The instant matter is a Motion
for Summary Judgment or in the alternative Motion to Dismiss filed on June 7,
2005 by South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR). The Motion argues that the
doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata prevent the granting of an
off-premises beer and wine permit to J & L Real Estate Holding, LLC d/b/a J
& L Quick Stop (J & L) thus requiring summary judgment to be entered in
favor of DOR. Under the record present in this case, the motion is granted.
J & L seeks an off‑premises
beer and wine permit for use at 219 Springs Street, Laurens, South Carolina.
However, the current application is not the first request made by J & L for
such a permit at this location. This same location was previously denied an
off-premises beer and wine permit by DOR with that denial upheld in a decision
by the Administrative Law Count (ALC) on September 23, 2003.
The September 23, 2003, decision
decided the issue of whether the location was a "proper one" within
the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 61-4-520(6) and (7). The decision made
a general finding that the location was not a proper location since "there
appears to be ample evidence in the record that the issuance of an off-premises
beer and wine permit at this location would have an adverse impact on the
community." Further, the decision based its denial on several specific
findings one of which was that "two churches [are] in close proximity to
the location."
The two churches addressed in the
2003 decision were Hillcrest Baptist Church and Trees of Righteousness. Those
same churches are in existence for the current application as well.
B. Applicable Law
1.
Introduction
Summary judgment is proper when
no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. R.J. Hendricks, II v. Clemson Univ.,
353 S.C. 449, 578 S.F.2d 711 (2003); Rule 56(c), SCRCP; Rule 68, SCRALC. Thus,
this case must establish the absence of any disputed material fact and that DOR
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under the theory of law of
collateral estoppel applicable to this case, no material facts are in dispute
and DOR is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Collateral
Estoppel
J & L is barred by collateral
estoppel from bringing the instant case. Collateral estoppel means that
"once judgment on the merits has been reached in a prior claim,
relitigation of those issues actually and necessarily litigated and determined
in the first suit are precluded in any subsequent action . . . " Nelson
v. QHG of South Carolina, Inc., 362 S.C. 421, 608 S.E.2d 855 (2005).
The first suit brought by J &
L litigated the issue of whether the 219 Springs Street, Laurens, South
Carolina location was a proper location. At that earlier hearing, evidence and
argument was presented by J & L seeking to show the location was proper.
However, on September 23, 2003, the ALC held the location was not a proper one
for a beer and wine permit within the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. Sec.
61-4-520(6) and (7).
The 2003 findings are relevant to
the instant case. While the court made several general findings supporting its
conclusion that the location was improper, it specifically held that "two
churches [are] in close proximity to the location." Such a finding is by
itself a proper basis for denying a beer and wine permit. Moore v. S.C.
ABC Comm'n, 308 S.C. 160, 417 S.E.2d 555 (1992). In fact, where an
improper proximity to churches exists, any other evidence concerning the
location is "immaterial [s]ince such factors are not necessary . . . to
the [ALC's] determination, [and] there[fore] would be [of] no benefit to
allowing further evidence to be presented on these factors."). Byers
v. South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Com'n, 305 S.C. 243, 407
S.E.2d 653 (1991).
Accordingly, the issue litigated
in 2003 resulted in a finding of an improper proximity to churches and,
therefore, a denial of the permit. Thus, if the churches are in the same
location today as they were in 2003, such a finding makes all other factors
addressing the appropriateness of the location irrelevant and immaterial. Id.
From the maps in evidence, it is
undisputed that the two churches are still situated at their same locations
today as they were in 2003. Thus, the proximity of the churches was fully
litigated in 2003 and cannot now be relitigated again in 2005. Such
relitigation is barred by collateral estoppel. Therefore, the Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted in favor of DOR, the permit is denied, and this
case is ended.
III. Order
The Motion for Summary Judgment
is granted in favor of DOR. DOR shall deny the requested permit, and this case
is ended with prejudice.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED
______________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative
Law Judge
Dated: June 23, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina
