ORDERS:
ORDER OF REMAND
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
The South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles appeals from
an Order of Dismissal that the South Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings
(DMVH) issued following a hearing conducted pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §
56-9-363 (2006). The Department argues that the DMVH hearing officer erroneously
rescinded the suspension of the vehicle registration privilege of Respondent Sean
Martin. The Department also filed a motion to supplement the Record on Appeal.
The Administrative Law Court (ALC) has jurisdiction to hear this matter
pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2007). For the following reasons,
the Order of Dismissal is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the DMVH for
a new hearing. The motion to supplement the Record on Appeal is denied.
BACKGROUND
On
January 30, 2006, the Department received a letter from Wilber & Associates,
a law firm representing the insurer for Hampton Auto, indicating that its
insured sustained $18,262.76 worth of damage as a result of a motor vehicle accident
involving Martin’s vehicle on March 8, 2005. On March 17, 2006, the Department
sent Martin written notice that, as a result of the accident, his driving and registration
privileges in South Carolina would be suspended pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-351
(2006). Respondent requested a hearing to challenge the suspension, which was conducted
on May 16, 2006. On that same date, the DMVH hearing officer issued an Order of
Dismissal, pursuant to ALC Rule 23, in which he rescinded Respondent’s suspension.
Specifically, the hearing officer found that “[t]here was no evidence/testimony
corroborating that the Respondent’s vehicle had been involved in an
accident/collision.” On appeal, this court reversed the Order of Dismissal on
the ground that the record included the letter from Wilber & Associates and
that, therefore, sufficient evidence indicated that Martin’s vehicle had been
involved in an accident. On remand, the DMVH hearing officer dismissed this
case on the ground that no evidence showed that Martin had been notified of the
suspension within sixty (60) days of the Department’s receipt of a report of
the accident.
ISSUE
ON APPEAL
Did the DMVH hearing officer err by dismissing this case on the ground
that there was no evidence showing that the Respondent had been notified of the
suspension within sixty (60) days of the Department’s receipt of a report of the
accident?
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The
DMVH is authorized by law to decide contested cases arising from the
Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2007). Therefore, the
DMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review
governs appeals from DMVH decisions. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380
(Supp. 2007); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human
Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995). The
standard used by appellate bodies, including the ALC, to review agency
decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007). This
section provides:
The court may not
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency
or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify
the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess
of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon
unlawful procedure;
(d) affected
by other error of law;
(e) clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or
capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007). Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2007), administrative law judges must conduct appellate review in the same manner
prescribed in section 1-23-380(A).
DISCUSSION
The
Department seeks to supplement the Record on Appeal with documentation showing
that Martin could not have been prejudiced by any delay in the suspension of
his vehicle registration privilege. The Department also requests this court to
consider the documents for the purpose of ruling on the substantive elements of
Martin’s case rather than remanding the case for a new hearing. S.C. Code Ann.
§ 1-23-380(A)(4) (Supp. 2007) and ALC Rule 36(G) prohibit an administrative law
judge from considering any fact which does not appear in the Record on Appeal.
An allegation of procedural irregularities in the hearing below may merit the
taking of proof independent of the record for the purpose of establishing those
irregularities. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(4) (Supp. 2007). However, the evidence that
the Department asks this court to consider does not fit that description.
Further, the Department has failed to convince this court that it was prevented
from presenting the evidence to the DMVH on the day of the hearing. Therefore,
the motion to supplement the Record on Appeal is denied.
Regarding the sixty-day
deadline, Section 56-9-351 provides:
Within sixty days of
receipt of a report of a motor vehicle accident within this State which has
resulted in bodily injury or death or damage to the property of any one person
in the amount of two hundred dollars or more, the Department of Motor Vehicles
shall suspend the license of each operator or driver if he is the owner of the
motor vehicle involved in the accident and all registrations of each owner of a
motor vehicle involved in the accident. If the operator or driver is a
nonresident, the privilege of operating a motor vehicle within this State and
the privilege of the use within this State of a motor vehicle owned by him is
suspended unless the operator, driver or owner, or both, deposits security in a
sum not less than two hundred dollars or an additional amount as the department
may specify that will be sufficient to satisfy a judgment that may be recovered
for damages resulting from the accident which may be recovered against the
operator or owner. Notice of the suspension must be sent by the department to
the operator and owner at least ten days before the effective date of the
suspension and shall state the amount required as security.
S.C. Code Ann. §
56-9-351 (2006). Here, the Department argues that the DMVH hearing officer erred
by rescinding its suspension of Martin’s vehicle registration privilege. Specifically,
the Department argues that section 56-9-351 contains no language regarding the
consequences if the Department misses the sixty-day deadline and that,
therefore, it is impermissible to assume that the legislature intended the
Department to lose its power to act for failing to comply with the statutory
time limit.
The
Department is correct in its assertion that the lack of language imposing consequences
for its failure to meet the sixty-day deadline should not affect the
Department’s power to suspend a driver’s license or vehicle registration. See Johnston v. S.C. Dep’t of Labor, Licensing, & Regulation, S.C. Real
Estate Appraisers Bd., 365 S.C. 293, 617 S.E.2d 363 (2005) (failure by
Board to serve written notice of decision on licensee within statutory time
limit did not affect Board’s jurisdiction because statute did not set forth
consequences for failure to serve written notice of decision within statutory
time limit); S.C. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles v. Vera, 06-ALJ-21-0325-AP, 2007 WL 1365849 (April 9, 2007) (even if second
hearing officer had possessed authority to issue sua sponte order reversing
first hearing officer’s order for failure to issue order within statutory
deadline, second hearing officer’s order would still merit reversal because
statute did not set forth consequences for failure to issue order within
statutory time limit and it would be wrong to assume that legislature intended
for motorist to have license reinstated as result of such failure).
More
importantly, when a motorist or vehicle owner seeks a hearing under section
56-9-363, compliance with the sixty-day deadline of section 56-9-351 is not
part of the Department’s prima facie case. Under the plain language of the
statute, the only prerequisite for suspending a license or registration is “receipt
of a report of a motor vehicle accident within this State which has resulted in
bodily injury or death or damage to the property of any one person in the
amount of two hundred dollars or more[.]” The sixty-day deadline pertains only to the manner in which the Department
must carry out its duty to suspend the license or registration. Further, the
sixty-day deadline does not pertain to the notice that a motorist or vehicle
owner must receive. Rather, it pertains to the time within which the
Department must suspend the license. The last sentence of section 56-9-351
sets forth the notice that the motorist or vehicle owner must receive:
Notice of the
suspension must be sent by the [D]epartment to the operator and owner at least
ten days before the effective date of the suspension and shall state the amount
required as security.
Because
the hearing officer misconstrued section 56-9-351 by expanding its operation,
his rescission of Martin’s suspension was based on an error of law. See Floyd v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 367 S.C. 253, 260, 626 S.E.2d 6, 10 (2005) (cardinal
rule of statutory interpretation is
to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature); Cooper v. Moore, 351 S.C. 207, 212, 569 S.E.2d 330, 332 (2002) (where the terms of the statute are clear, the court must apply those terms
according to their literal meaning, without resort to subtle or forced
construction to limit or expand the statute's operation). Therefore, the DMVH’s
rescission of the Department’s suspension must be reversed. See S.C.
Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5)(d) (Supp. 2007) (ALC may reverse or modify agency
decision if substantial rights of appellant have been prejudiced because administrative
conclusions are affected by error of law).
Accordingly,
the DMVH’s Amended Order of Dismissal is reversed and, because this case was
summarily dismissed without a full hearing, this matter is remanded to the DMVH
for a new hearing.
ORDER
IT
IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the DMVH’s Amended Order of Dismissal is REVERSED,
and that this matter is remanded to the DMVH for a new hearing.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
JOHN D. GEATHERS
June 10, 2008 Administrative
Law Judge
Columbia, South Carolina 1205
Pendleton Street, Suite 224
Columbia, South Carolina 29201-3731
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