ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. TYRCI 374-00UY
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant Hollis Staggs appeals the
decision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) to revoke 180 days of his "good-time"
credit as punishment for testing positive for the use of marijuana and possessing contraband money in violation of DOC
Disciplinary Code §§ 1.10, The Use or Possession of Narcotics, Marijuana, or Unauthorized Drugs, Including Prescription
Drugs, and 2.04, Possession of Contraband, respectively. Having reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed
by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department must be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On March 27, 2000, Sergeant D. Keatly found three one-dollar bills wrapped in tape and taped under Appellant's standing
wall locker in a common living area. Later that same day, Appellant was given the urine-based Ontrak Test, which tests for
the presence of marijuana, by Sergeant Keatly. Appellant tested positive for marijuana on the test, and was given a second
test for confirmation that also returned a positive result for marijuana. Accordingly, Appellant was charged with the
possession of contraband and the use of marijuana. At the hearing of these charges, Appellant pled guilty to the possession
of the contraband money, and a DOC Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) found Appellant guilty of the use of marijuana.
As punishment for these violations, the DHO revoked Appellant's 180 days of good-time credit, 90 days for each offense.
Appellant appealed the latter conviction to the Department, and then to this tribunal. On appeal, Appellant argues: (1) that
the revocation of 90 days of good-time credit for his use of marijuana violates his due process rights because it exceeds the
sentence set forth in S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370(d)(3) (Supp. 2000) for the possession of marijuana; (2) that his
conviction is not supported by the evidence because the Department failed to produce physical evidence of his drug test at
the hearing; and (3) that the Department's decision to twice revoke 90 days of good-time credit for the "same conduct"
violates the Department's policies.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department
in certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity
of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections, a majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate
appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an
inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No.
00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand,
Appellant contends that the Department improperly revoked 180 days of his good-time credit as punishment in a major
disciplinary hearing; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.
When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the
record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has
granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at
750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the
Department granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are
in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to
internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C.
at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off"
approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this
deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's actions to ensure that
inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at
757.
In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department's decision to revoke his good-time credit was made in violation
of his due process rights. Because inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits under
the Fourteenth Amendment, they are entitled to "minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by
the Due Process clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 557 (1974). Thus, where, as here, an inmate faces the revocation of good-time credits as punishment in a disciplinary
hearing, prison officials must provide that inmate with certain procedural safeguards. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 370, 527
S.E.2d at 750. (1) These procedural safeguards include:
(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) that
factfinders must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the
inmate should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue hazard to
institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be
allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the
matter, who may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial.
Id. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (paraphrasing Wolff). Beyond these procedural requirements, the United States Supreme
Court has held that the revocation of an inmate's good-time credits does not comport with Due Process unless "there [is]
some evidence from which the conclusion of the [prison official] could be deduced." Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). (2) Thus, if the Department affords the inmate a Wolff-type hearing and has at least some
evidence in the record to support its decision, the Department's revocation of an inmate's good-time credits satisfies the
requirements of due process.
In the disciplinary proceedings underlying the instant appeal, Appellant was afforded all the process due him pursuant to
Wolff and Al-Shabazz. The record indicates that Appellant received written notice of the charges against him and that he
waived his right to have that notice provided in excess of twenty-four hours prior to his hearing. A hearing on these
charges was held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. At the hearing, Appellant was given the opportunity,
through a counsel substitute, to offer evidence, call witnesses, and confront his accuser. The record reflects that Appellant
was found guilty of violating DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.10, The Use or Possession of Narcotics, Marijuana, or
Unauthorized Drugs, Including Prescription Drugs, and DOC Disciplinary Code § 2.04, Possession of Contraband, based
on the testimony of Sergeant Keatly and Appellant's guilty plea, and a written statement to that effect was prepared by the
hearing officer. After his conviction, Appellant filed a grievance and received a prompt response from his warden, which
Appellant then appealed to the Department. In its denial of his appeal, the Department informed appellant of his right to
appeal the Department's final decision under the APA. Further, there is some evidence in the record to support the
decision reached by the Department.
Appellant's remaining arguments must also fail. First, it is irrelevant that the 90 days of good-time credit the Department
revoked from Appellant as punishment for using marijuana exceeds the 30-day maximum sentence for a first conviction for
the possession of less than 28 grams of marijuana under Section 44-53-370(d)(3). Appellant was properly charged with a
violation of, and punished under, the DOC's Disciplinary Code, not Section 44-53-370. Further, it must be recognized that
prison disciplinary offenses and the punishments imposed for violations of them do not, and need not, correspond to
provisions in non-prison-related criminal statutes. See, e.g., DOC Disciplinary Code § 2.16, Out of Place; DOC
Disciplinary Code § 3.04, Malingering; see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560-563 (drawing a distinction between prison
disciplinary proceedings and proceedings outside the prison system, such as criminal trials and parole revocation hearings).
Second, the Department's failure to produce physical evidence of Appellant's drug test at the hearing does not render the
conviction invalid. The testimony of Sergeant Keatly, the person who administered the drug test, is sufficient evidence to
support the DHO's finding that Appellant tested positive for using marijuana; moreover, the production of physical
evidence is generally not required at an inmate disciplinary hearing. See, e.g., Barker v. State, 437 So. 2d 1375 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1983). Third, the Department clearly has not punished Appellant twice for the "same conduct." Rather, the two
revocations of 90 days of good-time credit were imposed for two separate offenses, namely Appellant's use of marijuana
and his possession of contraband money.
The Department provided Appellant with the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment before revoking his
sentence-related credits as punishment in a disciplinary proceeding. Accordingly, the Department's decision to deny
Appellant's grievance is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department's denial of Appellant's grievance is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
February 14, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina
1. However, this set of safeguards is necessarily a limited one. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560 ("[I]t is immediately apparent
that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society . . . to the very different
situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison.").
2. This review "does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or
weighing of the evidence," Hill, 472 U.S. at 455; rather, this standard only requires this tribunal to determine whether
"there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the [prison official]." Id. at 455-56. |