SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter comes before the Administrative Law Court (“ALC” or “Court”) pursuant to the notice of appeal filed by inmate Ryan Young (“Inmate”), an inmate formerly incarcerated with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC” or “Department”). In his Notice of Appeal, Young specifically requests “the prevailing wage.” Inmate alleges the Department violated the South Carolina Prevailing Wage Statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-430(D) (Supp. 2004). Inmate also requests that he be paid overtime pay for “every hour worked over eighty hours every bi-weekly pay period” and that he be reimbursed for the wages deducted for room and board and victim assistance.

The Department contends that because Inmate has been released, any appeal to this Court that he has stemming from his involvement in prison industries is moot. The Department denied Inmate’s grievances at the Step1 and Step 2 levels based on the contention that Inmate is not an “employee” of Kwalu as defined in Section 24-3-430 because Inmate’s labor was performed “in this prison industries project inside the walls of Ridgeland CI.”

DISCUSSION

The Court's jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). The Court's appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is limited to state created liberty interests typically involving: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which an inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary hearing as a result of a serious rule violation. Id. However, the South Carolina Supreme Court recognizes a limited Administrative Law Court jurisdictional exception “where inmate claims deprivation of property interest.” Slezak v. SC Dep’t of Corr., 361 S.C. 327, 330, 605 S.E.2d 506, 507 (2004) (citing Wicker v. SC Dep’t of Corr., 360 S.C. 421, 602 S.E.2d 56 (2004)). This case involves an inmate claiming deprivation of a property interest. The facts of this case are similar to the facts in Wicker. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal.

Moot Argument

The Department contends that Inmate filed a grievance while he was incarcerated, that Inmate has since been released, and therefore his claim is moot. In support of its argument that Inmate’s claim is moot, the Department cites the South Carolina Supreme Court:

This Court will not pass on moot and academic questions or make an adjudication where there remains no actual controversy. [citation omitted]. A case becomes moot when judgment, if rendered, will have no practical legal effect upon the existing controversy. This is true when some event occurs making it impossible for [a] reviewing court to grant effectual relief. [citation omitted].

Jones v. Dillon-Marion Human Resources Development Commission, 277 S.C. 533, 291 S.E.2d 195 (1982), Dodge v. Dodge, 332 S.C. 401, 505 S.E.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Jones). The Department also cites Gainey v. Gainey, a South Carolina Court of Appeals decision, for the proposition that “state appellate courts will not issue advisory opinions on questions for which no meaningful relief can be granted.” Gainey v. Gainey, 279 S.C. 68, 301 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1998).

The Department’s argument must fail based upon the case law the Department uses to support its argument. A judgment, if rendered, will have practical legal effect upon the existing controversy. Also, no event has occurred making it impossible for this Court to grant effectual relief and meaningful relief can be granted. Inmate requests monetary relief: that he be paid the difference between the “prevailing wage” and the wage he received, and that he be given monetary reimbursement for deductions he claims should not have been made from his wages. The fact that Inmate is no longer incarcerated does not prevent this relief from being granted. Therefore, this claim is not moot.

Prevailing Wage

Inmate claims he is entitled to the prevailing wage for the time he worked for Kwalu. Wicker makes it clear “that there is nothing in the statutory scheme authorizing the DOC to pay…a training wage less than the prevailing wage.” Wicker, 360 S.C. at 425, 602 S.E.2d at 58. S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-430(D) (Supp. 2004) states, “No inmate participating in the (prison industry) program may earn less than the prevailing wage for work of similar nature in the private sector.”

The Department denied Inmate’s grievances at the Step 1 and Step 2 levels based on the contention that Inmate is not an “employee” of Kwalu as defined in Section 24-3-430 because Inmate’s labor was performed “in this prison industries project inside the walls of Ridgeland CI.”

The Department admits that Kwalu was a prison industries project when it denied the inmate the prevailing wage. The Department was incorrect in denying inmate the prevailing wage for the above stated reason because such a situation is clearly contemplated by the statute. Section 24-3-430(B) provides:

The director may enter into contracts necessary to implement this program. The contractual agreements may include rental or lease agreements for state buildings or portions of them on the grounds of an institution or a facility of the Department of Corrections and provide for reasonable access to and egress from the building to establish and operate a facility.

S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-430(B) (Supp. 2004). Therefore, the Department owes Inmate the difference between the prevailing wage and the wage actually received for time Inmate worked for Kwalu.

Overtime

There is no language in S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-430 (Supp. 2004) authorizing or requiring the payment of overtime wages. Wicker does not address this issue either. See Wicker, supra. The intent of Section 24-3-430 is to prevent unfair competition. Adkins v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 360 S.C. 413, 418, 602 S.E.2d 51, 54 (2004). This intent is satisfied without the payment of overtime wages. Therefore, Inmate is not entitled to overtime wages.

“Room and Board” and “Victim Assistance”

Inmate requests that he be reimbursed for the wages deducted for room and board and victim assistance. Inmate claims these deductions were made in violation of Article 12, Section 2 of the South Carolina Constitution. However, these deductions are allowed and required by the South Carolina Code. S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-40 (Supp. 2004). Therefore Inmate will not be reimbursed for the wages deducted for room and board and victim assistance.

ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department determine from its records the number of hours Inmate was paid a training wage for hours worked in the Prison Industries System.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department calculate the wages owed to Inmate at the prevailing wage at the time in question and to pay Inmate the difference between the wages owed and the wages paid within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department provide proof to this Court that payment to Inmate has been made within five (5) days of the date of payment.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________

John D. McLeod

Administrative Law Judge

January 6, 2006

Columbia, South Carolina