ORDERS:
ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division pursuant to the appeal of Solomon Singletary from a decision of
the Fair Hearing Committee of the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) concerning his application for Food
Stamp and Family Independence (FS/FI) benefits. DSS approved Appellant's application for Food Stamps but denied
Appellant's application for FI benefits on the grounds that he failed to comply with the job search requirements of the FI
Program. Appellant appeals that part of the DSS decision that denied his application for FI benefits.
On May 3, 1999, Appellant submitted an application to DSS for FS/FI benefits. On May 6, DSS conducted an interview
with Appellant and requested that he record ten job searches/contacts in order to obtain FI benefits. DSS instructed
Appellant to complete the job search forms by June 2. As of June 2, Appellant had submitted only eight job contacts, and
DSS denied Appellant's application for FI benefits on that date. During a June 16 teleconference, DSS informed Appellant
that he was approved for FS benefits, but that he would have to reapply for FI benefits. Despite DSS' denial of FI benefits,
by letter dated June 16, 1999, DSS informed Appellant that he was being placed in its "self-directed job search component"
and was required to complete ten job contacts by June 26 to obtain FI benefits.(1) Appellant failed to submit the two
additional job contacts by June 26.
At the request of the Appellant, a hearing on this matter was conducted by teleconference on July 16, 1999. The Fair
Hearing Committee determined that the Appellant failed to comply with the FI program because he did not provide proof of
ten job contacts. On August 13, 1999, the Fair Hearing Committee upheld DSS' decision to deny Appellant FI benefits.
Pursuant to the authority provided under ALJD Rule 39, I find that oral argument is not required in this matter. Further,
after reviewing the record on appeal and considering the briefs submitted by both parties, I find that the decision of DSS
must be affirmed.
DISCUSSION
In reviewing the findings and conclusions of an agency, the Administrative Law Judge is limited to determining whether
substantial rights of the Appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record, or the decision
is arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. S.C. Code
Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6)(e)-(f) (Supp. 1998). In other words, the DSS decision may be set aside if unsupported by
"substantial evidence."
"Substantial evidence" is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is
evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the
administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action.
Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981).
In this case, the Fair Hearing Committee concluded that DSS acted properly in determining that Appellant did not satisfy the
requirements of the FI program. Substantial evidence in the record supports DSS' denial of Appellant's application. The FI
program provides that:
All adult applicants . . . who do not meet the exemption criteria of Section 114.1130A(3) . . . must conduct an initial job
search by returning to [DSS] a listing of the employers contacted, date of contact, and the name and telephone number of the
person with whom the applicant spoke. The number of employers to be contacted shall be determined by the Department.
An applicant must provide this information for case approval; an applicant who does not provide this information by the
thirtieth day must have the application denied.
27A S.C. Code Ann. Reg. 114-1160(B)(1) (Supp. 1998). On May 3, 1999, Appellant applied for FI benefits. On May 6,
DSS conducted an interview with Appellant and requested that he record ten job searches/contacts on forms provided as a
prerequisite to obtaining FI benefits. DSS requested that Appellant complete the job searches by June 2. By June 2,
Appellant had only submitted proof of eight job searches, and DSS denied Appellant's application. Although DSS had
initially allowed Appellant only twenty-seven days to complete the job search (i.e., from May 6 to June 2), by letter dated
June 16, 1999, it extended the time to complete the job searches until June 26. Consequently, Appellant was allowed more
than thirty days to complete the job search. Appellant, however, failed to complete the job search by June 26. Appellant's
failure to complete the job search either within the thirty-day period or by June 26 is well documented by records in the DSS
file.
Given the finding that Appellant had failed to comply with the program requirements, the Fair Hearing Committee correctly
determined that DSS properly denied Appellant's application for FI benefits. See 27A S.C. Code Ann. Reg. 114-1160B(1).
The Appellant's excuses for not complying with the FI program do not fall into any of the exemptions recognized under the
applicable regulations. See 27A S.C. Code Ann. Reg. 114-1160A(3) (Supp. 1998). Therefore, substantial evidence of the
Appellant's failure to comply with the FI program supports the Final Administrative Decision. This decision, however,
should not prejudice any right that Appellant may have to reapply for FI benefits.
This tribunal may rule on this matter without oral argument. ALJD Rule 39 provides that:
[t]he Clerk of the Division shall provide at least twenty (20) days notice of oral argument. The oral argument shall follow
the procedure in Rule 218, SCACR. In the discretion of the administrative law judge, oral argument may not be
required.
Pursuant to the authority provided in Rule 39, I find that oral argument is not required.
ORDER
Based upon the record and the applicable law, the Order of the DSS Fair Hearing Committee is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________________
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
November 23, 1999
Columbia, South Carolina
1. Although Appellant did not reapply for FI benefits, it appears that DSS allowed Appellant additional time until June 26 to complete his
application by submitting two additional job contacts. |