ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In April 28, 1998, the South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, State Board of Dentistry (Board)
found Jimmy L. Gardner, D.M.D. (Appellant) represented a danger to the public based in part on his unacceptable
treatment of a patient and revoked his license to practice dentistry. In the 1998 action, the Board also considered evidence
from a 1995 disciplinary action. In that action, the license of the Appellant was suspended for one year and he was placed
on probation for four years. The 1998 revocation was upheld on appeal. Subsequently, on April 23, 2001, the Appellant
applied to the Board for licensure. On September 23, 2001, the Board met with the Appellant present. On October 23,
2001, the Board issued its order denying the application and stating, "Applicant shall not be eligible to reapply for licensure
in this State at any time in the future." The Appellant appeals the decision to the Administrative Law Judge Division
(ALJD).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEWAn appeal before the ALJD is governed by the review criteria of S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-
380(A)(6) (Supp. 2001). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2001) (where an ALJ is directed to conduct a review
"in the same manner prescribed in [§ 1-23-380](A)."). Section 1-23-380(A)(6) establishes the following criteria:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The
court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify
the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences,
conclusions or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provision;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Here, the Appellant argues a reversal of the Board's decision is required because there was no evidence on which the Board
based its decision and that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. In the alternative, the Appellant argues this matter
should be remanded to the Board since the Board's decision fails to make specific findings of fact and fails to explain its
rationale in sufficient detail to afford judicial review.
Since I find that the Board's decision fails to make specific findings of fact and fails to explain its rationale, I do not reach
the merits. Rather, the Board's order is vacated, and this matter is remanded for further consideration consistent with the
explanation below.
III. ANALYSIS
Findings of the Board
The standard an administrative body must satisfy in issuing its decision is now well established. "An administrative body
must make findings which are sufficiently detailed to enable this Court to determine whether the findings are supported by
the evidence and whether the law has been applied properly to those findings." Kiawah Property Owners Group vs. Public
Serv. Comm'n of South Carolina and Kiawah Island Utility, Inc., 338 S.C. 92, 95-96, 525 S.E.2d 863, 865 (1999)(citing
Porter v. S.C. Public Serv. Comm'n., 333 S.C. 12, 21, 507 S.E.2d 328, 332 (1998)). This Court will not accept an
administrative agency's decision at face value without requiring the agency to explain its reasoning. Id. Findings of fact
must be sufficiently detailed to enable the reviewing court to determine whether the findings are supported by the evidence
in the record and whether the law has been properly applied. See Parsons v. Georgetown Steel, 318 S.C. 63, 456 S.E.2d
366 (1995) and Able Communications, Inc. v. S.C. Public Serv. Comm'n, 290 S.C. 409, 411, 351 S.E.2d 151, 152 (1986).
Where material facts are in dispute, the administrative body must make specific, express findings of fact. Able. In the
current case, the Board failed to meet the required standard.
Due Process
Action of an agency which affects individual rights is void where the individual has not been provided with proper notice
and an opportunity to be heard. S.C. Const. Art. I, § 22 ("No person shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi judicial
decision of an administrative agency affecting private rights except on due notice and an opportunity to be heard . . . .").
Due process requires the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. LLR vs. Girgis, 332 SC
162, 503 S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1998)(quoting SC Dept. of Social Services vs. Holden, 319 S.C. 72, 459 S.E.2d 846 (1986).
In this case, it does not appear that Appellant was afforded an opportunity to be heard from the limited record.
Further, the Appellant's right to an impartial adjudicator is protected. "...[W]e
find the purpose of article I, § 22 is to ensure adjudications are conducted by impartial administrative bodies." Ross vs.
Medical University of South Carolina, 328 S.C. 51, 69, 492 S.E.2d 62, 72 (1997). "Partiality exists where, among others,
an adjudicator either has ex parte information as a result of prior investigation or has developed, by prior involvement with
the case, a "will to win." Id. It is unclear exactly what happened in this case in regards to this issue. It is unclear if the panel
has any of the same members. However, it is clear that the Board relied heavily on the past orders of the Board instead of
considering anything presented at this hearing.
IV. Order
I remand this matter to the Board without reaching the merits. See S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(6)(Supp.2001). On
remand, the Board shall here evidence and find facts accordingly. The case shall be heard by a panel of Board member
unfamiliar with the case. Thereafter, and upon consideration of the entire record made, the Board shall issue its decision.
Such decision shall fall within their authority as designated at Title 40, Chapters 1 and 15. All that is required concerning
their order is that an adequate order result after due process is afforded.
Accordingly, the Board's order is VACATED, and this matter is remanded to the Board who shall proceed in accordance
with the dictates of this decision.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
CAROLYN C. MATTHEWS
Administrative Law Judge
October 21, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina |