ORDERS:
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before me upon the motion of the Respondent, South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, South Carolina Residential Builders Commission ("Commission") to dismiss this appeal on the grounds that the Appellant lacks standing to appeal a decision of the Commission. For the following reasons, the motion is granted, and this matter is hereby dismissed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1996, the Appellant contracted with Willie J. Blackmon, Jr., d/b/a Willie Blackmon Construction ("Blackmon"), a builder duly licensed with the Commission, to construct the Appellant’s residence at 170 Duck Blind Trail in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina for $124,600. After Blackmon began construction of the house, numerous defects in the construction became apparent, resulting in the Appellant’s filing of a complaint with the Commission. A representative of the Commission conducted inspections of the residence, which revealed building code violations attributed to Blackmon’s work. The Commission instituted disciplinary proceedings against Blackmon and held a hearing on June 17, 1998. In its Order dated June 22, 1998, the Commission found that Blackmon had violated S.C. Code Ann. § 40-1-110 and § 40-59-90, in that he was guilty of gross negligence, incompetence, or misconduct in the practice of residential home building. The Commission ordered Blackmon to conform the work on Appellant’s residence to applicable building codes within thirty days of his receipt of the Order. The Commission further ordered the Appellant to provide reasonable access to the residence as necessary to facilitate timely completion of the work, and stated that "[i]f the homeowner fails to allow [Blackmon] reasonable access to the home, then the complaint may be dismissed in the Commission’s discretion." Finally, the Commission imposed further conditions on Blackmon’s continued licensure.
On July 13, 1998, Blackmon filed an incident report with the Myrtle Beach Police Department, alleging that while he was attempting to complete the work on Appellant’s residence, Appellant’s boyfriend attacked him with a "stun gun." Blackmon reported the incident to the Commission. On July 15, 1998, the Commission held a meeting at which it heard reports from its staff concerning the alleged incident. As a result of this meeting, the Commission voted to dismiss the Appellant’s complaint on the grounds that Blackmon had been denied access to the property. Appellant was not notified of the meeting, and was not aware of the Commission’s action until she received a letter from the Commission dated August 7, 1998, advising her that the complaint had been dismissed. Thereafter, Appellant filed a notice of intent to appeal the Commission’s decision with the Administrative Law Judge Division ("Division").
DISCUSSION
The Commission asserts that, since the Appellant was not a party to the action between the Commission and Blackmon, she lacks standing to seek review of the Commission’s decision. Appellant argues that, since Blackmon’s negligent construction resulted in damages to her home, she has a personal stake in the subject matter of the complaint filed against Blackmon, and thus has standing to maintain this appeal.
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 1998) grants the Administrative Law Judge Division jurisdiction to "preside over all hearings of appeals from final decisions of contested cases before professional and occupational licensing boards or commissions within the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation pursuant to Section 1-23-380." Section 1-23-380(A)(Supp. 1998), which is applicable to appeals heard by an administrative law judge, provides that "[a] party who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to . . . review. . . ." (Emphasis added). Thus, in order for the Appellant to have standing to bring this appeal, she must have been a "party" to the contested case proceedings. "Party" is defined in the Administrative Procedures Act as "each person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party. . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(5) (Supp. 1998). It is uncontroverted that, although she was the original complainant, the Appellant was not "named or admitted as a party" to the contested case proceeding between the Commission and Blackmon. Appellant contends, however, that she is "properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party." She argues that she is entitled to be admitted as a party to this action because she has a personal stake in the subject matter of this appeal and is thus the real party in interest. Her argument must fail, however, for several reasons.
First, in order to have standing to bring an appeal, a person who was not named or admitted as a party in the contested case proceeding must have either obtained or attempted to obtain party status during the pendency of that proceeding. In Home Health Services, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Health and Envtl. Control, 298 S.C. 258, 379 S.E.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals held that, even if a person or entity may have been "adversely affected" by an administrative decision and "entitled as of right" to be admitted as a party to the contested case proceedings, it nevertheless lacked standing to appeal the administrative decision because it had never sought party status in those proceedings. Likewise, even though the Commission’s decision adversely affected the Appellant in that Blackmon was no longer required to perform repairs on Appellant’s residence, there is no evidence that the Appellant ever sought to be named a party to the contested case proceeding against Blackmon. Under these circumstances, the Home Health decision forecloses Appellant from appealing the decision of the Commission. See also Byers v. S.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n, 281 S.C. 566, 316 S.E.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1984) (persons protesting the issuance of a beer and wine permit were not entitled to receive notice of appeal from the Commission’s decision, where they were not admitted as a party and did not seek party status before the Commission).
Second, it is questionable whether, even if Appellant had sought party status in the contested case proceedings, she would have been "entitled as of right" to be admitted as a party. The purpose of the various professional and occupational licensing boards within the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation is to protect the public at large through the regulation of professional and occupational licensees. S.C. Code Ann. § 40-1-40 (Supp. 1998). In furtherance of this purpose, each board is given the power to determine the eligibility of applicants for licensure, to establish criteria for licensure, and to discipline licensees for violations of their respective practice acts. S.C. Code Ann. § 40-1-70 (Supp. 1998). Upon receiving a complaint from any person, the Commission has the authority to investigate the complaint, and it may, in its discretion, dismiss the complaint or conduct a hearing on the charges. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 40-1-80; 40-59-90 (Supp. 1998). There is no right of review from a decision to dismiss a complaint without a hearing, and there is no provision within the applicable statutes which entitles the complainant to notice of the disciplinary proceedings, to become a party to any disciplinary proceedings or to appeal final decisions of the Commission. The only person given the right to appeal the Commission’s decision is the person whose license is affected by the decision. § 40-59-90. Thus, I conclude that the Appellant was not "entitled as of right" to become a party to the disciplinary proceedings against Blackmon.
Finally, Appellant misconstrues the essential nature of disciplinary proceedings. The purpose of such proceedings is not to vindicate private rights, but to safeguard the public at large against incompetent licensees and practitioners. See S.C. Code Ann. § 40-1-40 (Supp. 1998); Wilson v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 305 S.C. 194, 406 S.E.2d 345 (1991) (revocation of a physician’s license is designed to protect the life, health and welfare of the people at large). In Wyoming State Board of Accountancy v. Macalister, 493 P.2d 1268 (Wyo. 1972), the court noted that the purpose of a disciplinary action was to serve the public interest by determining whether the licensee had engaged in practices discreditable to his profession, and not to vindicate or adjudicate private rights. In this case, likewise, the purpose of the proceedings against Blackmon was not to redress wrongs allegedly committed against the Appellant, but to determine whether Blackmon had committed any violations of the statutes and regulations governing his occupation, and to impose such punishment as the Commission deemed appropriate in its discretion. A complainant has no standing to contest the punishment, or lack of punishment, imposed by the Commission. See Eikelberger v. Nevada State Board of Accountancy, 91 Nev. 98, 431 P.2d 853 (1975) (complainant had no standing to appeal the Board’s disciplinary decision since he was not an aggrieved party within the meaning of the applicable procedural statute). Therefore, while I am sympathetic to the Appellant’s plight, her appropriate recourse is not in this forum.
ORDER
For all the foregoing reasons, the Commission’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_____________________________
Marvin F. Kittrell
Chief Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
April 13, 1999
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