South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
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SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
BECA Social Club, d/b/a Third Shift vs. DOR

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Revenue

PARTIES:
Petitioner:
BECA Social Club, d/b/a Third Shift
1206 Bush River Road, Columbia, South Carolina

Respondent:
South Carolina Department of Revenue
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
04-ALJ-17-0014-CC

APPEARANCES:
n/a
 

ORDERS:

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

By a Final Order and Decision dated April 27, 2004, this tribunal denied Petitioner BECA Social Club’s application for an on-premises beer and wine permit and a nonprofit private club minibottle license because of Petitioner’s failure to establish that the individuals responsible for the operations of its proposed club met the licensure qualifications set out by statute. In particular, based upon the evidence presented at the hearing of this matter, this tribunal was unable to identify all of the principals of Petitioner’s club, much less certify that those principals are persons of good moral character, over twenty-one years of age, and without any delinquent state or federal taxes. By a Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 6, 2004, Petitioner provided additional information regarding its principals and sought an order from this tribunal granting the proposed permit and license pending confirmation of the information provided regarding the identified principals. In a response filed on May 13, 2004, Respondent South Carolina Department of Revenue (Department) objected to any reconsideration or amendment of this tribunal’s Final Order of April 27, 2004. For the reasons set forth below, I find that Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration should be denied.

Petitioner moves for reconsideration on two grounds: first, under subsections (1) and (2) of Rule 60(b), SCRCP, as applied pursuant ALC Rule 29(D), which allow a court to grant a party relief from a judgment based upon the party’s “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” or upon “newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered” earlier, Rule 60(b)(1), (2), SCRCP; and second, under Rule 59(e), SCRCP, as applied through ALC Rule 68, which provides generally for the alteration or amendment of a judgment. Rule 59(e), SCRCP. In support of both grounds for its motion, Petitioner supplied new information regarding the identities and licensure qualifications of the principals of the organization. Yet, despite this new information, I find that Petitioner has not demonstrated sufficient grounds for a reconsideration of this tribunal’s Final Order in this matter.

First, Petitioner’s argument under Rule 60(b)(1) and (2), SCRCP, must fail. “The purpose of a Rule 60(b) motion is not to retry the original case, but is to present good cause why the [moving party] should be relieved from the judgment.” McGhee v. Conveyor Mach. Corp., 361 So. 2d 372, 373 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (upholding denial of plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion where plaintiff sought to introduce additional evidence to support his worker’s compensation claim after the claim had been fully litigated and decided). In the case at hand, Petitioner is not seeking to present newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered prior to the hearing of this matter; rather, it is seeking to retry its case by presenting evidence regarding its principals that it could have–and should have–presented at the hearing. Petitioner’s failure to produce sufficient evidence to support its case is not the sort of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect contemplated by Rule 60(b)(1) and the new presentation of old evidence is not the type of “newly discovered evidence” addressed by Rule 60(b)(2). Petitioner is essentially seeking to reopen this case to correct the evidentiary failings it committed at the hearing; however, the desire for this sort of re-litigation of old issues and old evidence is not a basis for relieving a party from the effects of decision pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRCP, and ALC Rule 29(D).

Petitioner’s argument under Rule 59(e) fails for similar reasons. “Rule 59(e) provides a procedure for correcting manifest errors of law or fact or considering the import of newly discovered evidence. . . . A motion under Rule 59(e) is not intended to be utilized to relitigate issues previously considered[; and] [n]either should it be used as a vehicle for submitting evidence which in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have been submitted before.” Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty v. Michigan, 152 F.R.D. 562, 563 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (citations omitted). While the grounds for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) are far broader than the few, enumerated grounds for relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b), these 59(e) grounds cannot be stretched to include the re-litigation of this matter sought by Petitioner. As noted above, Petitioner does not seek to present newly discovered evidence, but rather to present evidence that is new only in that it was not presented at the original hearing of this case. Petitioner has not alleged that this tribunal committed a manifest error of law or fact in its Final Order and Decision, and Petitioner’s attempts to present this tribunal with new evidence are merely part of an effort to reopen this case to cure certain evidentiary infirmities. Accordingly, Petitioner has not provided this tribunal with a sound basis upon which to reconsider its Final Order in this matter under Rule 59(e), SCRCP.

In its motion for reconsideration, Petitioner does not contend that this tribunal’s decision is plagued by a manifest error of law or fact, nor does it argue that previously undiscoverable, new evidence regarding the issues involved in this case has come to light. Rather, it simply seeks to now present evidence regarding its qualifications for licensure that it failed to present at the hearing of this case, despite having a full and fair opportunity to establish its qualifications at that hearing. To sustain such an after-the-fact attempt to reopen the record in this case and to re-litigate this matter as it should have been litigated in the first place would run contrary to the relevant rules of procedure and basic principles of judicial economy and finality. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is respectfully DENIED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________

JOHN D. GEATHERS

Administrative Law Judge

Post Office Box 11667

Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1667


May 27, 2004

Columbia, South Carolina


Brown Bldg.

 

 

 

 

 

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