SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

3. Petitioner Hubert E. Baldwin is a resident of Anderson County. He owns a 1998 Lincoln Town Car he purchased for $7,000 on March 25, 2003. Afterwards, Anderson County sent Petitioner a tax notice valuing his Town Car at $12,560. The taxes for that vehicle were due on July 23, 2003. Petitioner then sent a letter to the Anderson County Auditor's Office contesting the valuation of his Town Car because his purchase price was only $7,000 and the vehicle had been driven more than 150,000 miles. However, in that letter Petitioner incorrectly stated the year of his vehicle as 1988. He also failed to attach any supporting documentation.

After receiving Petitioner's letter, Ms. Weathers, a Research Analyst with the Anderson County Auditor's Office, called Petitioner and discussed the letter with him on June 16, 2003. During that “conference,” she verified the date of the vehicle and explained to Mr. Baldwin that he needed to complete a "Request for Review Form" and return it to the Auditor's Office along with a dealer appraisal or other supporting documentation. Ms. Weathers then mailed a blank "Request for Review Form" to Petitioner that same day. However, Petitioner did not return that form (or any other correspondence) to the Auditor's Office until August 25, 2004.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:

1. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600 (Supp. 2004) grants jurisdiction to the ALC to hear contested cases under the Administrative Procedures Act. S.C. Code Ann. §12-60-2920(A) (2000) authorizes the ALC to conduct contested case hearings concerning property tax assessment decisions made by county auditors.

2. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-210 (2000) defines property which is taxable in South Carolina as follows:

All real and personal property in this State, personal property of residents of this State which may be kept or used temporarily out of the State, with the intention of bringing it into the State, or which has been sent out of the State for sale and not yet sold, and all moneys, credits and investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies or otherwise of persons resident in this State shall be subject to taxation.

3. Petitioner contends that he timely appealed the accessed value of his vehicle. The Auditor argues that Petitioner failed to comply with the time frame to appeal to the Auditor set forth in S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2910 (2000). More specifically, the Auditor asserts that Petitioner failed to appeal his claim after his “conference” with the Auditor’s Office. Section 12-60-2910 provides, in part, that:

(A) A property taxpayer may object to a personal property tax assessment or a denial of a homestead exemption made by the county auditor by requesting, in writing, to meet with the auditor at any time on or before the later of:

(1) thirty days after the tax notice is mailed; or

(2) last day the tax levied upon the assessment may be timely paid.

(B) Within thirty days of the request for a meeting, or as soon thereafter as practical, the auditor shall schedule a conference with the taxpayer. If the matter is not resolved at the conference, the auditor shall advise the taxpayer of the right to protest and provide the taxpayer a form on which to file the protest. The taxpayer shall file with the auditor a written protest within thirty days after the date of the conference. The protest shall contain:

(1) the name, address, and phone number of the taxpayer;

(2) a copy of the tax notice or a description of the property including the receipt number of the tax notice;

(3) a statement of facts supporting the taxpayer's position;

(4) a statement outlining the reasons for the appeal, including any law or other authority upon which the taxpayer relies; and

(5) the value which the taxpayer considers the fair market value of the property.

Section 12-60-2910 sets forth fixed periods of time by which individuals can seek a review of their tax protest before the Auditor. “A statute of limitations has been defined as the action of the state in determining that after the lapse of a specified time a claim shall not be enforceable in a judicial proceeding. Thus, any law which creates a condition of the enforcement of a right to be performed within a fixed time may be defined as a statute of limitations.” 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 2 (1970). Furthermore,

There has been some difference of opinion among the authorities whether, at least in the absence of an expression of the legislature in this particular respect, the running of a statute of limitations operates to extinguish merely the remedy or to extinguish the substantive right as well as the remedy. The general rule in this respect, supported by the great preponderance of the authorities on the subject, is that a statute of limitations operates on the remedy directly only and does not extinguish the substantive right. Under this rule the courts have regarded true statutes of limitation as doing no more than cut off resort to the courts for enforcement of the substantive claim or right.

51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 22 (1970). I therefore find that Section 12-60-2910 operates as a "statute of limitations."

In this case, Petitioner properly objected to the accessed value of his vehicle. Afterwards, the Auditor's Office contacted him and informed him that they were unable to properly evaluate his objection without more information. He was further told he needed to file a written protest upon the appropriate form with documentation supporting his claim. Thereafter, the form was provided to Petitioner. Respondent Auditor contends that Ms. Weathers' June 16, 2003 telephone conversation with Petitioner was the “conference” required by Section 12-60-2910 (B).

A conference is “[a] meeting of several persons for deliberation, for the interchange of opinion, or for the removal of differences or disputes.” Black's Law Dictionary 296 (6^th ed. 1990). However, neither the definitions in Black's Law Dictionary or Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary set forth that the term conference means only a face-to-face meeting. See Merriam-Webster Online (2005), available at http://www.m-w.com. Furthermore, in Hoelzel v. First Select Corp., 214 F.R.D. 634, 55 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1118 (D. Colo. 2003), the Court addressed the meaning of a court rule that required a moving party to “confer or make a reasonable effort to confer” before filing a motion. The Court held that to satisfy the requirements of that rule, “the parties must hold a conference, possibly through the exchange of correspondence but preferably through person-to-person telephone calls or face-to-face meetings, and must compare views and attempt to reach an agreement, including by compromise if appropriate.” Id. at 636. Though Hoelzel is not directly on point, I find its reasoning persuasive in this case.

I find that a conference pursuant to Section 12-60-2910(B) may be either a face-to-face meeting or a person-to-person telephone call in which the Auditor's Office and taxpayer attempt to reach an agreement concerning the tax assessment. Accordingly, the telephone conference between Petitioner and the Auditor’s Office was a conference pursuant to Section 12-60-2910. During that conference, the Auditor’s Office advised Petitioner of his right to protest along with the information required by the Auditor and thereafter mailed him the form on which to properly protest the tax assessment. Therefore, Petitioner’s failure to either file an appeal within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the "Request for Review Form" or by the date the taxes were due precludes the ALC from hearing this matter.

ORDER

Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is dismissed.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________

Ralph King Anderson, III

Administrative Law Judge

June 28, 2005

Columbia, South Carolina