ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
INTRODUCTIONThis matter is before the Administrative Law Court (“ALC”) pursuant to the appeal of Harry
Goodwin, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections (“DOC”). On August 19,
2003, Goodwin was convicted of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code 2.07, Damage, Loss,
Destruction, or Defacing of Property with a Value of $50 or More. As a result of his conviction,
Goodwin lost 120 days of good time credit and was ordered to pay restitution.
Goodwin filed a
grievance with the DOC and received a final agency decision on January 7, 2004. On January 26,
2004, Goodwin filed this appeal. After a review of the record and the arguments, the decision of the
DOC is affirmed.
FACTS
On August 9, 2003, at approximately 12:55 p.m., Ofc. Gibert was conducting a security
check in Unit F-1 A-wing of McCormick Correctional Institution when he noticed that televisions
in the recreational area appeared to be broken and/or damaged. Ofc. Gibert immediately reported
the damage to Sgt. Bell, who in turn informed Lt. Mursier.
At approximately 3:00 p.m. on the same day, Lt. Mursier conducted an investigation into the
broken television sets. Lt. Mursier spoke to a confidential informant who had proven reliable to Lt.
Mursier in the past. This confidential informant told Lt. Mursier that Goodwin and one other inmate,
John Wood, had broken the television sets. Other inmates also informed Lt. Mursier that Goodwin
and Wood were responsible for breaking the televisions sets. The television sets were confiscated,
and Goodwin and Wood were placed in SMU. During further checks of the area, a damaged
microwave was also discovered in a trash can in the same room as the broken televisions.
Goodwin was served with papers on August 12, 2003, charging him with the offense of
Damage, Loss, Destruction, or Defacing of Property with a Value of $50 or More, (2.07). Goodwin
indicated on the papers that he wanted his accuser present at the hearing and that he wanted a counsel
substitute.
A hearing on the charge commenced on August 19, 2003. The charging officer, Lt. Mursier,
testified at the hearing via a speakerphone. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) read Ofc.
Gibert’s and Lt. Mursier’s reports into the record at the beginning of the hearing. Goodwin, who was
represented by counsel substitute, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Goodwin stated that Lt. Mursier
never questioned him during his investigation into the broken televisions. Goodwin stated that the
inmates who provided information to Lt. Mursier during his investigation fabricated their stories.
Goodwin further stated that these inmates have fabricated stories about him twice before, resulting
in his being “lock[ed] up” twice on no evidence, and that he needed “Lt. Stevenson”
to verify to the
DHO that these inmates have indeed lied before and are unreliable.
The DHO conducted Goodwin’s hearing simultaneously with Wood’s hearing on the same
charge based upon the same event. Wood stated that the information provided by the inmate
informants to Lt. Mursier was false. Goodwin and Wood’s counsel substitute then questioned Lt.
Mursier regarding his investigation. Lt. Mursier stated that he interviewed at least five inmates at
the time of his investigation, and that Major Lewis talked to numerous inmates in the unit as well.
Lt. Mursier stated that the inmates he interviewed told him that Goodwin had recently been robbed,
and that he took his frustration about the robbery out on the televisions.
They told Lt. Mursier that
Goodwin and Wood broke the televisions by throwing a lock in a sock at them. No lock or sock was
found in the room when it was inventoried. Lt. Mursier stated that the charge against Goodwin was
based solely on the words of the inmate informants regarding what they told him they witnessed.
Lt. Mursier went on to state that, at the time of the investigation, Goodwin and Wood were
in their room when he went to pick them up. He stated that he picked them up at about count time
for the 3:00 count. He stated that neither Goodwin nor Wood said anything when he picked them
up.
Lt. Stevens also testified at the hearing to answer questions from Goodwin’s counsel
substitute. Lt. Stevens testified that he was aware of a prior incident in which Goodwin was in lock-up as the result of a charge brought against him based upon inmate informant statements which
turned out to have been fabricated. Lt. Stevens admitted that there is a similarity between the prior
charge and the current charge, in that in both cases Goodwin was charged solely on the basis of
something an inmate informant told someone. However, Lt. Stevens also stated that he was not
aware of how it was proven that the inmate informant had fabricated his statements in the prior case;
Lt. Stevens stated that he only heard about the fabrication from another inmate.
In summation, Goodwin’s counsel substitute told the DHO that there was no physical
evidence in this case, only the word of other inmates. He argued that there was no verification from
any other source that Goodwin had been robbed prior to the time the televisions were broken. The
DHO found Goodwin guilty on the charge on the basis of Lt. Mursier’s report and statements during
the hearing. Addressing the substitute counsel’s point about the confidential informants’s statements
being the only evidence to support the charge, the DHO stated that, in a dorm where all of the
televisions and the microwave are damaged, the inmates usually do tell the truth, because it is their
televisions and microwave that have been broken and are gone. The DHO recommended that
Goodwin lose 120 days of good time and that he be required to pay restitution in an amount to be
determined.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
(1)Was Goodwin afforded due process during the adjudication of this internal
disciplinary matter?
(2)Was the final decision supported by substantial evidence in the record?
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is invoked in the instant case since this matter is a disciplinary hearing in which
Goodwin was punished by the loss of good time credits, a loss which impacts a created liberty
interest. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000); Sullivan v. S.C. Dep’t of
Corrections, 355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124 (2003).
SCOPE OF REVIEW
In this review, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) acts “in an appellate capacity” and is
“restricted to reviewing the decision below.” Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. When
acting in an appellate capacity, the ALJ must apply the criteria of S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6)
(Supp. 2003). See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2003) (where an ALJ is directed to
conduct a review “in the same manner prescribed in [§ 1-23-380](A).”).
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2003) establishes the following:
The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of
the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences,
conclusions or decisions are:
(a)in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b)in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c)made upon unlawful procedure;
(d)affected by other error of law;
(e)clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f)arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion
or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2003).
DISCUSSION
I. DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT
The statutory right to sentence-related credits is a protected liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 369-370, 527 S.E.2d at 750. An inmate facing
the loss of sentence-related credits is entitled to minimal due process to ensure that the state-created
right is not arbitrarily abrogated. Id. While due process is “flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands,” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972),
certain elements must be satisfied in order for procedural due process requirements to be met. Those
elements include the following:
(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least
twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) that factfinders must prepare a written
statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that
the inmate should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence,
provided there is no undue hazard to institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that
counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be allowed to help
illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the
persons hearing the matter, who may be prison officials or employees, must be
impartial.
Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72
(1974)).
Goodwin mentions several incidents connected with the hearing of this matter which he
deems to be improper. Goodwin is primarily concerned with the non-availability of the inmate
informers relied on by Lt. Mursier. He states in his brief that the inmate informants were not present
at the hearing, that the inmate informants did not answer written questions he had asked to be
submitted to them, and that no statements were issued by the informants for purposes of the hearing.
He argues that the absence of the informants from the hearing violates his right to have the accuser
present at the hearing and to be able to question the accuser.
The record indicates that the actual accuser in this case is Lt. Mursier. When Goodwin
checked the box on the charge sheet stating that he wanted his accuser present at the hearing, his
request was met by the presence via telephone of Lt. Mursier. Lt. Mursier provided statements to
the DHO regarding the incident at issue, and Goodwin’s counsel substitute was allowed to question
Lt. Mursier regarding the incident. Thus, Goodwin was allowed to question his accuser, as in the
person who actually charged him with the offense, at the hearing.
The Department has procedures in place governing an inmate’s or a counsel substitute’s
questioning of another inmate who is an adversarial witness in a hearing. Thus, either Goodwin or
Goodwin’s counsel substitute could have requested that the inmate informants testify before the
DHO in this case. However, there is no indication in the record that Goodwin asked to question or
hear from any of the inmate informants. Although Goodwin claims in his appellate brief that he
submitted written questions for the inmate informants to answer, there is no indication in the record
that he did so. Thus, there is nothing preserved for this tribunal to review concerning this issue.
State v. Huggins, 336 S.C. 200, 205, 519 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1999) (“It is well settled that issues may
not be raised for the first time on appeal.”)
In addition to his arguments regarding the inmate informants, Goodwin also states that he
told his counsel substitute that he had other witnesses he wanted to question on his own behalf, but
that only his roommate was questioned at the hearing. A review of the hearing transcript does not
reveal that Goodwin or his counsel substitute requested the presence of any witness other than those
who testified at the hearing; thus, there is nothing for this tribunal to review regarding this issue. Id.
In this case, Goodwin received adequate advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity
for a hearing in which he could present witnesses and documentary evidence, a counsel substitute,
and an impartial hearing officer who prepared a written statement of all the evidence presented and
the reasons for his decision. Thus, Goodwin received all of the due process to which he was entitled.
II.SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARGUMENT
In his appeal, Goodwin essentially argues that the evidence upon which the DHO relied in
finding him guilty was unreliable and insufficient. Goodwin points out that the information used to
charge him came solely from other inmates. There was no other evidence other than the inmates’s
words to prove that he committed the charged offense. Further, Goodwin claims, a conflict exists
between Lt. Mursier’s testimony that, following the incident, he found Goodwin in his room for the
3:00 count, and Lt. Mursier’s report of the incident, which indicates that the incident itself occurred
at approximately 3:00. Goodwin argues that the statements regarding the time make it impossible
for him to have committed the act in question.
The ALC, as a reviewing tribunal, cannot substitute its judgment for that of the DOC as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2003).
Thus, once the facts are established by the DHO, the ALC will not re-weigh the evidence in an
attempt to come to an independent conclusion on the factual dispute. Rather, the ALC will rely upon
the DHO’s factual determinations and will not overturn those determinations unless they are clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. S.C. Code
Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6)(e) (Supp. 2003); Adams v. Texfi Indus., 341 S.C. 401, 404, 535 S.E.2d 124,
125 (2000). “‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed
blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would
allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or must have
reached in order to justify its action.” Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981).
“Substantial evidence is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s
finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 282 S.C. 430, 432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1984).
Considering the record as a whole, this tribunal cannot say that the DHO’s decision was
erroneous. The DHO relied upon Lt. Mursier’s report and testimony concerning his investigation
into the incidents. Although there may be a discrepancy in Lt. Mursier’s report where he states that
both the incident and the investigation of the incident occurred at approximately 3:00, Ofc. Gibert’s
report, which was read into the record by the DHO, establishes that he discovered the damage to the
televisions at 12:55 p.m. Lt. Mursier’s report indicates that Lt. Mursier began his investigation into
the broken televisions at approximately 3:00 p.m. However, it does not specify the exact time that
he found Goodwin and Hood in their room; it only states that Goodwin and Hood were in their room
for the 3:00 count. From a review of the record, it appears that all evidence can be reconciled. The
fact that reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence does not
prevent the DOC’s conclusion from being supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Goodwin also argues that an improper inmate-staff relationship exists between Lt. Mursier
and the inmate informants in that Lt. Mursier has used the same inmates as informants in the past
and found them to be reliable. Goodwin argues that Lt. Mursier’s use of inmates as informants in
his case who have been informants for Lt. Mursier in the past constitutes unprofessional behavior.
He argues that Lt. Mursier should be charged with 3.13, giving an inmate the power to “exert
authority over another inmate.” South Carolina courts have traditionally adhered to a “hands off”
approach regarding judicial involvement in internal prison disciplinary procedures. Pruitt v. State,
274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980). In Al-Shabazz the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that,
since prison officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, the courts and the
[ALC] shall adhere to this traditional “hands off” doctrine “when reviewing the outcome of any
major or minor disciplinary hearing in which an inmate has a protected liberty interest due to the
potential loss of sentence-related credits.” Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757. To
address this claim of Goodwin’s would be to overstep this tribunal’s authority.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the guilty verdict entered by DOC against Appellant Harry
Goodwin is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________________
C. DUKES SCOTT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
May 17, 2004
Columbia, South Carolina |