ORDERS:
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This
matter is before the Administrative Law Court (“ALC” or “court”) on a Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by the Respondent, South Carolina Budget and Control
Board, South Carolina Retirement Systems (“SCRS”). For the reasons that
follow, SCRS’s motion is granted.
Summary
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), SCRCP;
Rule 68, ALC Rules of Procedure; see also Henderson v. Allied
Signal, Inc., 373 S.C. 179, 183, 644 S.E.2d 724, 726 (2007). Summary
judgment is designed to expedite disposition of cases that do not require the
services of a fact finder. Austin v. Beaufort County Sheriff’s Office,
377 S.C. 31, 34, 659 S.E.2d 122, 123 (2008).
In
the instant case, the parties agree upon the material facts. Petitioner Leroy Conner
(“Conner”) is a sixty-four year old retired member of SCRS. He retired from
employment with the State Board for Technical and Comprehensive Education
(“Technical College Board”) on July 22, 2006, under a service retirement
allowance. His last date on the payroll of the Technical College Board was
July 21, 2006. On July 31, 2006, SCRS issued Conner’s first monthly retirement
benefit check. On August 1, 2006, Conner inquired with SCRS about the
possibility of applying for disability retirement benefits. On August 22,
2006, SCRS explained by letter to Conner that he was ineligible to apply for
disability retirement benefits because he was no longer a “member in service.” After
exhausting his administrative appeals, Conner filed a request for a contested
case hearing with this court.
Section
9-1-1540 of the South Carolina Code provides:
Upon the application of a
member in service or of his employer, a member in service on or after July 1,
1970, who has had five or more years of earned service or a contributing member
who is disabled as a result of an injury arising out of and in the course of
the performance of his duties regardless of the length of membership on or
after July 1, 1985, may be retired by the board not less than thirty days and
not more than nine months next following the date of filing the application on
a disability retirement allowance if the system, after a medical examination of
the member, certifies that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated
for the further performance of duty, that the incapacity is likely to be
permanent, and that the member should be retired.
S.C. Code Ann. §
9-1-1540 (Supp. 2007). Case law is clear that the plain language of this
provision requires that a member seeking disability retirement benefits file an
application while he or she is still “in service.” Lazicki-Thomas v. S.C.
Budget & Control Bd., 378 S.C. 72, 661
S.E.2d 374 (2008) (holding that § 9-1-1540 requires that an employee’s application
for disability retirement benefits must be filed while the applicant is an
employee of a covered employer in the retirement system in question); Anderson
v. S.C. Budget & Control Bd., Docket No. 06-ALJ-30-0008-CC, slip op. at
12-13 (S.C. Admin. Law Ct. Aug. 21, 2006) (en banc).
Although
Conner does not dispute that he retired from service with the Technical College
Board on July 22, 2006, he argues that because his last paycheck was not issued
until August 16, 2006, his contract of employment was in effect until that
date. Conner relies on the language in Anderson stating that “member in
service” means “a person having the status of an employee by virtue of a
contract of employment that is in effect at the time the application for
disability benefits is filed.” Anderson, Docket No. 06-ALJ-30-0008-CC,
slip op. at 12-13. He contends that because the Technical College Board did
not fulfill its duties under the contract to pay Conner for his services until
August 16, 2008, he was “in service” until that date. The court disagrees.
A
promisor may have obligations that survive the term of a contract. See 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 421 (1999) (“Upon the expiration of the period
prescribed in the agreement, the agreement ceases to exist, and its provisions
ordinarily have no force and effect in the future; but rights and obligations
which have accrued are not affected by the expiration of a contract.”). Thus,
the fact that a party’s promise may remain executory does not extend the term
of the contract. Here, Conner’s contract of employment indisputably ended with
his service retirement. The Board had no obligation to pay Conner for services
performed after July 21, 2006. Its executory promise to pay Conner for
services rendered prior to July 22, 2006 does not render the contractual
relationship extant.
The
undisputed facts show that Conner retired from service with the Technical
College Board as of July 22, 2006. He did not attempt to apply for disability
retirement benefits until August 1, 2006, when he was no longer a “member in
service.” Accordingly, he is ineligible to apply for disability retirement
benefits, and SCRS is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
It
is therefore
ORDERED that SCRS’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
IT
IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
PAIGE J.
GOSSETT
Administrative
Law Judge
August 5, 2008
Columbia, South Carolina
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