ORDERS:
ORDER ON MOTION TO STAY
I. Introduction
On November 5, 1997, D. Michael Woodward (Woodward) filed A Motion To Stay the decision of
the Board of Medical Examiners (Board). After hearing arguments on November 7, 1997, the
Motion To Stay is denied.
II. Analysis
Statutory law specifies the authority of an Administrative Law Judge to issue a stay of a decision
issued by the Board. "No stay or supersedeas may be granted pending appeal from a decision by the
board to revoke, suspend, or restrict a license for more than six months." § 40-47-200(E) (Supp.
1996). In the instant case, the prohibition of § 40-47-200(E) is controlling.
The Board's order revoked Woodward's license effective October 21, 1997 and triggered the
prohibition of § 40-47-200(E) (Supp. 1996). In the absence of some other provision of law no stay
is authorized.
Woodward argues other provisions of law authorize a stay. In particular Woodward argues the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) allows the issuance of a stay and equal protection prohibits
an interpretation which singles out physicians for discriminatory treatment.
A. Administrative Procedures Act
Under the APA the appeal of an agency decision does not automatically stay the appealed order but
instead the reviewing court may order a stay upon appropriate terms. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(2) (Supp. 1996). However, that authority cannot be read in isolation. The language of § 1-23-380(A)(2) is general in nature in that the authority relates to appeals of all agency decisions.
Appeals from actions of the Board, however, are governed by the specific statute of § 40-47-200(E)
(Supp. 1996). If statutes are potentially in conflict, a recognized rule of construction favors the
specific over the general. Mims v. Alston, 312 S.C. 311, 440 S.E.2d 357 (1994) (The general rule
of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one). Accordingly, §
40-47-200(E) controls over § 1-23-380(A)(2).
Further, the creation of the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD) does not permit the issuance
of a stay in this case. While an ALJ has the broad powers of a circuit court judge to issue remedial
writs (§ 1-23-630), a review of the statutes amended at the time of the creation of the ALJD
demonstrates the General Assembly did not alter the prohibition on the issuance of a stay for appeals
from Board decisions.
For example, prior to 1993, the plain language of § 40-47-200(E) denied a circuit court judge the
ability to stay the Board's revocation decision. The act that created the ALJD in 1993 also amended
§ 40-47-200(E) and substituted the ALJ for the circuit court judge. See 1993 Act 181, § 19 and §
921. Thus, since a circuit court judge was denied stay authority prior to Act 181, the mere
substitution of an ALJ for the circuit court judge does not confer upon the ALJ the authority to stay
the Board's revocation orders. Accordingly, neither the Administrative Procedures Act nor the
creation of the ALJD authorizes an ALJ to stay a Board revocation order.
B. Equal Protection
The equal protection clause is not violated by finding that revocation of doctors' licenses cannot be
stayed while other professions can be stayed. No requirement exists that all persons be treated alike.
Rather, all persons within a properly drawn class must be treated alike. Baldwin v. Dept. of Hwys.
and Pub. Transp., 376 S.E.2d 259 (S.C. 1989). When deciding if the class is properly drawn, a
statutory classification created by the legislature will not be disregarded unless the classification is
plainly arbitrary with no reasonable hypothesis to support it. Samson v. Greenville Hospital System,
295 S.C. 359, 368 S.E.2d 665 (1988). While a party may object to how effective the classification
is, a classification need not completely accomplish the legislative purpose in order to survive an
equal protection challenge. Foster v. SCDHPT, 306 S.C. 519, 413 S.E.2d 31 (1992).
Here, the statute prohibits a stay of a revocation order but balances that prohibition with a
requirement that the appeal of the case be heard within thirty days. Thus, the General Assembly
drew its classification based upon the rational concept that the appeal on the merits would be reached
quickly. Such a criteria is a balancing of the competing interests of the public's need for protection
and the doctor's need to practice a chosen profession. The use of such a method for doctors and not
for other professions is not arbitrary but is rather a reasoned approach to assure proper delivery of
medical services to the public. While Woodward may not agree with the General Assembly's choice,
the choice is rational and will not be disturbed.
III. Order
No provision of the APA overrides the prohibition on stays imposed by § 40-47-200 and the
classification drawn by the General Assembly is not in violation of the equal protection provided by
the United States or South Carolina constitutions. Accordingly, the Motion For Stay is denied.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
This 12th day of November, 1997
Columbia, South Carolina |
