ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASEThis matter comes before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court)
pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 9-21-60 (Supp. 2003) upon the Petitioner’s request for a contested
case hearing. The Petitioner contests the Final Agency Determination issued by Respondent South
Carolina Budget and Control Board, South Carolina Retirement Systems (Respondent or SCRS)
which found he was not eligible in December 2003 to apply for disability retirement benefits because
he was not “in service” when he filed his application. The main issue in this case is whether the
Petitioner in fact met the eligibility requirement that he was a “member in service” when he made his
application. After notice to all of the parties, a hearing was conducted on August 3, 2004, at the
offices of the ALC in Columbia, South Carolina.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Having carefully considered the testimony and arguments of both sides, I make the following
Findings of Fact, taking into consideration the burden of proof and the credibility of the witnesses:
1.Notice of the date, time, place, and subject matter of the hearing was provided to all
parties in a timely manner.
2.The Respondent operates four retirement systems including the Police Officers’
Retirement System (PORS).
3.On July 31, 1997, the Petitioner began employment as a police officer for the Town
of Irmo. Pursuant to that employment, the Petitioner joined the Police Officers’ Retirement System.
On January 5, 2002, while working for the Town of Irmo, the Petitioner checked on a house for a
family that was out of the country. When the Petitioner was returning to his patrol car, he slipped
and fell on black ice. As a result, the Petitioner broke his ankle, requiring surgery to insert screws
and pins into his ankle. The Petitioner never returned to work after this incident.
After the Petitioner was injured, his supervisor requested a disability application package
which was mailed to the Petitioner at his current address by the Respondent on or about October 7,
2002. However, when the Petitioner resigned from the Town of Irmo on January 28, 2003, he had
not filed an application with the Respondent for disability retirement benefits.
In fact, in September
2003, when the Petitioner’s workers’ compensation claim was settled, he still had not filed an
application with the Respondent for disability retirement benefits.
On December 1, 2003, the Petitioner visited the Respondent’s Customer Service Center and
inquired about filing an application for disability retirement benefits. The Customer Service
Representative informed him that he was not eligible to apply for those benefits because he was no
longer in service. The Petitioner again visited the Respondent’s Customer Service Center on
December 5, 2003. During that visit, the Petitioner delivered a letter from his supervisor, Chief Andy
Blackwell, and filed a PORS Disability Retirement Application.
On December 12, 2003, the Respondent notified the Petitioner in writing that he was ineligible
for disability retirement benefits because he did not apply while he was “in service.” The Respondent
also informed the Petitioner that he could appeal the decision within one year. Director Boykin
ultimately issued a Final Agency Determination on March 30, 2004, finding that the Petitioner was
not “in service” at the time he filed his application for disability retirement benefits and, therefore, he
was not eligible to apply for those benefits.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:
1.This Court has jurisdiction to decide the issues in this case pursuant to S.C. Code Ann.
§ 9-21-60 (Supp. 2003).
2.The burden of proof in this case is on the Petitioner to show that he met the statutory
requirements of eligibility to file an application for disability retirement benefits. The standard of proof
in determining whether the Petitioner has met that burden in an administrative proceeding is a
preponderance of the evidence. Anonymous v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 329 S.C. 371, 496 S.E.2d
17 (1998).
3.There is no dispute in this case that the Petitioner was injured while performing his
job duties or that he was a contributing member of the PORS at the time he was injured. Rather,
since neither the Petitioner nor his employer applied for disability retirement while he was employed
with the Town of Irmo, the Respondent denied the Petitioner’s claim because he was not “in service”
at the time the claim was filed. The pertinent statute in this case provides:
On the application of a member in service or the member’s employer, a member who
has five or more completed years of earned service or any contributing member who
is disabled as a result of an injury arising out of and in the course of the performance
of the member’s duties regardless of length of membership may be retired by the
retirement board not less than thirty days and not more than nine months next
following the date of filing the application on a disability retirement allowance if the
medical board, after a medical examination of the member, certifies that the member
is mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of duty, that the
incapacity is likely to be permanent, and that the member should be retired.
S.C. Code Ann. § 9-11-80(1) (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
The “primary or fundamental rule of statutory construction a court must follow is to ascertain
and give effect to the legislature’s intention or purpose as expressed in the statute.” Scholtec v.
Reeves, 327 S.C. 551, 558, 490 S.E.2d 603, 606-607 (Ct. App. 1997). The language used in the
statute should be given its plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction
to expand or limit the scope of the statute. Berkebile v. Outen, 311 S.C. 50, 426 S.E.2d 760 (1993).
Furthermore, the construction given to a statute by the agency charged with its administration is
entitled to most respectful consideration and should not be overruled absent compelling reasons.
Glover v. Suitt Constr. Co., 318 S.C. 465, 469, 458 S.E.2d 535, 537 (1995). This rule of statutory
construction is particularly persuasive “where the construction of the statute has been uniform for
many years in administrative practice, and has been acquiesced in by the General Assembly for a long
period of time.” Etiwan Fertilizer Co. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 217 S.C. 354, 60 S.E.2d 682,
684 (1950).
For forty-two years, SCRS has interpreted the “in service” requirement such that a member
is considered to be “in service” at the time he or she files a disability application if the member is
employed by a covered employer at, or within ninety (90) days of the time the member files the
application for disability retirement benefits.
Furthermore, the Respondent propounded several
cogent reasons for its interpretation of the “in service” requirement in this statute. First, disability
retirement is an employment benefit. The benefit of disability retirement is provided only for members
who are working for a covered employer and become incapacitated from further performing that
work. Conversely, disability retirement is not available for a member who worked for a covered
employer in the past and became disabled subsequent to termination of that employment. The “in
service” requirement ensures that a relationship exists between the member and the State of South
Carolina at or near the time the application for disability retirement benefits is made.
Second, disability retirement benefits are job-focused. The determination of whether a
member is disabled is based on whether the member can perform the particular job he held with a
covered employer at the time he allegedly became disabled. The “in service” requirement ensures that
evidence of medical conditions existing at the time the member allegedly became disabled is available
to determine whether the member in fact was disabled from performing his particular job at the time
he filed his application. This also precludes the difficulty of trying to separate current medical
conditions from medical conditions that actually existed at the time the member allegedly became
disabled while working at a particular job for a covered employer.
As a long-standing administrative policy, the Respondent’s interpretation of the “in service”
requirement should not be overruled without compelling reasons. In this case, the Petitioner did not
establish any compelling reasons to justify overruling the Respondent’s construction of the statutory
requirement and implementation of long-standing administrative policy. Therefore, pursuant to S.C.
Code Ann. § 9-11-80(1) (Supp. 2003), a member of the PORS is eligible to apply for disability
retirement benefits only if:
a.The application is made by:
i.A member in service; or
ii.The employer of the member in service; and
b.The member:
i.Has five or more years of earned service; or
ii.Is a contributing member who is disabled as a result of an injury
arising out of and in the course of the performance of the member’s
duties regardless of length of membership.
In this case, the Petitioner became disabled on January 5, 2002. He did not resign from his
job until January 28, 2003. The Respondent’s application of “in service” requirement allowed him
to file an application for disability retirement benefits as late as April 28, 2003. Accordingly, for more
than fifteen months, the Petitioner was eligible to file an application for disability retirement benefits.
The Respondent even mailed an application to the Petitioner at his then-current home address more
than six months before he became ineligible to file the application. The Petitioner, however, did not
file his application until December 5, 2003. Consequently, he did not file his application for disability
retirement benefits while he was in service.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner Christopher T. Hoefer failed to meet the
statutory requirements of eligibility to file an application for disability retirement benefits and,
therefore, was ineligible to apply for disability retirement benefits in December 2003.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
Ralph King Anderson, III
Administrative Law Judge
October 15, 2004
Columbia, South Carolina |
