South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
Edgar A. Brown building 1205 Pendleton St., Suite 224 Columbia, SC 29201 Voice: (803) 734-0550

SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
Harry Goodwin, #208622 vs. DOC

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Corrections

PARTIES:
Appellant:
Harry Goodwin, #208622

Respondent:
South Carolina Department of Corrections
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
04-ALJ-04-00031-AP

APPEARANCES:
n/a
 

ORDERS:

FINAL ORDER AND DECISION

INTRODUCTIONThis matter is before the Administrative Law Court (“ALC”) pursuant to the appeal of Harry Goodwin, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections (“DOC”). On August 19, 2003, Goodwin was convicted of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code 2.07, Damage, Loss, Destruction, or Defacing of Property with a Value of $50 or More. As a result of his conviction, Goodwin lost 120 days of good time credit and was ordered to pay restitution. Footnote Goodwin filed a grievance with the DOC and received a final agency decision on January 7, 2004. On January 26, 2004, Goodwin filed this appeal. After a review of the record and the arguments, the decision of the DOC is affirmed.

FACTS

On August 9, 2003, at approximately 12:55 p.m., Ofc. Gibert was conducting a security check in Unit F-1 A-wing of McCormick Correctional Institution when he noticed that televisions in the recreational area appeared to be broken and/or damaged. Ofc. Gibert immediately reported the damage to Sgt. Bell, who in turn informed Lt. Mursier.

At approximately 3:00 p.m. on the same day, Lt. Mursier conducted an investigation into the broken television sets. Lt. Mursier spoke to a confidential informant who had proven reliable to Lt. Mursier in the past. This confidential informant told Lt. Mursier that Goodwin and one other inmate, John Wood, had broken the television sets. Other inmates also informed Lt. Mursier that Goodwin and Wood were responsible for breaking the televisions sets. The television sets were confiscated, and Goodwin and Wood were placed in SMU. During further checks of the area, a damaged microwave was also discovered in a trash can in the same room as the broken televisions.

Goodwin was served with papers on August 12, 2003, charging him with the offense of Damage, Loss, Destruction, or Defacing of Property with a Value of $50 or More, (2.07). Goodwin indicated on the papers that he wanted his accuser present at the hearing and that he wanted a counsel substitute.

A hearing on the charge commenced on August 19, 2003. The charging officer, Lt. Mursier, testified at the hearing via a speakerphone. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) read Ofc. Gibert’s and Lt. Mursier’s reports into the record at the beginning of the hearing. Goodwin, who was represented by counsel substitute, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Goodwin stated that Lt. Mursier never questioned him during his investigation into the broken televisions. Goodwin stated that the inmates who provided information to Lt. Mursier during his investigation fabricated their stories. Goodwin further stated that these inmates have fabricated stories about him twice before, resulting in his being “lock[ed] up” twice on no evidence, and that he needed “Lt. Stevenson” Footnote to verify to the DHO that these inmates have indeed lied before and are unreliable.

The DHO conducted Goodwin’s hearing simultaneously with Wood’s hearing on the same charge based upon the same event. Wood stated that the information provided by the inmate informants to Lt. Mursier was false. Goodwin and Wood’s counsel substitute then questioned Lt. Mursier regarding his investigation. Lt. Mursier stated that he interviewed at least five inmates at the time of his investigation, and that Major Lewis talked to numerous inmates in the unit as well. Lt. Mursier stated that the inmates he interviewed told him that Goodwin had recently been robbed, and that he took his frustration about the robbery out on the televisions. Footnote They told Lt. Mursier that Goodwin and Wood broke the televisions by throwing a lock in a sock at them. No lock or sock was found in the room when it was inventoried. Lt. Mursier stated that the charge against Goodwin was based solely on the words of the inmate informants regarding what they told him they witnessed.

Lt. Mursier went on to state that, at the time of the investigation, Goodwin and Wood were in their room when he went to pick them up. He stated that he picked them up at about count time for the 3:00 count. He stated that neither Goodwin nor Wood said anything when he picked them up.

Lt. Stevens also testified at the hearing to answer questions from Goodwin’s counsel substitute. Lt. Stevens testified that he was aware of a prior incident in which Goodwin was in lock-up as the result of a charge brought against him based upon inmate informant statements which turned out to have been fabricated. Lt. Stevens admitted that there is a similarity between the prior charge and the current charge, in that in both cases Goodwin was charged solely on the basis of something an inmate informant told someone. However, Lt. Stevens also stated that he was not aware of how it was proven that the inmate informant had fabricated his statements in the prior case; Lt. Stevens stated that he only heard about the fabrication from another inmate.

In summation, Goodwin’s counsel substitute told the DHO that there was no physical evidence in this case, only the word of other inmates. He argued that there was no verification from any other source that Goodwin had been robbed prior to the time the televisions were broken. The DHO found Goodwin guilty on the charge on the basis of Lt. Mursier’s report and statements during the hearing. Addressing the substitute counsel’s point about the confidential informants’s statements being the only evidence to support the charge, the DHO stated that, in a dorm where all of the televisions and the microwave are damaged, the inmates usually do tell the truth, because it is their televisions and microwave that have been broken and are gone. The DHO recommended that Goodwin lose 120 days of good time and that he be required to pay restitution in an amount to be determined.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

(1)Was Goodwin afforded due process during the adjudication of this internal disciplinary matter?


(2)Was the final decision supported by substantial evidence in the record?

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is invoked in the instant case since this matter is a disciplinary hearing in which Goodwin was punished by the loss of good time credits, a loss which impacts a created liberty interest. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000); Sullivan v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrections, 355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124 (2003).

SCOPE OF REVIEW

In this review, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) acts “in an appellate capacity” and is “restricted to reviewing the decision below.” Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. When acting in an appellate capacity, the ALJ must apply the criteria of S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2003). See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2003) (where an ALJ is directed to conduct a review “in the same manner prescribed in [§ 1-23-380](A).”).

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2003) establishes the following:

The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(a)in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b)in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c)made upon unlawful procedure;

(d)affected by other error of law;

(e)clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f)arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.


S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2003).

DISCUSSION

I. DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT

The statutory right to sentence-related credits is a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 369-370, 527 S.E.2d at 750. An inmate facing the loss of sentence-related credits is entitled to minimal due process to ensure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated. Id. While due process is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), certain elements must be satisfied in order for procedural due process requirements to be met. Those elements include the following:

(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) that factfinders must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the inmate should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue hazard to institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the matter, who may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial.


Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72 (1974)).

Goodwin mentions several incidents connected with the hearing of this matter which he deems to be improper. Goodwin is primarily concerned with the non-availability of the inmate informers relied on by Lt. Mursier. He states in his brief that the inmate informants were not present at the hearing, that the inmate informants did not answer written questions he had asked to be submitted to them, and that no statements were issued by the informants for purposes of the hearing. He argues that the absence of the informants from the hearing violates his right to have the accuser present at the hearing and to be able to question the accuser.

The record indicates that the actual accuser in this case is Lt. Mursier. When Goodwin checked the box on the charge sheet stating that he wanted his accuser present at the hearing, his request was met by the presence via telephone of Lt. Mursier. Lt. Mursier provided statements to the DHO regarding the incident at issue, and Goodwin’s counsel substitute was allowed to question Lt. Mursier regarding the incident. Thus, Goodwin was allowed to question his accuser, as in the person who actually charged him with the offense, at the hearing.

The Department has procedures in place governing an inmate’s or a counsel substitute’s questioning of another inmate who is an adversarial witness in a hearing. Thus, either Goodwin or Goodwin’s counsel substitute could have requested that the inmate informants testify before the DHO in this case. However, there is no indication in the record that Goodwin asked to question or hear from any of the inmate informants. Although Goodwin claims in his appellate brief that he submitted written questions for the inmate informants to answer, there is no indication in the record that he did so. Thus, there is nothing preserved for this tribunal to review concerning this issue. State v. Huggins, 336 S.C. 200, 205, 519 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1999) (“It is well settled that issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”)

In addition to his arguments regarding the inmate informants, Goodwin also states that he told his counsel substitute that he had other witnesses he wanted to question on his own behalf, but that only his roommate was questioned at the hearing. A review of the hearing transcript does not reveal that Goodwin or his counsel substitute requested the presence of any witness other than those who testified at the hearing; thus, there is nothing for this tribunal to review regarding this issue. Id.

In this case, Goodwin received adequate advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in which he could present witnesses and documentary evidence, a counsel substitute, and an impartial hearing officer who prepared a written statement of all the evidence presented and the reasons for his decision. Thus, Goodwin received all of the due process to which he was entitled.

II.SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARGUMENT

In his appeal, Goodwin essentially argues that the evidence upon which the DHO relied in finding him guilty was unreliable and insufficient. Goodwin points out that the information used to charge him came solely from other inmates. There was no other evidence other than the inmates’s words to prove that he committed the charged offense. Further, Goodwin claims, a conflict exists between Lt. Mursier’s testimony that, following the incident, he found Goodwin in his room for the 3:00 count, and Lt. Mursier’s report of the incident, which indicates that the incident itself occurred at approximately 3:00. Goodwin argues that the statements regarding the time make it impossible for him to have committed the act in question.

The ALC, as a reviewing tribunal, cannot substitute its judgment for that of the DOC as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2003). Thus, once the facts are established by the DHO, the ALC will not re-weigh the evidence in an attempt to come to an independent conclusion on the factual dispute. Rather, the ALC will rely upon the DHO’s factual determinations and will not overturn those determinations unless they are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6)(e) (Supp. 2003); Adams v. Texfi Indus., 341 S.C. 401, 404, 535 S.E.2d 124, 125 (2000). “‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action.” Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). “Substantial evidence is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 282 S.C. 430, 432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1984).

Considering the record as a whole, this tribunal cannot say that the DHO’s decision was erroneous. The DHO relied upon Lt. Mursier’s report and testimony concerning his investigation into the incidents. Although there may be a discrepancy in Lt. Mursier’s report where he states that both the incident and the investigation of the incident occurred at approximately 3:00, Ofc. Gibert’s report, which was read into the record by the DHO, establishes that he discovered the damage to the televisions at 12:55 p.m. Lt. Mursier’s report indicates that Lt. Mursier began his investigation into the broken televisions at approximately 3:00 p.m. However, it does not specify the exact time that he found Goodwin and Hood in their room; it only states that Goodwin and Hood were in their room for the 3:00 count. From a review of the record, it appears that all evidence can be reconciled. The fact that reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence does not prevent the DOC’s conclusion from being supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Goodwin also argues that an improper inmate-staff relationship exists between Lt. Mursier and the inmate informants in that Lt. Mursier has used the same inmates as informants in the past and found them to be reliable. Goodwin argues that Lt. Mursier’s use of inmates as informants in his case who have been informants for Lt. Mursier in the past constitutes unprofessional behavior. He argues that Lt. Mursier should be charged with 3.13, giving an inmate the power to “exert authority over another inmate.” South Carolina courts have traditionally adhered to a “hands off” approach regarding judicial involvement in internal prison disciplinary procedures. Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980). In Al-Shabazz the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that, since prison officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, the courts and the [ALC] shall adhere to this traditional “hands off” doctrine “when reviewing the outcome of any major or minor disciplinary hearing in which an inmate has a protected liberty interest due to the potential loss of sentence-related credits.” Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757. To address this claim of Goodwin’s would be to overstep this tribunal’s authority.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the guilty verdict entered by DOC against Appellant Harry Goodwin is AFFIRMED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

___________________________________

C. DUKES SCOTT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

May 17, 2004

Columbia, South Carolina


Brown Bldg.

 

 

 

 

 

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