to reverse the
DHO's decision. This appeal followed. In his Appeal and Reply Briefs, Swofford alleges his offense was improperly
classified as a major and that Major Maxey improperly interfered with the DHO's responsibilities with respect to
Swofford's hearing. Finally, Swofford alleges his punishment, particularly the loss of his ability to earn work credits and to
serve as a hospice volunteer, is too severe.
III. ANALYSIS
The Division's jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in
Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). On September 5, 2001, the Division issued an En Banc Order
in McNeil v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP (September 5, 2001), interpreting the
breadth of its jurisdiction pursuant to Al-Shabazz. The decision holds that the Division's appellate jurisdiction in inmate
appeals is limited to two types of cases: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an
inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing.
In this case, Swofford lost 30 days of good time after he pleaded guilty to a prison disciplinary infraction. As such, I find
that this tribunal has jurisdiction to hear Swofford's appeal. (1)
In its appellate capacity, the Division is concerned with ensuring that the appellants receive all procedural process they are
due when the constitutional rights of the appellants are implicated. 338 S.C. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750. Because statutory
right to sentence-related credits is a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, an inmate is entitled to
minimal due process before those credits may be taken away. Id. However, an inmate may waive his right to due process
by knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty to a disciplinary charge. See Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F.Supp. 1504, 1507-08
(N.D. Ind. 1985), citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). An inmate's guilty plea is neither knowing nor
voluntary if it is "'induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including
unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper or having no proper relationship to the
prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).'" Id. at 1508, quoting Marby v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2547 (1984). An inmate's
own testimony is insufficient to support a claim that a promise was made in exchange for his guilty plea absent any other
evidence that the inmate's plea was solicited. Id.
In this case, Swofford has not even alleged, much less offered any evidence to support such an allegation, that the DHO or
anyone else promised him anything in exchange for his guilty plea. In fact, the hearing transcript reflects that Swofford
gave his guilty plea only after the DHO informed him that the charge could not be reduced to a minor.
Moreover, I find that Swofford's allegation that his offense was improperly classified as a major and that Major Maxey
improperly interfered with the DHO's responsibilities fails to implicate his due process rights. "The final decision as to
whether a disciplinary hearing will be classified as "major," "minor," or informal resolution will be made by the Major,
Duty Warden, or higher authority." SCDC Policy OP-22.14(1)(e)(1). Even if Swofford's allegations were true, Major
Maxey is the proper authority to classify Swofford's charge as a "major." Therefore, Swofford's argument is without merit.
Finally, Swofford's punishment of loss of thirty days' good time is not excessive. It appears that Swofford's main concern
is not the loss of his good time, but the loss of other privileges, such as the ability to earn work credits and serve as a
hospice volunteer, both of which were lost as a result of Swofford's plea of guilty to a major disciplinary charge. Because
the Division has no jurisdiction to address the loss of privileges, I hereby AFFIRM the Final Decision of the Department in
its entirety and DISMISS Swofford's appeal.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Final Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED and the Appeal of Swofford is
DISMISSED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
C. DUKES SCOTT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
June 10, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina
1. However, with respect to Swofford's appeal regarding the imposition of "lesser penalties," this tribunal does not have
jurisdiction pursuant to McNeil, supra. |
