ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF CASE
THIS
MATTER comes before the Administrative Law Court (the “ALC” of “Court”) from
the appeal of the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (the
“Department”) with regard to the Final Order and Decision issued by the South
Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles Hearings (the “DMVH”) in the contested
case of Berrino McClary (“Respondent”). The DMVH’s Order was issued in
connection with an administrative hearing that was held pursuant to S.C. Code
Ann. § 56-1-1090(c) (Supp. 2006). The ALC has jurisdiction to hear this matter
pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Upon consideration of the
record, the DMVH’s Order is REVERSED.
BACKGROUND
The
license to operate a motor vehicle upon South Carolina’s public highways is not
a property right, but is a mere privilege subject to reasonable regulations in
the interests of public safety and welfare. Sponar v. S.C. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, 361 S.C. 35, 39, 603 S.E.2d 412, 415 (Ct. App. 2004), cert.
granted on November 17, 2005 (quoting Summersell v. S.C. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety, 334 S.C. 357, 366, 513 S.E.2d 619, 624 (Ct. App. 1999), vacated
in part on other grounds, 337 S.C. 19, 522 S.E.2d 144 (1999)). Consistent
with this principle, S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090, as amended provides in
pertinent part:
“No license to
operate motor vehicles in this State may be issued to an habitual offender …
(a) for a period of five years from the date of a final decision by the
Department of Motor Vehicles that a person is an habitual offender … (c) until,
upon petition and for good cause shown, the department may restore to the
person the privilege to operate a motor vehicle ….”
Prior
to January 1, 2006, the Department’s Office of Administrative Hearings held the
hearings requested under Section 56-5-2951(B)(2). However, in the summer of
2005, S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 was extensively amended by Act No. 128, § 22,
2005 S.C. Acts 1503 (the “DMVH Act”). Pursuant to the amended Section 1-23-660,
the DMVH was created as a division of the ALC and, as of January 1, 2006, “the
duties, functions, and responsibilities of all hearing officers and associated
staff” of the Department were transferred to the DMVH. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Therefore, it is now the DMVH that conducts
these hearings.
HISTORY
On February 19, 2004, Respondent was adjudicated as a
Habitual Offender under S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 (2006) with the five (5)
year suspension beginning June 24, 2004 and ending June 24, 2009. On May 15,
2007, after having served a suspension of almost three (3) years, Respondent
filed a Petition under S.C. Code Ann §56-1-1090 seeking to have his S.C.
Driver’s License restored and his privilege to drive reinstated.
The DMVH scheduled a hearing for June 27, 2007, and the
Department Hearing Officer (“DHO”) issued a Final Order and Decision on June 29,
2007, that granted Respondent’s petition for a reduction of his Habitual
Offender suspension.
FACTS
On
February 19, 2004, Respondent was convicted of Driving Under Suspension (“DUS”)
for his third major motor vehicle offense in three years, making him a Habitual
Offender under Section 56-1-1020. Respondent’s driver’s license was suspended
for five (5) years beginning on June 24, 2004 and ending on June 24, 2009. The
Ten (10) Year Driving Record that was entered into the record for the DMVH
hearing contained the following violations and offenses: three (3) DUS
violations, three (3) Careless or negligent driving offenses, five (5) speeding
tickets – which included two incidences of driving in excess of twenty-five
miles per hour over the posted speed limit, four (4) suspensions for Failure to
Pay Traffic Ticket, one (1) offense of Operating an Uninsured Motor Vehicle,
and one (1) violation of the Habitual Offender Suspension.
On
May 15, 2007, Respondent filed a petition for a Habitual Offender suspension
reduction. The Department filed an Objection To Request For Reduction Of
Habitual Offender Suspension based on Respondent’s motor vehicle offense from
May 20, 2005, which was a violation of his Habitual Offender suspension. The
DMVH notified the parties that an administrative hearing regarding Respondent’s
petition would be held on February 26, 2007.
At
the DMVH hearing, which was attended by Respondent and his counsel, Respondent
admitted that he violated the terms of his Habitual Offender suspension. Respondent
noted, however, that he had not driven in more than two (2) years despite his
violation. Respondent also testified that it was personally difficult not
having a license, because he worked the swing shift and lived apart from his children.
He stated that Kingstree, S.C., where he lived, had no public transportation
and he relied upon his mother for transportation. Concerning good cause for the
reduction, Respondent stated that he felt more mature and more responsible
because of his family obligations. Respondent also entered into the record a
couple affidavits that attested to Respondent’s good character and the personal
benefits he could attain by having a valid license.
On
June 29, 2007, the DHO issued a Final Order and Decision (“Order”) finding good
cause to reduce the Habitual Offender suspension based in part on the fact that
Respondent’s record did not contain driving under the influence or controlled
substance offenses. The DHO also found that Respondent had become more mature
and responsible and had learned from his past mistakes. The Department now
appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
DMVH is authorized by law to determine contested cases arising from the
Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Therefore, the
DMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review
governs appeals from decisions of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A) (Supp. 2006); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human
Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995). The
standard used by appellate bodies, including the ALC, to review agency
decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2006) (directing Administrative Law Judges
to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in Section
1-23-380(A)). This section provides:
The court may not substitute its judgment
for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for
further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the
agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation
of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of
the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful
procedure;
(d) affected by other
error of law;
(e) clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(f) arbitrary
or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006).
A
decision is supported by “substantial evidence” when the record as a whole
allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton
v. Best Western Royal Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68
(Ct. App. 1984). A decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable
minds may differ on the judgment. Lark, 276 S.C. at 136, 276 S.E.2d
304, 307. The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility
of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the
agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm’n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391
(1995).
In
applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the
administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire
Co., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996) (citing Kearse
v. State Health and Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d
892, 893 (1995)). The party challenging an agency action has the burden of
proving convincingly that the agency’s decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence. Waters, 321 S.C. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the Administrative Hearing Officer err in finding that the
Respondent had made a showing of good cause under Section 56-1-1090?
State
policy maximizes highway safety by denying the privilege of driving from
individuals who repeatedly demonstrate an indifference to the safety of others
and disrespect for the laws of the State. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1010. An
individual who accumulates three or more motor vehicle offense during a three
year period, which includes driving with a suspended or revoked license, shall
be declared a Habitual Offender. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 (2006). Violation
of the Habitual Offender suspension is a felony that is punishable by up to
five (5) years in prison. S.C. Code Ann. §56-1-1100. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, however, the State has seen fit to allow a reduction of a Habitual
Offender suspension from five years to two years for “good cause shown.” S.C.
Code Ann. § 56-1-1090(c) (Supp. 2006).
No
clear objective standard of what constitutes “good cause” is found, but South Carolina law suggests that the facts must extend beyond those that are merely
personal in nature and common to the population in general (italicized
portion added by this Court). See Faile v. South Carolina Employment
Sec. Commission, 267 S.C. 536, 541-542 (1976) (finding that the meaning of
“good cause” within the provisions of S.C. Unemployment Compensation Law did
not contemplate benefits for an employee that was compelled to quit her job
solely based on personal circumstances.); see also Ex parte
Capital U-Drive-It, 369 S.C. 1, 13 (2006) (finding that appellant did not
establish good cause to keep his family court records sealed where he claimed
the records contained extremely personal, private, and confidential matters.).
Determining whether good cause is shown involves a balancing of the needs of
the parties as they weigh against public policy. See Doe v. Ward
Firm, P.A., 353 S.C. 509, 514 (2003) (finding good cause to examine the
medical records of the biological parents based on the compelling needs of the
adopted child, and by balancing the privacy rights of the parties against the
best interest of the child). Ultimately, the finding of good cause, or lack
thereof, must be made by the Court on a case by case basis.
Here,
Respondent’s Habitual Offender suspension arose from three DUS offenses that
accrued within an eight (8) month period between May 2003 and January 2004. Further
inquiry into Respondent’s driving record reveals that his driving privileges
were suspended when he neglected to pay two traffic tickets from an offense on
August 22, 2002. Rather than clearing up his driving record, Respondent
continued to drive with a suspended license. Even when Respondent was
adjudicated a Habitual Offender under the laws of this State, Respondent
continued to flaunt the law. Respondent’s conduct was consistent with his
driving record, which evidenced that he disregarded the laws of the State on a
regular basis dating back as far as 1998.
Based
upon the testimony of Respondent at the DMVH hearing and the evidence entered
into the record on appeal, the Court does not find that there was any
substantial evidence to establish good cause for a Habitual Offender suspension
reduction. Respondent’s affidavits establish him as a respected member of the
community. Furthermore, Respondent stated that he was more mature and more
responsible because of his family situation. Unfortunately, the Court does not
find such evidence or testimony any different from any other person in the
general population, who would also require the privilege to drive.
While
the Court is very much sympathetic with the personal needs of Respondent, and
cognizant of the personal difficulties that can arise without having a valid
driver’s license, the Court is not presented with any overriding evidence of
good cause that outweighs the public policy behind the Habitual Offender laws
of the State. The plain fact is that Respondent’s driving record demonstrates
a repeated indifference for the laws of the State. The Court finds that the
DHO was in error in allowing a reduction of the Habitual Offender suspension,
based on the lack of any substantial evidence in the record and the laws of the
State.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Order of the DHO is REVERSED.
________________________________
John D. McLeod, Judge
S.C. Administrative Law Court
January 31, 2008
Columbia, SC
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