South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
Edgar A. Brown building 1205 Pendleton St., Suite 224 Columbia, SC 29201 Voice: (803) 734-0550

SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
Club Exception, Inc., d/b/a Club Exception vs. SCDOR

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Revenue

PARTIES:
Petitioners:
Club Exception, Inc., d/b/a Club Exception

Respondents:
South Carolina Department of Revenue

Intervenor:
Karon Mitchell
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
07-ALJ-17-0431-CC

APPEARANCES:
For the Petitioner:
Kenneth E. Allen, Esquire

For the Respondent:
Amelia F. Ruple, Esquire

For the Intervenor:
Pro se
 

ORDERS:

FINAL ORDER AND DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (“ALC”) for a final order and decision following a contested case hearing pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310 et seq. (2005), S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(B) (Supp. 2006), and S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-260 (Supp. 2006). The petitioner, Club Exception, Inc., d/b/a Club Exception (“Petitioner” or “Club Exception”), applied for an on-premises beer and wine permit pursuant to §§ 61-4-500 et seq. and for a liquor by the drink license pursuant to §§ 61-6-1600 et seq. for the location at 721 North Ocean Boulevard, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina 29577. Kyle and Karon Mitchell[2] (“Protestants”) filed a written protest to the Petitioner’s application. Respondent South Carolina Department of Revenue (“Department”) denied the application pursuant to § 61-4-525 and § 61-6-1825 due to the receipt of the Protestants’ valid public protest. The Department further denied the application pursuant to § 61-6-1820 because the proposed location did not meet restaurant requirements and pursuant to § 61-2-160 because one of the principals has outstanding state tax liabilities.[3]

After notice to the parties and the Protestant, the court held a hearing on October 24, 2007. All parties appeared at the hearing.[4] Evidence was introduced and testimony presented. After carefully weighing all of the evidence, the court finds that the Petitioner’s application for this location should be granted subject to the conditions set forth below.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Having observed the witnesses and exhibits presented at the hearing and closely passed upon their credibility, and taking into consideration the burden of persuasion by the parties, the court makes the following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of the evidence.

Evidence was presented regarding all of the relevant statutory criteria. Notice of the time, date, place, and subject matter of the hearing was given to all parties and the Protestant.

The Petitioner seeks a permit for the retail sale of beer and wine for on-premises consumption and a license to sell liquor by the drink for the location at 721 North Ocean Boulevard, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina 29577. The proposed location is inside the municipal limits of Myrtle Beach. Notice of the application was lawfully posted at the location and was published in a newspaper of general circulation.

Itzhak Edri (“Edri”) and David Harrar (“Harrar”) are the principals of the corporation seeking the requested permit and license. Both are over the age of twenty-one and have never had a permit or license to sell beer, wine, or liquor revoked. Neither Edri nor Harrarr has a criminal record. However, Harrar allegedly currently owes delinquent state income taxes, penalties, and interest.

The Petitioner seeks an on-premises beer and wine permit and a license to sell liquor by the drink for Club Exception, a restaurant and nightclub. The proposed location has not been previously permitted or licensed to sell beer, wine, or liquor by the drink. The proposed location is on North Ocean Boulevard, a heavily traveled thoroughfare in Myrtle Beach. The area in the vicinity of the proposed location is substantially commercial, consisting entirely of businesses such as multiple motels, a bar and grill, retail stores, and a hair salon. The proposed location is directly across the street from the former site of the Pavilion, an amusement park that has recently closed. There are no churches, schools, or playgrounds within three hundred feet of the proposed location. Parking at the proposed location is adequate.

Edri testified regarding the nature of Club Exception. The club has a maximum capacity of 700 people. During the pendency of the Petitioner’s application, Edri has operated the proposed location as a “teen club.” Initially, the proposed location experienced problems with patrons blocking the sidewalk on North Ocean Boulevard or due to the volume of patrons exiting the club at closing time. To remedy these issues, Edri consulted with law enforcement and improved crowd flow by designating different exit and entrance points, with patrons exiting the club onto Flagg Street rather than North Ocean Boulevard at closing time. Further, during the nightly closing time local law enforcement is outside the proposed location.

If the Petitioner’s application is granted, Edri envisions that Club Exception will be open from mid February until the end of October or November with hours of operation from 6:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m. each evening. The club will serve dinner between 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. Around 9:00 p.m. a deejay will start playing music and patrons can begin dancing. The club will admit patrons ages eighteen and up and will utilize a wristband identification system for patrons ages twenty-one and up. The proposed location will have twenty-four four-top tables and a thirty-foot bar with twenty stools, creating a total seating capacity of 116 people. The proposed location will not have any live music, karaoke, or objectionable contests.

While operating as a teen club, Club Exception employed twelve security personnel. Edri generally stationed one security employee at each of the three exits, one in the bathrooms, two at the front of the club, and four on the floor. Edri testified that this arrangement will continue if the application is granted.

Karon Mitchell (“Mitchell”) testified in opposition to the application. Mitchell believes the application should be denied for various reasons. Mitchell owns several motels located in close proximity to the proposed location. Many of her concerns derive from her experiences with a previous night club that was located across the street from the proposed location and caused her to lose business.[5] Mitchell believes the same problems will arise if Club Exception’s application is granted. She stated that the number of people that will be exiting the club each night after drinking will result in havoc and fighting in the streets. For example, one evening last June, while the Petitioner was operating as a teen club, a fight erupted in the streets in front of the proposed location that involved between one hundred and two hundred people. The fight traveled down North Ocean Boulevard in front of one of Mitchell’s motels and resulted in one of her guests being struck and the rest retreating into their rooms. Mitchell objects to the detrimental effect such incidents may have on the operation of her businesses.

LAW

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court concludes the following as a matter of law.

1. Jurisdiction and Review

Jurisdiction over this case is vested with the South Carolina Administrative Law Court pursuant to §§ 1-23-310 et seq., § 1-23-600(B), and § 61-2-260. “[T]he issuance or granting of a license to sell beer or alcoholic beverages rests in the sound discretion of the body or official to whom the duty of issuing it is committed[.]” Palmer v. S.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n, 282 S.C. 246, 248, 317 S.E.2d 476, 477 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Wall v. S.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n, 269 S.C. 13, 235 S.E.2d 806 (1977). The weight and credibility assigned to evidence presented at the hearing of a matter is within the province of the trier of fact. See S.C. Cable Television Ass’n v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 308 S.C. 216, 222, 417 S.E.2d 586, 589 (1992). Furthermore, a trial judge who observes a witness is in the best position to judge the witness’s demeanor and veracity and to evaluate the credibility of his testimony. See, e.g., Woodall v. Woodall, 322 S.C. 7, 10, 471 S.E.2d 154, 157 (1996); Wallace v. Milliken & Co., 300 S.C. 553, 556, 389 S.E.2d 448, 450 (Ct. App. 1990).


2. Suitability of Location

a. Generally

Section 61-4-520 establishes the criteria for the issuance of a beer and wine permit. Included in the criteria is the requirement that the proposed location be a proper and suitable one. See §§ 61-
4-520(5)-(6). Additionally, § 61-6-1820 sets forth the basic criteria for the issuance of a liquor license. However, a liquor license may be denied if the proposed location is not suitable. See Schudel v. S.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n, 276 S.C. 138, 276 S.E.2d 308 (1981). Therefore, either a beer and wine permit or a liquor license may be denied if the location of the business is not a proper one.

b. Factors in Determining Proper Location

“Proper location” is not statutorily defined, but broad discretion is vested in the trier of fact to determine the fitness or suitability of a particular location for the requested permit. See Fast Stops, Inc. v. Ingram, 276 S.C. 593, 281 S.E.2d 118 (1981). In determining whether a proposed location is suitable, it is proper for this tribunal to consider any evidence that shows adverse circumstances of location. Kearney v. Allen, 287 S.C. 324, 326, 338 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1985); Palmer, 282 S.C. at 249, 317 S.E.2d at 478 (citing Smith v. Pratt, 258 S.C. 504, 189 S.E.2d 301 (1972)). The determination of suitability of location is not necessarily solely a function of geography. Rather, it involves an infinite variety of considerations related to the nature and operation of the proposed business and its impact on the community within which it is to be located. Kearney, 287 S.C. at 326-27, 338 S.E.2d at 337; Schudel, 276 S.C. at 138, 276 S.E.2d at 308. Further,

a liquor license or permit may be properly refused on the ground that the location of the establishment would adversely affect the public interest, that the nature of the neighborhood and of the premises is such that the establishment would be detrimental to the welfare . . . of the inhabitants, or that the manner of conducting the establishment would not be conducive to the general welfare of the community.

48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 168 at 366 (2004). 

Other factors may be considered when determining whether a location is proper. For example, consideration can be given to the impact the issuance of the permit or license will have on law enforcement. Fowler v. Lewis, 260 S.C. 54, 194 S.E.2d 191 (1973); Roche v. S.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n, 263 S.C. 451, 211 S.E.2d 243 (1975). Evidence that the granting of a permit will place a strain upon police to adequately protect the community must be weighed. Moore v. S.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n, 308 S.C. 160, 162, 417 S.E.2d 555, 557 (1992). Denial is appropriate where the public areas surrounding the proposed location have been the source of constant law enforcement problems or significant problems with public intoxication. Roche, 263 S.C. at 451, 211 S.E.2d at 243. Another pertinent factor is whether police have been summoned to the scene on prior occasions when licensed to another party. Schudel, 276 S.C. at 141-42, 276 S.E.2d at 309-10. It is relevant whether the location is near other locations that have either been a constant source of law enforcement problems or are locations where young people congregate and loiter. Palmer, 282 S.C. at 250, 317 S.E.2d at 478.

Similarly, consideration can be given to whether the location is heavily traveled or creates a traffic danger. Id. Furthermore, whether the location has in the recent past been permitted and whether the location is now more or less suitable than it was in the past is a relevant factor. Taylor v. Lewis, 261 S.C. 168, 198 S.E.2d 801 (1973). Finally, a valid consideration is whether the surrounding area is substantially commercial. Id.; Byers v. S.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n, 281 S.C. 566, 316 S.E.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1984).

Section 61-4-580(5) prohibits a permittee from knowingly allowing “any act, the commission of which tends to create a public nuisance or which constitutes a crime under the laws of this state” to occur on the licensed premises. The term “licensed premises” includes not only the interior of Club Exception, but also the areas immediately adjacent to the entrance and exit, as well as the parking areas. See 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-700 (“Licensed premises shall include those areas normally used by the permittee or licensee to conduct his business and shall include but are not limited to the following: selling areas, storage areas, food preparation areas and parking areas.”). “[O]ne who holds a license to sell alcoholic beverages is responsible for supervising the conduct of his clientele, both within the licensed premises and in the immediate vicinity, in order to ensure that his operations do not create a nuisance for the surrounding community.” Dayaram Krupa, LLC, d/b/a Midland’s Mini-Mart v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 06-ALJ-17-0929-CC, 2007 WL 1219343 (S.C. Admin. Law Ct., March 19, 2007) (citing § 61-4-580(5) and A.J.C. Enters., Inc. v. Pastore, 473 A.2d 269, 275 (R.I. 1984)). The court in A.J.C. Enterprises held that a liquor licensee “assumes an obligation to supervise the conduct of its clientele so as to preclude the creation of conditions within the surrounding neighborhood which would amount to a nuisance to those who reside in the area.” A.J.C. Enters., Inc., 473 A.2d 269, 275 (R.I. 1984). In the event that a licensed location becomes a public nuisance to the surrounding community, the Department may revoke or refuse renewal of the license for the location. See S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-580(5).

Without sufficient evidence of an adverse impact on the community, a permit or license application must not be denied if the statutory criteria are satisfied. The fact that the issuance of a permit or license is protested is not a sufficient reason, by itself, to deny the application. See 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 166 (2004).  Moreover, the denial of a permit or license to an applicant on the ground of unsuitability of location is without evidentiary support when relevant testimony of those opposing the requested license or permit consists entirely of opinions, generalities, and conclusions not supported by the facts. Taylor, 261 S.C. at 171, 198 S.E.2d at 802.

3. Other Requirements

Permits and licenses may not be issued if one of the principals owes delinquent taxes, penalties, or interest. Section 61-2-160 states that a permit or license “must not be issued, renewed, or transferred unless the department determines that the applicant does not owe the State delinquent taxes, penalties, or interest.”

Before an applicant may obtain a license to sell liquor by the drink, the Department must find that “the applicant conducts a business bona fide engaged primarily and substantially in the preparation and serving of meals or furnishing of lodging.” § 61-6-1820. “‘Bona fide engaged primarily and substantially in the preparation and serving of meals’ means a business which has been issued a Grade A retail establishment food permit prior to issuance of a license [to sell liquor by the drink], and in addition provides facilities for seating not less than forty persons simultaneously at tables for the service of meals.” § 61-6-20(2).

4. Conclusions

After carefully weighing the evidence and applying the law as discussed above, the court finds that, with certain restrictions and conditions, Club Exception’s application meets the statutory requirements and should be granted.

The evidence shows that Club Exception, even without an alcohol license, has had problems with crowd management. It further shows, however, that Club Exception’s management has worked with law enforcement in an effort to control problems associated with crowds at the club. The court notes that the capacity of the club, at 700, is very high, lending itself to large crowds and the problems associated therewith. Additionally, the club is located in a resort setting with many tourist patrons and with several hotels and motels in the surrounding area, including but not limited to those operated by Mitchell.

Accordingly, the court finds that certain conditions should be imposed on Club Exception’s license. First, as a condition of the permit, the Department shall require Club Exception to abide by any applicable noise ordinances. Second, it shall require Club Exception to maintain adequate security personnel and adequate security lighting at all public points of ingress or egress to the club and in the rear parking area. Third, as offered by the Petitioner at the contested case hearing, the Petitioner shall not employ anyone who was previously employed by the Freaky Tiki. Finally, the Department shall require Club Exception to continue to cooperate with law enforcement and that it take whatever other reasonable measures necessary to ensure orderly dissipation of the crowd from the club and the nearby area. In addition to these conditions, issuance of the license shall be subject to Club Exception’s satisfaction of a final restaurant inspection and Harrar’s satisfactory resolution of his South Carolina income tax liability.

Failure to abide by any of these conditions shall be a violation of the permit and may subject the licensee to revocation. Additionally, should Club Exception’s management knowingly allow any activity, including but not limited to criminal acts or behavior that disrupts the peace of the neighborhood, which constitutes a public nuisance, then under South Carolina law, its license can be revoked or renewal may be denied. Cf. Blink, Inc., d/b/a The Freaky Tiki v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 05-ALJ-17-0255-CC, 2005 WL 3061999 (S.C. Admin. Law Ct., Oct. 24, 2005) (denying renewal and finding that the manner in which the club was operated constituted a public nuisance).

ORDER

Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law stated above, the court finds that, with the above-noted restrictions, the Petitioner meets all of the statutory requirements for the issuance of an on-premises beer and wine permit and liquor by the drink license. It is therefore

ORDERED that the Department shall GRANT Petitioner’s application for an on-premises beer and wine permit and liquor by the drink license for the premises located at 721 North Ocean Boulevard, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina 29577 in accordance with § 61-2-80, § 61-4-540, and § 61-6-1820, subject to the Petitioner’s satisfying all applicable final inspection requirements and Harrar’s resolution of his outstanding tax liabilities, with the conditions as described above.


IT IS SO ORDERED.

_______________________________

PAIGE J. GOSSETT

Administrative Law Judge

December 5, 2007

Columbia, South Carolina



[1] At the beginning of the hearing Karon Mitchell moved to intervene as a party in this matter pursuant to ALC Rule 20. The court granted this motion, but limited her intervention to issues involving the suitability of the location. Accordingly, the caption is hereby amended as reflected above.

[2] All other public protests filed in this matter were either withdrawn or deemed abandoned because the Protestants failed to appear at the hearing. See S.C. Code Ann. § 61-6-185(C).

[3] Initially, the Department also denied the application based upon the Petitioner’s failure to disclose a principal on its application and failure to provide a correct and valid lease with the application. Prior to the hearing, these two issues were resolved and the Department issued an amended Department determination, dated September 27, 2007.

[4] After the court granted Karon Mitchell’s motion to intervene, Kyle Mitchell informed the court that Karon Mitchell would adequately present his concerns involving the proposed location and offered no further testimony.

[5] At the contested case hearing, the Petitioner stipulated that it would not employ anyone who was previously employed by the Freaky Tiki, the club Mitchell experienced problems with in the past. See, eg, Blink, Inc, d/b/a The Freaky Tiki v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 05-ALJ-17-0255-CC, 2005 WL 3061999 (S.C. Admin. Law Ct., Oct. 24, 2005).


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