ORDERS:
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter came before the undersigned for a contested case hearing pursuant to S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-23-600 (Supp. 2003) and S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2540 (Supp. 2003). The
Petitioner is appealing the Jasper County Assessor's valuation of her real property also known as
Tax Map Sheet Number (TMS#) 063-30-03-003 for the 2003 tax year. The Jasper County
Assessor had assigned a valuation of $150,000.00 to that parcel of land. Prior to the hearing into
this matter, a hearing was scheduled below before the Jasper County Board of Assessment
Appeals on October 7, 2004. The Petitioner did not attend the hearing and an entry of default
was entered in writing against Petitioner on that same date. A request for a contested case
hearing was filed by Petitioner with the Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) on January 3,
2005.
After notice to the parties, a hearing was held on April 5, 2005, at the offices of the
Administrative Law Court in Columbia, South Carolina.
Prior to the hearing, Respondent Jasper County Assessor filed a Motion to Dismiss which
set forth that Respondent complied with a prior Final Order and Decision issued by the
Honorable C. Dukes Scott on this same matter and that there have been no changes in the facts
surrounding the valuation of TMS # 063-30-03-003.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner is the owner of two parcels of land bearing TMS Numbers 063-30-03-003
(“larger tract”) and 063-30-03–025 (“smaller tract”) in Ridgeland, South Carolina. She has
previously appealed the Assessor’s determination of the property’s value to the ALC on two
occasions. In the first case, the Honorable John D. Geathers determined in a Final Order dated
October 13, 2000, that the value of the two parcels was $84,000.00. Afterwards, the Jasper
County Assessor implemented a county-wide reassessment program for the 2001 tax year in
2000. As a result, the Assessor determined the assessed value of the larger parcel to be
$121,100.00 and the assessed value of the smaller parcel to be $60,600.00. However, after
holding a contested case hearing concerning that valuation, Judge Scott determined that the
value of the two parcels was $150,000.00 in a Final Order issued on August 23, 2002. Neither
the Jasper County Assessor nor Petitioner appealed Judge Scott's decision.
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2510 (A)(4) provides, in part:
In years when there is no notice of property tax assessment, the property taxpayer
must, by March first, give the assessor written notice of objection to one or more
of the following: the fair market value, the special use value, the assessment ratio,
and the property tax assessment.
It is unclear which exact tax year Petitioner is appealing.
Nevertheless, Petitioner is seeking
another hearing concerning the valuation of the exact property that was determined by Judge
Scott in August 2002. “Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, once a final judgment on the
merits has been reached in a prior claim, relitigation of those issues actually and necessarily
litigated and determined in the first suit is precluded as to the parties and their privies in any
subsequent action based upon a different claim.” Richburg v. Baughman, 290 S.C. 431, 434, 351
S.E.2d 164, 166 (1986); see also Carman v. South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control
Comm'n, 317 S.C. 1, 451 S.E.2d 383 (1994) (applying collateral estoppel in administrative
proceedings). Furthermore, “[r]es judicata precludes the parties from relitigating issues actually
litigated and those that might have been litigated in the first action.” South Carolina Dept. of
Social Services v. Basnight, 346 S.C. 241, 249, 551 S.E.2d 274, 278 (Ct. App. 2001); see also
Bennett v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 305 S.C. 310, 408 S.E.2d 230 (1991). “In order
for the doctrine of res judicata to apply, the following elements must be shown: (1) the identities
of the parties are the same as the prior litigation; (2) the subject matter is the same as the prior
litigation; and (3) there was a prior adjudication of the issue by a court of competent
jurisdiction.” Basnight at 278.
However, “[w]here, after the rendition of a judgment, subsequent events occur, creating a
new legal situation or altering the legal rights or relations of the litigants, the judgment may
thereby be precluded from operating as an estoppel. In such case, the earlier adjudication is not
permitted to bar a new action to vindicate rights subsequently acquired, even if the same
property is the subject matter of both actions.” 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 567 (1994). “In this
connection, it has been declared that a judgment is not res judicata as to rights which were not in
existence at the time of the rendition of the judgment.” Mosely v. Welch, 218 S.C. 242, 62
S.E.2d 313, 319 (1950). Nevertheless, “the enforcement of the rule of res judicata may not be
avoided by the discovery of new evidence bearing on a fact or issue involved in the original
action, as distinguished from a subsequent fact or event, which creates a legal situation.” Id.;
see also Plum Creek Development Co., Inc. v. City of Conway, 334 S.C. 30, 512 S.E.2d 106
(1999).
Here, the issue of the value of Petitioner's property was litigated by the same parties and
decided by Judge Scott on August 23, 2002. Petitioner does not dispute that the vast majority of
the evidence presented in this case would be the same evidence presented before Judge Scott.
Nevertheless, Petitioner argues that this case should not be estopped based upon newly
discovered evidence. She contends that she recently discovered that the Assessor relied upon the
Marshall & Swift Commercial Estimator Program in making its assessment of the value of her
property. She argues that the Marshall & Swift Program shows that the Assessor’s valuation of
the property was based upon erroneous application of the Marshall & Swift data. However, the
Marshall & Swift evidence Petitioner now claims warrants another review of this case is
evidence that was available before the previous hearing into this matter.
Petitioner also contends that there is new Marshall & Swift data that has been made
available since the previous trial before Judge Scott that warrants another hearing into this
matter.
The Assessor contends that though Marshall & Swift does issue revised reports to
update its property values, those reports do not reflect any decrease in the value of Petitioner’s
property. In other words, there is no new evidence in those reports reflecting a lower value of
Petitioner’s property. Furthermore, Petitioner did not present any argument or evidence that the
new data would reflect a lower property value than the data available when the previous case
into this matter was heard.
Therefore, based on the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
________________________________
Ralph King Anderson, III
Administrative Law Judge
May 19, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina |
