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Administrative Law Court
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SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
SCDOR vs. Sandy’s Lakeside Bar & Grill, Inc.

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Revenue

PARTIES:
Petitioners:
South Carolina Department of Revenue

Respondents:
Sandy’s Lakeside Bar & Grill, Inc.
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
06-ALJ-17-0731-CC

APPEARANCES:
n/a
 

ORDERS:

ORDER REMANDING CASE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a contested case involving the South Carolina Department of Revenue’s (Department) denial of the Respondent’s request to set aside its decision revoking the Respondent’s beer and wine permit. A hearing was held before me on October 25, 2006, at the offices of the Administrative Law Court.

STIPULATIONS OF FACT

1. Sandy’s Lakeside Bar & Grill, Inc. (Sandys) holds a permit issued by the South Carolina Department of Revenue (Department) that permits it to sell beer and wine for on premises consumption at the location 1011 Shirley Circle, Anderson, South Carolina. The Permit No. is 32019241 PBW. Sandys held this permit for this location on March 30, 2006.

2. On March 30, 2006 South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) agents, in conjunction with an eighteen year old underage confidential informant (UCI) entered the location at the above referenced address. He ordered a beer from the bartender on duty, Cynthia Platt. Ms. Platt requested identification from the UCI. He presented his South Carolina Driver’s License that showed his birth date of “06-02-1987.” Ms. Platt sold the beer to the UCI anyway.

3. Ms. Platt was charged with transfer of beer to an individual under the age of twenty-one. Sandys was issued an administrative citation for knowingly permitting a person under the age of twenty-one to purchase beer on the licensed premises, 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regulation 200.4.

4. Sandys has had three prior alcohol violations within a three year period at this specific location.

5. Sandys admits that on March 30, 2006 it committed a violation of Regulation 7-200.4 by permitting the eighteen year old UCI purchase beer on its licensed premises.

6. The Department’s Regulatory Division issued Sandys and Initial Notice of Intent to Revoke dated April 18, 2006. The Department issued its Final Agency Determination in this matter on August 17, 2006.[1] Both the Initial Notice and the Final Agency Determination were prepared and served in compliance with the Revenue Procedures Act, S.C. Code Ann. Sections 1-23-10, et. seq. (Supp. 2005).

7. Sandys submitted an untimely protest to the Department. The envelope containing Sandy’s protest is postmarked July 29, 2006. The Department received the protest on August 1, 2006.

8. Further, the parties stipulate to the entry of the following Petitioner’s Exhibits into evidence without objection:

a. Department’s Final Determination dated May 12, 2006;

b. Initial Notice of Intent to Revoke;

c. Envelope Containing Sandy’s Protest.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Having observed the witnesses and exhibits presented at the hearing and taking into consideration the burden of persuasion and the credibility of the witnesses, I make the following findings of fact by a preponderance of evidence:

The owner of Sandy’s, Denise Sisk, receives her business mail at her family’s restaurant in Belton, South Carolina. The Letter of Intent to Revoke was sent to that address where it was picked up by Denise Sisk’s sister. Her sister later gave the letter to their mother, who, in turn, placed the letter in the cash register of Sandys underneath the change drawer. Denise Sisk saw the letter in late May of 2006, and recalls seeing the ninety (90) days time limit in which to respond. A few days later, however, the restaurant was broken into and among other items, the cash register with the letter in it was stolen.

Based upon her brief perusal of DOR’s letter, Ms. Sisk was under the belief that the ninety days in which to file her protest were up at the end of July or beginning of August of 2006. Ms. Sisk was also under the mistaken belief that in order to file her Letter of Protest she had to also send in the Letter of Intent to Revoke, which was stolen along with the cash register.[2] Ms. Sisk was thus unsure of the procedural steps to take to file her protest without the Letter of Intent to Revoke. Therefore, she attempted to contact the Department to find out how she needed to proceed. Ms. Sisk obtained an 800 number for the Department from the phone book and after two unsuccessful attempts at reaching someone, she asked her employee, Cindy Platt, to try to contact the Department. Ms. Platt was also unsuccessful in her attempts to reach the Department. In mid-July Ms. Platt eventually spoke with Agent Causey of SLED who gave her the Case Number of the violation. As soon as Ms. Sisk received the information that Ms. Platt had gathered, she sent a Letter of Protest in to the Department.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the above Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:

1. Respondent asserts that its failure to timely file a letter of protest is justified under the facts of this case. Therefore, Respondent argues that it should be permitted to contest the Department’s revocation of its permit. To the contrary, the Department contends that Respondent’s failed to appeal within the ninety-day (90) statutory period permitted and thus has no further right to appeal the revocation of its permit.

2. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600 (Supp. 2005) grants jurisdiction to the Administrative Law Court to hear contested cases under the APA. Additionally, S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-260 (Supp. 2004) grants the ALC the responsibilities to determine contested matters governing alcoholic beverages, beer and wine.

S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-1330 (A) (Supp. 2005) provides that a party must exhaust his prehearing remedy before he may seek a determination by an ALJ. More specifically, S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-1330 (A) (3) (Supp. 2005) sets forth that:

If a person fails to file a protest with the department within ninety days of the date of the denial or proposed suspension, cancellation, or revocation, the person is in default, and the department shall deny, suspend, cancel, or revoke the license or permit appropriate. The denial, suspension, cancellation, or revocation of the license or permit may be lifted by the administrative law court for good cause shown, and remand the matter to the department.

(emphasis added). In this case, Respondent alleges that there are numerous reasons which explain her failure to timely file a Letter of Protest, including the theft of the letter and her belief that the filing of the letter was a necessary component to her filing a protest of her revocation.

“Good cause” is not defined in Chapter 60 of Title 12. In Black's Law Dictionary it is defined, in part as, “[a] legally sufficient reason.” Black's Law Dictionary 213 (7th ed. 1990). Furthermore, in the context of whether a party is entitled to relief from an entry of default under Rule 55(c), SCRCP, the courts have considered the promptness with which relief is sought, the existence of a meritorious defense, and the prejudice to other parties as relevant factors in determining whether “good cause” has been shown. See, e.g., New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. The Bey Corp., 312 S.C. 47, 435 S.E.2d 377 (Ct. App. 1993). Here, the Respondent failed to timely file her letter of protest but nevertheless filed that letter before the Department made a “final decision” in this matter. She also promptly sought relief from the Department’s decision to sustain the revocation once it was made. There are also excusable reasons for Respondent’s failure to meet the filing deadline and there appears to be little, if any, prejudice to the Department. Accordingly, I find Respondent established a good cause warranting the remand of this case to the Department.

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is Remanded to the Department to complete the exhaustion of her prehearing remedies.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

________________________________

Ralph King Anderson, III

Administrative Law Judge

November 1, 2006

Columbia, South Carolina



[1] The Department’s Final Agency Determination contains a licensed location address of “101 Shirley Circle” rather than the correct address of “1011 Shirley Circle.” Sandy’s counsel was notified of this scrivener’s error and waived the issuance of an amended determination to correct such error. Sandys further agrees it had sufficient notice of the violation and determination despite the scrivener’s error.

[2] In fact, the letter did state that if she wished to concede to the revocation of her permit she needed to return the letter along with her permit.


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