ORDERS:
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division ("ALJD") pursuant to the request of
the Petitioner, Juanita Moore, for a stay pending appeal of the decision of the Respondent, South
Carolina Department of Social Services' ("DSS") Foster Care Hearing Committee, which ordered
that a foster child be removed from Petitioner's home. For the following reasons, I conclude that
the ALJD does not have subject matter jurisdiction in this case.
The ALJD possesses only such jurisdiction as has been expressly conferred upon it by statute.
See Bazzle v. Huff, ___ S.C. ___, 462 S.E.2d 273 (1995); S.C. Tax Comm'n v. S.C. Tax Bd. of
Review, 278 S.C. 556, 299 S.E.2d 489 (1983). S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-600(B)(Supp. 1996)
provides that the ALJD shall hear all "contested cases as defined in Section 1-23-310 involving
the departments of the executive branch of government in which a single hearing officer is
authorized or permitted by law or regulation to hear and decide such cases. . . ." This section
would appear to confer contested case jurisdiction upon the ALJD in matters such as this case.
However, since a decision in this case has already been made at the contested case level by the
Foster Care Hearing Committee, this matter is in the nature of an appeal rather than a contested
case, and §1-23-600(B) does not confer jurisdiction on the ALJD in this matter.
Furthermore, the general grant of appellate jurisdiction contained in S.C. Code Ann.
§1-23-600(D) applies only to appeals from professional and occupational licensing boards or
commissions within the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, and therefore this
section does not confer jurisdiction in this case on the ALJD.
The ALJD does exercise appellate jurisdiction in other areas which have been specifically granted
to it by statute. For example, the ALJD hears appeals from DSS decisions concerning the
licensing of child welfare agencies. See S.C. Code Ann. §20-7-2260(Supp. 1996). However,
there is no specific statute in this instance which would grant appellate jurisdiction to the ALJD.
In the absence of such a specific statute, the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act,
S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A), which grants appellate jurisdiction to the Circuit Court, would
appear to be controlling.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Marvin F. Kittrell
Chief Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
February 11, 1997 |
