ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER
FACTS
The
above-captioned matter is before this Court pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 40-1-160
(2001) and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2006) for an administrative
appeal. The
Accountancy Board revoked Michael Paulin’s license as a certified public
accountant (CPA) after he pled guilty to a felony for committing a lewd act
upon a child under sixteen years of age under S.C. Code Ann. 16-15-140.
Although he was initially also charged with failing to provide tax returns for
three clients, the Board found no violation with regard to those charges.
Thus, the sole basis for the Board’s order was the felony conviction.
LAW/ANALYSIS
On
appeal, Paulin raises a single issue: whether the Board retained the power,
that is, subject matter jurisdiction, to revoke his license where he voluntarily
surrendered his license days before pleading guilty to a felony. He argues
that because he was no longer a licensed accountant, he was not within the
Board’s jurisdiction. Paulin’s argument is without merit and his attempt to
circumvent the Board’s jurisdiction and sanction patently has no basis in the
law.
S.C.
Code Ann. §§ 40-1-150 and 40-2-150 provide that voluntary surrender of one’s
license “does not preclude the board from taking disciplinary action against
the licensee,” including revocation. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 40-1-150 & 40-2-150
(2001 & Supp. 2006). S.C. Code Ann. §§ 40-1-110(h) and 40-2-110(A)(1)
provide that the Board may revoke Paulin’s license based on his felony
conviction. That felony is a crime of moral turpitude. State v. McFarlane,
279 S.C. 327, 332, 306 S.E.2d 611, 614 (1983) (“[C]riminal sexual conduct with
a minor in any degree is a crime of moral turpitude.”). S.C. Code Ann. §
40-1-115 gives the Board jurisdiction over actions of current and former
licensees and over any action that arises during the licensure period. S.C.
Code Ann. §§ 40-1-115 (2001 & Supp. 2006). The conduct underlying the
guilty plea and resultant felony conviction occurred while Paulin was an active
licensed accountant. Other jurisdictions have similarly rejected the argument
that voluntary relinquishment of a license deprives the Board of disciplinary
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Cross v. Colo. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs,
552 P.2d 38 (Colo. App. 1976); Gilpin v. Bd. of Nursing, 837 P.2d 1342 (Mont. 1992), overruled on other grounds Erickson v. State ex. rel. Bd. of Med.
Exam’rs, 938 P.2d 625 (Mont. 1997); Gares v. N.M. Bd. of Psychologist
Exam’rs, 798 P.2d 190 (N.M. 1990); Gaddy v. Okla. State Bd. of
Osteopathy, 554 P.2d 1375 (Okl. 1976); Delozier v. State, 631 A.2d
228 (Vt. 1993).
THEREFORE,
because the Board clearly retained subject matter jurisdiction and statutory
authority to revoke Paulin’s accountancy license based on his felony conviction
for a crime of moral turpitude, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Board’s
decision is AFFIRMED.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
December 6, 2007 JOHN
D. GEATHERS
Columbia, South Carolina Administrative
Law Judge
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