ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF CASE
This
matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) pursuant to the
appeal of Adrian L. Tribble, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of
Corrections (Department or DOC). Tribble was convicted of violating SCDC
Disciplinary Code § 809, Threatening to Inflict Harm on/Assaulting an Employee
and/or Member of the Public. As a result of his conviction, Tribble lost ninety
(90) days of “good-time” credit. Inmate Tribble filed a grievance with the
Department and received the Department’s final decision on or about January 18,
2005. On February 9, 2005, Inmate Tribble (Appellant) filed this appeal with
the Court.
BACKGROUND
On October 28,
2004, Corporal Harouff and Officer Rogers were assigned to move Appellant to
another cell. While they were preparing to pack his property, Appellant became
agitated and stated that he would not go to “lock up for PC.” Corporal Harouff
informed Appellant that he knew nothing about the reason for his transfer and
that he was simply there to pack his property. Appellant then took off his
shirt and responded that “your punk ass is going to have to come get me.”
Corporal Harouff and Officer Rogers then exited the cell. As soon as the door
shut, Appellant threw his breakfast tray at the cell door and then a chair.
When Corporal Harouff opened the door to retrieve the chair, Appellant stated
that “I got this cup of piss I’m going to throw on you when you come in here.”
The Department later recovered the cup which in fact contained urine.
Following the
incident, Corporal Harouff completed an Incident Report and submitted it to his
supervisor, Sergeant Fleming. Appellant was charged with violating SCDC
Disciplinary Code § 809, Threatening to Inflict Harm on/Assaulting an Employee
and/or Member of the Public. He was given written notice of the charges on November
3, 2004.
On November 3,
2004, a Major Disciplinary Hearing was held before a DOC Disciplinary Hearing
Officer (DHO) concerning the above charges. At Appellant’s request he was
provided a counsel substitute. Additionally, Appellant originally requested
that Corporal Harouff be present at the hearing. However, once at the hearing,
he waived that request. During the hearing, the DHO read a narrative of Corporal
Harouff’s Incident Report into the Record and received testimony from Inmate
Tribble and Corporal Wessinger. At the conclusion of the hearing, the DHO
found Appellant guilty of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 809, Threatening
to Inflict Harm on/Assault an Employee and/or Member of the Public, and
sanctioned him with the loss of ninety (90) days of good time credit. After
the hearing, the DHO completed a Major Disciplinary Report and Hearing Record
which documented the DHO’s findings.
Appellant filed a
grievance with the Department appealing his conviction of violating SCDC Disciplinary
Code § 809. After reviewing his contentions, the Warden denied Appellant’s
grievance. Appellant then appealed the Warden’s decision and the Department
subsequently denied that grievance, stating that the evidence supported the
conviction and that the sanction imposed was appropriate for the violation that
Appellant committed. This appeal followed.
In his Appeal
Brief, Appellant alleges that:
1. His due process rights were
violated because the Department failed to attach an “accessory memorandum” from
the mental health care professionals; and
2. He
was denied the right to call Sergeant Fowler.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The Court’s
jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527
S.E.2d 742 (2000). The Court’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is
limited to state created liberty interests typically involving: (1) cases in
which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated his
sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which
an inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary hearing as a result of
a serious rule violation. Id.
When reviewing the
Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the Court sits in an
appellate capacity. Id. at 756. Consequently, the review in these
inmate grievance cases is limited to the Record presented. An Administrative
Law Judge may not substitute his judgment for that of an agency “as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1‑23‑380(A)(6)
(Supp. 2004). Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may not reverse or
modify an agency’s decision unless substantial rights of the Appellant have
been prejudiced because the decision is clearly erroneous in view of the
substantial evidence on the whole Record, arbitrary or affected by an error of
law. See Section 1-23-380(A)(6); See also Marietta
Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety, 337 S.C. 133, 522
S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1999); South Carolina Dept. of Labor, Licensing and
Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 503
S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1998).
“‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence
viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering
the
Record as a whole, would allow
reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached
or must have reached in order to justify its action.” Lark v. Bi‑Lo,
276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). Accordingly, the possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Grant
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Additionally, in Superintendent,
Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the relevant
question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the
conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Moreover, in Al-Shabazz,
the Court underscored that since prison officials are in the best position to
decide inmate disciplinary matters, the Courts and therefore this tribunal
adhere to a “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and
procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz at
757; See also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d
779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of South Carolina
courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy).
In
this case, Appellant alleges that the Department should not have revoked his ninety
(90) days of accrued good time. Inmates have a protected liberty interest in
their earned statutory good-time credits under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Therefore, when, as here, the Department revokes an inmate’s good-time credits
as punishment in a “major disciplinary hearing” involving “more serious rule
violations,” prison officials must provide that inmate with “minimal due
process.” Al-Shabazz at 750. Consequently, specific administrative
procedures must be followed before depriving an inmate of statutorily granted
earned credit, including adequate advance notice of the charges, adequate
opportunity for a hearing in which the inmate can present witnesses and
documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing officer who prepares a written
statement of all the evidence presented and the reasons for his decision. Id. at 751 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct.
2963, 2978-82 (1974)).
DISCUSSION
The Appellant contends
his due process rights were violated because the Department failed to attach an
“accessory memorandum” from the mental health care professionals. SCDC
Policy/Procedure 22.14 § 3.5 provides that:
The supervisor will review the SCDC Form 19-29A, “Incident
Report” within 24 hours unless there are exceptional circumstances for delaying
this review. The review may include interviewing the reporting employee, other
employee witnesses, the accused inmate, or the accused inmate’s witnesses.
Upon review, the supervisor will make a determination whether to refer the
inmate to the Major/Responsible Authority (Responsible Authority includes the
Warden or Duty Warden, or for institutions with no Major assigned, the Captain)
for disciplinary action. The supervisor will document his/her review in the
space provided on SCDC Form 19-29A. (NOTE: When appropriate, this review
may include meeting with appropriate mental health care professionals to
determine the inmate’s mental status at the time of the offense. In these
instances, a memorandum from the mental health care professional must be
included as an attachment to SCDC Form 19-29A, “Incident Report,” attesting to
the inmate’s mental status and accountability for his/her actions.
(Emphasis added).
Clearly, Section 3.5
grants the reviewing supervisor discretion in determining whether to meet with
the appropriate mental health professional. Only when the supervisor elects to
conduct such a review is a memorandum required to be attached to the SCDC Incident
Report. Here, there is no evidence that the reviewing supervisor chose to meet
with a mental health professional concerning Appellant. Therefore, Appellant
failed to show the Department violated its policy. Moreover, Appellant failed
to explain why a memorandum from his mental health professional was essential
to his receiving due process at the disciplinary hearing. See Palmetto
Alliance, Inc. v. S. C. Public Service Comm’n., 282 S.C. 430, 319 S.E.2d
695 (1984) (To prove the denial of due process, a party must show that it has
been substantially prejudiced by the administrative process.).
Furthermore,
Appellant’s due process rights in this proceeding are summarized in Al-Shabazz,
supra. The Record indicates that Appellant received written notice of
the charges against him in excess of twenty-four (24) hours prior to a hearing
that was held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. At the
hearing, Appellant was given the opportunity to offer evidence, call witnesses,
and confront his accuser. In addition,
although not constitutionally required, Appellant was afforded a counsel
substitute who assisted him in his defense. After the DHO determined that
Appellant was guilty of the charged offense, he prepared a written report
detailing the evidence he relied upon and the penalty assessed in finding
Appellant guilty of the disciplinary infraction. Appellant was also permitted
to appeal the DHO’s decision through the inmate grievance process. Finally,
Appellant did not establish that he was adversely affected by the Department’s
incorrect spelling of his name on the Disciplinary Report and Hearing Record. I
find that Appellant was afforded all process due him pursuant to Al-Shabazz.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE
ORDERED that the appeal of Appellant Tribble is DISMISSED and the Final
Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED;
AND IT IS SO
ORDERED.
_________________________________
Ralph
K. Anderson, III
Administrative
Law Judge
June 1, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina |