ORDERS:
ORDER OF REMAND
This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division ("Division") pursuant to the appeal of Anthony Reed
("Appellant") from a decision of the Respondent, South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, South
Carolina Manufactured Housing Board ("Board"), denying Appellant's application for a license as a manufactured home
retail multi-lot sales person. Appellant attended a hearing before the Board on July 13, 1999, at which the Board denied the
application on the grounds that the Appellant had, while previously licensed, submitted financial applications on behalf of
various customers which were allegedly found to contain misrepresentations, and that he had signed off on transactions
entered into by unlicensed salespersons.
Upon review of the file and the briefs submitted in this matter, it is apparent that the Board did not provide a certified
transcript of the hearing at which Appellant appeared. Rather, it merely provided as part of the "Record on Appeal" a set of
minutes of its July 13, 1999, meeting, at which Appellant's application was discussed and at which Appellant presumably
made some kind of statement.
A person's right to follow his chosen profession is protected by the Due Process Clause. Brown v. S.C. State Bd. of
Education, 301 S.C. 326, 391 S.E.2d 866 (1990). Furthermore, "when the State seeks to revoke or deny a professional
license, [due process] interests are implicated and procedural due process requirements must be met. [Citations omitted.]
The State must afford notice and the opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Id. at 329, 391 S.E.2d
at 867. While due process is "flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands," Stono
River Envtl. Protection Ass'n v. S.C. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, 305 S.C. 90, 94, 406 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1991), at a
minimum, certain elements must be satisfied in order for procedural due process requirements to be met, including adequate
notice, adequate opportunity for a hearing, the right to introduce evidence, and the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses. Huellmantel v. Greenville Hosp. System, 303 S.C. 549, 402 S.E.2d 489 (Ct. App. 1991).
Without a certified transcript of the proceedings before the Board, it is impossible to determine whether the Appellant was
afforded due process in this case or to afford any kind of meaningful review of the Board's decision. There is simply no
indication whether the Appellant was allowed to fully present his case, whether opposing witnesses testified, or whether the
Appellant was allowed to cross-examine any opposing witnesses. Moreover, there is nothing in the incomplete record to
guide this Court in determining whether the Board's decision was supported by the evidence. Accordingly, I conclude that
this case must be remanded to the Board to conduct a contested case hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act.
On remand, the Board shall provide the Appellant with adequate notice of the charges against him; shall provide thirty (30)
days' notice of the hearing, as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-320(a); and shall afford the Appellant the opportunity to
present witnesses and evidence on his own behalf, as well as the opportunity to cross-examine any adverse witnesses.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Marvin F. Kittrell
Chief Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
January 12, 2000 |