SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

STATEMENT OF CASE

THIS MATTER is an appeal by the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (the “Department”) from the Final Order and Decision by the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles Hearings (the “DMVH”). The DMVH’s Order was issued in connection with an administrative hearing that was held pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090(c) (Supp. 2006). The Department contends that the DMVH hearing officer erroneously reduced the Habitual Offender suspension of Martina Gee (“Respondent”). The Administrative Law Court (“ALC”) has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Upon consideration of the record, the DMVH’s Order is REVERSED.

BACKGROUND

The license to operate a motor vehicle upon South Carolina’s public highways is not a property right, but is a mere privilege subject to reasonable regulations in the interests of public safety and welfare. Sponar v. S.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 361 S.C. 35, 39, 603 S.E.2d 412, 415 (Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted on November 17, 2005 (quoting Summersell v. S.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 334 S.C. 357, 366, 513 S.E.2d 619, 624 (Ct. App. 1999), vacated in part on other grounds, 337 S.C. 19, 522 S.E.2d 144 (1999)). Consistent with this principle, S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090, as amended provides in pertinent part:

“No license to operate motor vehicles in this State may be issued to an habitual offender … (a) for a period of five years from the date of a final decision by the Department of Motor Vehicles that a person is an habitual offender … (c) until, upon petition and for good cause shown, the department may restore to the person the privilege to operate a motor vehicle ….”

Prior to January 1, 2006, the Department’s Office of Administrative Hearings held the hearings requested under Section 56-5-2951(B)(2). However, in the summer of 2005, S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 was extensively amended by Act No. 128, § 22, 2005 S.C. Acts 1503 (the “DMVH Act”). Pursuant to the amended Section 1-23-660, the DMVH was created as a division of the ALC and, as of January 1, 2006, “the duties, functions, and responsibilities of all hearing officers and associated staff” of the Department were transferred to the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Therefore, it is now the DMVH that conducts these hearings.

HISTORY

On February 8, 2005, Respondent was adjudicated as a Habitual Offender under S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 (2006) with the five (5) year suspension beginning March 20, 2005 and ending March 20, 2010. On May 11, 2007, after having served a suspension of more than two (2) years, Respondent filed a Petition under S.C. Code Ann §56-1-1090 seeking to have her S.C. Driver’s License restored and her privilege to drive reinstated.

The DMVH scheduled a hearing for June 27, 2007, and the Department Hearing Officer (“DHO”) issued a Final Order and Decision on June 29, 2007, that granted Respondent’s petition for a reduction of her Habitual Offender suspension.

FACTS

On February 8, 2005, Respondent was convicted of Driving Under Suspension (“DUS”) for her third major motor vehicle offense in three (3) years, making her a Habitual Offender under Section 56-1-1020. Respondent’s driver’s license was suspended for five (5) years beginning on March 20, 2005 and ending on May 20, 2010. The Ten (10) Year Driver Record entered into the record for the DMVH hearing indicated that Respondent violated her Habitual Offender Suspension on May 12, 2005. At the time of the DMVH hearing, Respondent’s driving history was comprised of four (4) DUS violations, two (2) suspensions for Failure to Pay Traffic Ticket(s), and one (1) violation for Failure to Surrender Suspended Vehicle Registration or Plate.

On May 11, 2007, Respondent filed a petition to request a hearing for a Habitual Offender suspension reduction. In the petition, Respondent stated in support of good cause shown that she had learned her lesson and that she needed to be able to drive to her new full-time job. Respondent also stated that she planned on going back to school at night and that the cost of taking a taxi would be expensive. On May 25, 2007, the Department filed an Objection to Request for Reduction of Habitual Offender suspension that alleged Respondent was not eligible for a reduction because she violated her Habitual Offender suspension.

The DMVH notified the parties that a hearing would be held on June 27, 2007. At the hearing, the DHO questioned Respondent about the circumstances giving rise to her Habitual Offender suspension. The DHO suggested that the three (3) DUS violations resulted from Respondent’s failure to pay a traffic ticket. In response to the questioning pertaining to good cause for the reduction, Respondent stated that she was more responsible and that she knew the difference between right and wrong. She also responded affirmatively to the DHO when she was asked if she felt more mature.

On June 29, 2007, the DHO issued a Final Order and Decision finding good cause based on the fact that Respondent had served two (2) years and three (3) months of the Habitual Offender suspension. The DHO also stated that, despite the Habitual Offender suspension violation, Respondent was “in the process of complying with all the rules and regulations required of a Habitual Offender.” The Department now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The DMVH is authorized by law to determine contested cases arising from the Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Therefore, the DMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review governs appeals from decisions of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A) (Supp. 2006); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995). The standard used by appellate bodies, including the ALC, to review agency decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2006) (directing Administrative Law Judges to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in Section 1-23-380(A)). This section provides:

The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006).

A decision is supported by “substantial evidence” when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton v. Best Western Royal Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68 (Ct. App. 1984). A decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable minds may differ on the judgment. Lark, 276 S.C. at 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307. The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm’n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995).

In applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire Co., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996) (citing Kearse v. State Health and Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995)). The party challenging an agency action has the burden of proving convincingly that the agency’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters, 321 S.C. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

1.                  Did the DHO err in determining that the Respondent had made a showing of good cause under Section 56-1090 despite evidence in the record that she had driven and was found guilty of a traffic violation after being declared a habitual offender?

The Habitual Offender laws of South Carolina exist to discourage repeat offenders and to keep the highways free from drivers that threaten the safety of others. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1010 (2006). Included in the enumerated offenses that qualifies as a Habitual Offender violation is Driving Under Suspension. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020(a)(4). Upon the commission of three such offenses, a driver is deemed a habitual offender under the laws of the State. Id. The public policy of Chapter 1 of Title 56 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina exist to keep the roads safe and to enforce compliance with the laws of the State.

No clear objective standard of what constitutes “good cause” is found, but South Carolina law suggests that the facts must extend beyond those that are merely personal in nature and common to the population in general (italicized portion added by this Court). See Faile v. South Carolina Employment Sec. Commission, 267 S.C. 536, 541-542 (1976) (finding that the meaning of “good cause” within the provisions of S.C. Unemployment Compensation Law did not contemplate benefits for an employee that was compelled to quit her job solely based on personal circumstances.); see also Ex parte Capital U-Drive-It, 369 S.C. 1, 13 (2006) (finding that appellant did not establish good cause to keep his family court records sealed where he claimed the records contained extremely personal, private, and confidential matters.). Determining whether good cause is shown involves a balancing of the needs of the parties as they weigh against public policy. See Doe v. Ward Firm, P.A., 353 S.C. 509, 514 (2003) (finding good cause to examine the medical records of the biological parents based on the compelling needs of the adopted child, and by balancing the privacy rights of the parties against the best interest of the child). Ultimately, the finding of good cause, or lack thereof, must be made by the Court on a case by case basis.[1]

In this case, Respondent stated in her petition for a suspension reduction and in the DMVH hearing, that she needs her license in order to be able to drive to work. Respondent alleged that she learned her lesson and has subsequently matured and has become more responsible. Unfortunately, Respondent did not advance any other evidence pertaining to good cause other than her personal needs. The Court does not find that Respondent’s assertions are different from any other person in the general population, who would also require the privilege to drive. Nor does the Court find that Respondent’s suspension precipitated merely from a failure to pay a traffic ticket as suggested by the DHO. The Court finds that the DHO was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

On June 21, 2002, Respondent received her first DUS violation for driving with a license that had been suspended for failure to pay a traffic ticket. After failing to surrender her license, Respondent received a motor vehicle violation on January 15, 2004 for Failure to Surrender Suspended Vehicle Registration or Plate. Respondent did not surrender her license until February 13, 2004, which was three days after she received her second DUS violation. After her third DUS violation, on January 11, 2005, the Department informed Respondent by mailing an official notice dated February 18, 2005. The letter informed Respondent of her right to a hearing, and the notice stated when the Habitual Offender suspension would begin and end. Despite Respondent’s previous violations and the notice of her official Habitual Offender status, Respondent continued to drive and received another DUS violation on May 12, 2005.

While the Court is very much sympathetic with the personal needs of Respondent and cognizant of the personal difficulties that can arise without having a valid driver’s license, the Court is not presented with any substantial evidence of good cause that outweighs the public policy behind the Habitual Offender laws of the State. The plain fact is that Respondent’s driving record demonstrated a repeated indifference for the laws of the State. After reviewing the record in its entirety, the Court finds that the DHO was in error in allowing a reduction of the Habitual Offender suspension.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Order of the DHO is REVERSED.

________________________________

John D. McLeod, Judge

S.C. Administrative Law Court

March 5, 2008

Columbia, SC