SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

Alex Cooper (Cooper) #219523 brings this appeal challenging a decision by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC) which convicted Cooper of striking an inmate with a weapon for which he received the loss of 400 days of good time credit. Jurisdiction is invoked in the instant case since this matter is a disciplinary hearing in which Cooper was punished by the loss of good time credits, a loss which impacts a created liberty interest. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 750 (2000); McNeil v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP (September 5, 2001). After a review of the record and the arguments, the DOC decision is AFFIRMED.

In this review, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) acts "in an appellate capacity" and is "restricted to reviewing the decision below." Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 754 (2000). The review must apply the criteria of S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2000). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2000) (where an ALJ is directed to conduct a review "in the same manner prescribed in [§ 1-23-380](A)."). Section 1-23-380(A)(6) establishes the following:

The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

In this case, Cooper argues that the DOC decision is made upon unlawful procedure and is without substantial evidence supporting the decision.

Cooper argues the hearing was carried out under unlawful procedure since DOC failed to follow lawful procedures.

1. Failed To Provide Procedural Due Process.

Cooper argues procedural due process was not followed. Due process for an inmate subjected to the loss of good time credits requires the following procedures:

(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) that factfinders must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the inmate should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue hazard to institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the matter, who may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial. Wolff, 418 U.S. 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2978-82, 41 L.Ed.2d at 954-60.

Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 751 (2000)

In the instant case Cooper argues the hearing was not conducted by an impartial officer. Cooper further claims that his conviction should be overturned because he did not receive a Pre-Hearing Detention (PHD) Notice. I disagree with Cooper.

The use of prison officials to hold inmate hearings does not present an inherent showing of a lack of an impartial hearing and the use of prison officials to conduct those hearing is not a violation of due process. Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 1996) (no due process violation when prison officials serve as impartial decision-makers at disciplinary hearings). Certainly, an impartial hearing board is required. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 539, 572 n.20. However, due process is violated only if the officer is substantially involved with the investigation. Diercks v. Durham, 959 F.2d 710, 713 (8th Cir. 1992) (due process violation when complainant was a member of the board hearing the case); Pedraza v. Meyer, 919 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1990) (no due process violation when disciplinary board official's only involvement in filing of complaint was receipt of incident report and intercepted letters); Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1446 (10th Cir. 1996) (no due process violation because officer did not witness inmate's participation in riot, was not present during riot, and did not prepare offense report).

Here, no evidence of a lack of impartiality has been shown. For example, no evidence suggests the hearing officer had conducted an investigation before the hearing. Rather, the hearing officer reached a conclusion based on the evidence and testimony received during the hearing. Likewise, no evidence is present to suggest the officer had reached a pre-designed conclusion. Accordingly, the hearing held was impartial.

Finally, not receiving a PHD notice is not a ground for overturning the conviction. Indeed, the notice is not relevant to whether Cooper committed the underlying disciplinary infraction or whether the disciplinary hearing was properly conducted. All of the procedural protections of Wolff were afforded and no lack of procedural due process is established.

Finally, while not specifically argued by Cooper, he appears to assert the DOC decision must be reversed since the decision is not supported by the evidence. I cannot agree.

In examining a DOC determination for the presence of evidentiary support, an ALJ must review the matter in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742. In that capacity, an ALJ reviewing factual disputes between DOC and the inmate "will not substitute [the ALJ's] judgment for that of the [DOC Hearing Officer] as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2000).

Thus, once the facts are established by the Hearing Officer, the ALJ will not re-weigh the evidence in an attempt to come to an independent conclusion on the factual dispute. Rather, the ALJ will rely upon the Hearing Officers factual determinations unless such those determinations are "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23- 380(A)(6)(e) (Supp. 2000). In determining if substantial evidence supports the Hearing Officer's factual determinations, the ALJ does not look for "a mere scintilla of evidence nor evidence viewed blindly from one side, but [rather looks for ] evidence which, when considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the agency reached." Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 282 S.C. 430, 432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1984). Accordingly, if such evidence is present, substantial evidence is present and the factual determinations will not be overturned.

Here, substantial evidence supports the factual determinations made below. An inmate was stabbed. Evidence from confidential informants explain that Cooper tripped an inmate which tripping then allowed a third inmate to stab the downed inmate. Such actions are consistent with conspiring to engage in the striking of an inmate with a weapon. These factual determinations would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that Cooper committed the act here in dispute. Thus, substantial evidence supports the DOC decision.

The guilty verdict entered by DOC against Alex Cooper is AFFIRMED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________

RAY N. STEVENS

Administrative Law Judge

Dated: April 15, 2002

Columbia, South Carolina