ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
Grievance No. Ker-0620-00
I. Introduction
Timothy Akers (Akers) brings this appeal challenging a decision by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC)
which convicted Akers of the use, possession or distilling and brewing of alcoholic beverages for which Akers lost 90 days
of good time credit. Jurisdiction is invoked in the instant case since this matter is a disciplinary hearing in which Akers
was punished by the loss of good time credits, a loss which impacts a created liberty interest. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C.
354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 750 (2000); McNeil v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP
(September 5, 2001). After a review of the record and the arguments, the DOC decision is AFFIRMED.
II. Scope of Review
In this review, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) acts "in an appellate capacity" and is "restricted to reviewing the
decision below." Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 754 (2000). The review must apply the criteria of
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2000). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2000) (where an ALJ is
directed to conduct a review "in the same manner prescribed in [§ 1-23-380](A)."). Section 1-23-380(A)(6) establishes the
following:
The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
In this case, Akers argues that the DOC decision is made upon unlawful procedure and is clearly erroneous in view of the
reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.
III. Analysis
A. Unlawful Procedure
Akers argues the hearing was carried out under unlawful procedure since DOC failed to provide required due process.
Due process for an inmate subjected to the loss of good time credits requires the following procedures:
(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) that
factfinders must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the
inmate should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue hazard to
institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be
allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the
matter, who may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial. Wolff, 418 U.S. 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2978-82, 41 L.Ed.2d
at 954-60.
Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 751 (2000)
In essence, Akers argues that the persons hearing the matter were not impartial.
The use of prison officials to hold inmate hearings does not present an inherent showing of a lack of an impartial hearing
and such use of prison officials is not a violation of due process. Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 1996) (no
due process violation when prison officials serve as impartial decision-makers at disciplinary hearings). Rather, the
presumption is that the officer will act in a neutral and impartial manner.
Certainly, an impartial hearing board is required. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 539, 572 n.20. However, proof of a due process
violation requires specific acts of lack of neutrality such as the hearing officer being substantially involved with the
investigation. See Merritt v. De Los Santos, 721 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1983) (due process violated only if officer
substantially involved with investigation of charges against inmate, but not violated if officer's involvement at hearing is
only tangential); see, e.g., Diercks v. Durham, 959 F.2d 710, 713 (8th Cir. 1992) (due process violation when complainant
was member of board hearing the case). But see, e.g., Pedraza v. Meyer, 919 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1990) (no due process
violation when disciplinary board official's only involvement in filing of complaint was receipt of incident report and
intercepted letters); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 1995) (no due process violation when investigating officer
signs disciplinary report as shift supervisor); Ivy v. Moore, 31 F.3d 634, 635 (8th Cir. 1994) (no due process violation when
chairperson of hearing personally investigated defense because did not threaten impartial decision-making); Mitchell v.
Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1446 (10th Cir. 1996) (no due process violation because officer did not witness inmate's
participation in riot, was not present during riot, and did not prepare offense report).
He partiality has not be shown. Nothing establishes the hearing officer participated in the investigation and nothing shows
the hearing officer had a pre-designed conclusion. Rather, the decision reached was based on the evidence presented at the
hearing and was arrived at after full participation by Akers. Accordingly, no failure of due process is present here.
B. Substantial Evidence
Akers argues the DOC decision must be reversed since the decision is not supported by the evidence. I cannot agree.
In examining a DOC determination for the presence of evidentiary support, an ALJ must review the matter in an appellate
capacity. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742. In that capacity, an ALJ reviewing factual disputes between
DOC and the inmate "will not substitute [the ALJ's] judgment for that of the [DOC Hearing Officer] as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact." S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2000).
Thus, once the facts are established by the Hearing Officer, the ALJ will not re-weigh the evidence in an attempt to come to
an independent conclusion on the factual dispute. Rather, the ALJ will rely upon the Hearing Officers factual
determinations unless such those determinations are "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23- 380(A)(6)(e) (Supp. 2000). In determining if substantial evidence
supports the Hearing Officer's factual determinations, the ALJ does not look for "a mere scintilla of evidence nor evidence
viewed blindly from one side, but [rather looks for ] evidence which, when considering the record as a whole, would allow
reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the agency reached." Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 282 S.C. 430, 432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1984). Accordingly, if such evidence is present, substantial evidence is
present and the factual determinations will not be overturned.
Here, substantial evidence supports the factual determinations made below. The evidence below shows that a DOC officer
smelled an unusual odor coming from Akers area. Upon investigation, the officer found a yellow liquid in a duffel bag
along with pineapples. At the time of the incident, the officer stated that Akers admitted possession of the liquid. Upon
completing a chemical analysis, the liquid was confirmed to contain alcohol. At the hearing Akers denied he had possession
of the liquid or the pineapples and denied being the owner of the duffel bag. Further, Akers denied telling the investigating
officer who owned the liquid. Thus, the hearing officer had conflicting testimony and was required to weigh the credibility
of the witnesses. Under these facts, reasonable minds could reach the conclusion that Akers committed the act here in
dispute. Thus, substantial evidence supports the DOC decision.
IV. Conclusion
The guilty verdict entered by DOC against Timothy Akers is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: April 30, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina |