ORDERS:
ORDER
This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division ("ALJD") pursuant to the Appellant's appeal from the
decision of the South Carolina Manufactured Housing Board ("Board") dated July 9, 2001. For the following reasons, the
Board's Order is hereby vacated and this matter is remanded to the Board.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On or about June 5, 2000, Brian Boyleston obtained a salvaged title to a 1972 Saratoga manufactured home. Later that day,
Appellant Homes America, Inc. ("HAI") entered into a contract to sell a 1998 Redman New Moon manufactured home to
Brian Boyleston, giving Boyleston a trade-in allowance of $8,000 for the Saratoga. Boyleston's purchase of the Redman
was financed by Conseco Financing Servicing Corporation, which received a credit application prepared by an HAI
salesman on behalf of Boyleston. On that application, the sales price of $38,199.00 was listed, as well as various other
charges associated with the purchase of the Redman, bringing the total cash purchase price to $40, 290.48. In addition, the
trade-in allowance of $8,000.00 was also listed.
As a result of its transaction with Boyleston, HAI was charged with violating certain statutes and regulations and was
assessed fines totaling $2000.00. On June 12, 2001, HAI was given a contested case hearing before the Board. On July 9,
2001, the Board issued an Order finding that HAI employed fraudulent methods or practices and used unfair deceptive acts
or practices in connection with the sale of a manufactured home in violation of applicable statutes and regulations. On
August 8, 2001, HAI appealed the Board's Order to the ALJD.
II. DISCUSSION
Jurisdiction on appeal from a decision of a Board or Commission within the Department of Labor, Licensing and
Regulation is vested in the ALJD pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 1999). On appeal to the ALJD, the
standard of review is limited to the record presented. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 1999). An Administrative
Law Judge may reverse or modify the agency's decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because
the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are affected by error of law or clearly erroneous in view of
the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 1999);
Stephen v. Avins Const. Co., 324 S.C. 334, 478 S.E.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1996).
The standard an administrative body must satisfy in issuing its decision is now well established:
"An administrative body must make findings which are sufficiently detailed to enable this Court to determine whether the
findings are supported by the evidence and whether the law has been applied properly to those findings." Porter v. S.C.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 333 S.C. 12, 507 S.E.2d 328 (1998). This Court will not accept an administrative agency's decision
at face value without requiring the agency to explain its reasoning. Id. ...Where material facts are in dispute, the
administrative body must make specific, express findings of fact. Able Communications, Inc. v. S.C. Public Serv. Comm'n,
290 S.C. 409, 411, 351 S.E.2d 151, 152 (1986).
Kiawah Property Owners Group v. Public Serv. Comm'n of South Carolina and Kiawah Island Utility, Inc., 338 S.C. 92,
525 S.E.2d 863.
Under this standard, an administrative decision is unacceptable if it states the outcome without explaining the reasoning
that leads to the outcome. An adjudicative body fails to explain its reasoning when the decision does not spell out how the
conclusions reached were arrived at from the facts determined. Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 626-57 (1976).
Here, HAI argues that a reversal of the Board's decision is required because there is no evidence in the Record that HAI
employed fraudulent methods or practices or used unfair deceptive acts or practices in connection with the sale of a
manufactured home. In its July 9 Order, the Board failed to make specific findings of fact. (1) More importantly, the Board
failed to explain its rationale, leaving this tribunal to speculate, something this tribunal is unable and unwilling to do. This
tribunal has neither the power nor the inclination to justify the Board's decision when the Board itself has failed to do so.
III. ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the July 9 Order of the Board is VACATED and this matter is REMANDED to the
Board to issue a Final Order containing detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in conformance with the principles
set forth herein within 30 days of the date of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should the Board fail to issue such a conforming Final Order within 30 days of the
date of this Order, all citations issued to and/or penalties assessed against Homes America, Inc., that arose out of the
Boyleston transaction shall be vacated.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
C. DUKES SCOTT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
December 27, 2001
Columbia, South Carolina
1. In its Findings of Fact, the Board states that Homes America, Inc., through its employees and agents, "participated in a
fraudulent scheme." Contrary to the Board's characterization, such a statement in this context is not a finding of fact but a
conclusion of law, as it is the very issue to be determined. |
