ORDERS:
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Launeil "Neil" Sanders' (Sanders) is seeking a contested case hearing to challenge the anticipated reissuance of NPDES
permit # SC0003042 by the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) to Sonoco Products Company
(Sonoco). Both DHEC and Sonoco have filed Motions to Dismiss on the ground that DHEC has yet to reissue the permit
in question and, therefore, the case is not ripe for adjudication. Further, DHEC seeks an Order directing the Clerk of the
Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD) "not to receive any pleading or filing from Petitioner which contains
scandalous, irrelevant or impertinent matter." The Motions to Dismiss are granted but the Motion for Sanctions is denied
given the actions of Sanders to date.
The Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD) has only that jurisdiction expressly conferred by statute. See Triska v.
Department of Health and Environmental Control, 292 S.C. 190, 355 S.E.2d 531 (1987). For a DHEC dispute, the
ALJD obtains jurisdiction if a contested case is presented. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(B) (Supp. 1999). A"contested
case" is presented when "the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency
after an opportunity for a hearing[.]" S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310 (Supp. 1999). Therefore, jurisdiction arises when the
legal rights of a party are impacted by an agency's decision. In this case, DHEC has not yet made an agency decision since
DHEC has not concluded whether the permit sought by Sonoco should be granted or denied. Thus, Sanders has presented
a claim that is not ripe and which, therefore, deprives the ALJD of jurisdiction.
'to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements
over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has
been formalized and its effect felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.'
Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 118 S.Ct. 1665 (1998).
Here, DHEC has not yet reissued the permit in question. Indeed, it is mere speculation to assume that DHEC will in fact
reissue the permit. Accordingly, Sanders' unripe challenge to the Sonoco permit deprives the ALJD of jurisdiction. Cf. Orr v. Clyburn, 277 S.C. 536, 290 S.E.2d 804 (1982) ("The existence of an actual, justiciable controversy is essential to
jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment. A justiciable controversy is a real and substantial controversy which is ripe
and appropriate for judicial determination, as distinguished from this dispute of a contingent, hypothetical or abstract
character."). Accordingly, this matter must be dismissed since no justiciable controversy exists and since such a condition
denies the ALJD any contested case jurisdiction over Sanders' current challenge. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310 and 1-23-600(B) (Supp. 1999).
DHEC seeks an Order directing the Clerk of the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD) "not to receive any pleading
or filing from Petitioner which contains scandalous, irrelevant or impertinent matter." I decline at this point to impose such
an Order.
An ALJ has the same powers as those held by a circuit court judge. S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-630 (1999). An inherent power
of a judge is the power to control the practices of those who appear before it. See Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,
632, (1962) (establishing that the inherent power of a court to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices is
"well-acknowledged"). However, since a judge's inherent powers "are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must
be exercised with restraint and discretion. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450-451 (1911).
Exercising my discretion in this area, I conclude that at this point in time Sanders has not crossed the line warranting
sanctions. Certainly, it is true that Sanders has been unsuccessful in satisfying the criteria needed to establish a contested
case and has repeatedly failed to appreciate the need for obtaining a final decision from DHEC before seeking a contested
case. Further, it is also true that Sanders' filings allude to criminal activity beyond the purview of the matters decided by
the ALJD and his filings use inflammatory language. However, his status of proceeding without counsel is a mitigating
factor in Sanders' failure to understand the need for a final decision by DHEC before seeking a contested case. On the
whole, Sanders' actions up to this point do not warrant the use of sanctions.
The Motions to Dismiss are granted, but are granted without prejudice. Sanders has the right to challenge the reissuance of
the NPDES permit # SC0003042 by DHEC to Sonoco if such a reissuance occurs and if his challenge is made as prescribed
by law. Further, the Motion for Sanctions is denied.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: April 27, 2000
Columbia, South Carolina |
