ORDERS:
ORDER AND DECISION
REVERSED, WITH INSTRUCTIONS
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division ("ALJD") pursuant to a request
for an appeal by Fred and Cecelia Elliott ("Appellants"). The Elliotts appeal the decision of the
Foster Care Hearing Committee ("Committee") of the Department of Social Services to revoke
their foster family home license pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-1642 (Supp. 1994), S.C.
Code Regs. 114-550 (N)(3) (Supp. 1994), and S.C. Code Regs. 114-550 (J)(13) (Supp. 1994).
The issue on appeal is whether the Committee erred in not summarily reversing the decision of the
Respondent to revoke Appellants' license because the issues relied upon at the hearing by
Respondent had been previously adjudicated in Appellants' favor.
Jurisdiction on appeal is vested in the ALJD pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-2260 (Supp.
1994). On appeal to the ALJD, the standard of review is limited to the record presented. An
administrative law judge shall not substitute his judgment for that of an agency unless the agency's
determination is affected by error of law or clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence of the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (A)(6) (Supp. 1994); Lark
v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981).
The relevant facts are as follows: On August 13, 1993, Respondent began an investigation of the
Appellants which concerned allegations of sexual abuse, physical abuse and neglect, and threat of
harm of abuse and neglect pertaining to the Diaz, Elliott and Foster children then living in the
Appellants' home. Upon Motions to Dismiss by Appellants, the Family Court conducted a hearing
on the above allegations on January 5, 1994. At the commencement of the hearing, Counsel for
the Respondent conceded that no allegations of abuse or neglect (sexual or physical) against Fred
Elliott, or allegations of physical abuse, physical neglect, or threat of harm of any such abuse or
neglect against Cecelia Elliott, had been indicated as required by statute, and consented to
Appellants' motion concerning those matters.
In its Order of January 11, 1994, the Family Court made Findings of Fact and rendered
Conclusions of Law that Respondent failed to indicate any allegations of sexual and physical
abuse, physical neglect, or threat of harm of any such abuse or neglect against Fred Elliott; that
Respondent failed to indicate any allegations of physical abuse, physical neglect, or threat of harm
of any such abuse against Cecelia Elliott; that the only remaining allegations in the Complaint
involved sexual abuse of the Foster children and harm of sexual abuse of the Diaz and Elliott
siblings by Cecelia Elliott; and that the allegations in the Complaint involving the Diaz and Elliott
siblings were fatally defective under S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-736 (Supp. 1994). The Family Court
then Ordered all allegations of sexual and physical abuse, physical neglect, and threat of harm of
any abuse or neglect as to Fred Elliott dismissed with prejudice; all allegations of physical
abuse, physical neglect, and threat of harm of any such abuse or neglect as to Cecelia Elliott
dismissed with prejudice; and all allegations of threat of harm of sexual abuse of the Diaz and
Elliott siblings at the hands of Cecelia Elliott dismissed without prejudice.
On April 11, 1994, Respondent issued Appellants a license to conduct a Foster Care Boarding
Home whereby they were authorized to care full-time for a maximum of three children of either
sex from birth to eighteen years of age. The license contained two "deficiencies" that the
Appellants were to correct by July 11, 1994. One of the deficiencies was a routine fingerprinting
matter while the other was the "family court hearing." Thereafter, on May 16, 1994, Respondent
forwarded Appellants a letter revoking their license and removing any foster children in their care.
This decision was based on an application of provisions contained in S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-1642
(Supp. 1994), S.C. Code Regs. 114-550 (N)(2) (Supp. 1994), and S.C. Code Regs. 114-550
(N)(3) (Supp. 1994), which authorize revocation of a license if the recipient has a substantiated
history of child abuse and neglect or, if it is determined that the foster family failed to maintain
minimum licensing standards. The letter stated that there was an "indicated case" against Cecelia
Elliott and that the Appellants failed to maintain proper standards of care because they had
engaged in inappropriate discipline.
On May 18, 1994, the Family Court heard arguments on Appellants' Motion for an Order
enforcing an agreement of the parties to dismiss with prejudice the sexual abuse allegations
involving the Foster children. In its Order of June 20, 1994, the Court made Findings of Fact that
all parties had agreed this matter would be dismissed without contradiction; that a binding
agreement to that effect was entered into by Respondent and the Appellants; and that there were
no allegations (nor arguments) by Respondent of new or after-discovered facts or evidence upon
which a reversal of position might be predicated. As a result, the Court ordered the matter
dismissed with prejudice. Respondent then moved the Court to reconsider its June 20, 1994
Order. After giving the matter careful consideration, the Court denied the Motion in its entirety
and issued an Order to that effect on September 8, 1994.
A hearing addressing Respondent's revocation of Appellants' Foster Care Boarding Home license
was conducted before the Department's Foster Care Hearing Committee on September 30, 1994.
In its Decision rendered December 13, 1994, the Committee made Findings of Fact that, during a
prior investigation of abuse and neglect, Cecelia Elliott disclosed that she had used a clothes pin
on a child's nose as a form of discipline; that Valerie Foster disclosed that Cecelia Elliott forced
her to sleep outside during a thunderstorm, hit her in the nose, and had placed a clothes pin on her
nose; that these prior allegations were dismissed in Family Court on January 11, 1994 upon a lack
of adequate investigation and a failure to make a final indication within the mandated 60 days; that
Cecelia Elliott engaged in inappropriate discipline; and that Respondent properly revoked the
Appellants' license due to inappropriate discipline. The Committee rendered Conclusions of Law
that a foster home license may be revoked if the foster family fails to maintain proper standards of
care and services to children; if it would be detrimental for additional children to be placed in the
home; and if cruel, inhumane, and inappropriate discipline is employed. A Decision was rendered
stating that Respondent had properly revoked Appellants' license because Cecelia Elliott engaged
in inappropriate methods of discipline, and as a result, failed to maintain a proper standard of care
for the Foster children.
On January 5, 1995, the Family Court entertained a Motion by the Guardian ad litem for the Diaz
children seeking an Order preventing them from being removed from the home of the Appellants.
In its Order of January 6, 1995, the Court made Findings of Fact that all allegationsregarding
abuse and neglect relating to the Appellants were dismissed with prejudice via the Family Court
Orders of January 11, 1994 and June 20, 1994; that the revocation of Appellants' foster family
license was based on an indicated case against Cecelia Elliott (the sexual abuse allegations
dismissed without prejudice on January 11, 1994 and dismissed with prejudice on June 20, 1994),
physical abuse and neglect allegations which had either been unfounded or not indicated by
Respondent, and allegations dismissed with prejudice by the Family Court on January 11, 1994;
and that Respondent attempted, by collateral means, to thwart and avoid the Orders of the Family
Court. The Court made a Conclusion of Law that the Diaz children should remain in the
Appellants' home, "whether or not the Elliotts have a foster care license."
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of collateral estoppel mandates that the Decision of the Foster Care Hearing
Committee to revoke Appellants' license be reversed. Under this doctrine, re-litigation of the
same facts or issues necessarily determined in a former proceeding is prohibited. Carman v. South
Carolina Alcohol Beverage Control Commission, ___ S.C. ___, 451 S.E.2d 383 (1994); Liberty
Mutual v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 284 S.C. 234, 325 S.E.2d 566 (Ct. App. 1984). Collateral
estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies in all tribunals and forums. See Bennett v. South Carolina
Department of Corrections, 305 S.C. 310, 408 S.E.2d 230 (1991); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 691
(1947). When a decision is rendered by an administrative agency in which a party has a full and
fair opportunity to litigate issues, and the agency decision is not appealed, the party cannot
thereafter re-litigate the same issues in civil or criminal court. Carman, 451 S.E.2d at 386;
Bennett, 408 S.E.2d at 231-232. Therefore, logic dictates that the doctrine is applicable when a
party brings an action before a civil or criminal court, is given a full opportunity to litigate the
issues but does not prevail, and thereafter, rather than appealing that court's decision, seeks to
re-litigate the same issues before an administrative tribunal.
The allegations levied against Appellants, stemming from the August 13, 1993 investigation, were
necessarily determined in Family Court whereby they could not have been re-litigated at the
license revocation hearing conducted December 13, 1994. In the Order of January 11, 1994, the
Court determined that all allegations, save the sexual abuse and threat of harm of sexual abuse
allegations levied against Cecelia Elliott, were not indicated by Respondent. Upon an affirmative
determination, indicated reports are converted to the category of "affirmative determination."
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-650 (E) (Supp. 1994). As a consequence, reports not indicated should
also be converted as such. Furthermore, when allegations are not indicated by the agency, they
are deemed "unfounded." S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-650 (D) (Supp. 1994). Because the Family
Court determined that Respondent failed to indicate the allegations, and that they were
"unfounded," all allegations (except the above noted allegations versus Cecelia Elliott) were
dismissed with prejudice. In the Family Court Order of June 20, 1994, the remaining allegations
levied against Appellants were also dismissed with prejudice.
At the license revocation hearing, the Committee made Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
its Decision relying solely on the allegations dismissed with prejudice by the Family Court. No
new or after-discovered evidence compiled or acquired subsequent to the September 8, 1994
Order of the Family Court was introduced by Respondent. As a result, all evidence considered in
the determination of the Committee concerned matters that had been litigated with finality. The
doctrine of collateral estoppel mandates reversal of the Decision on the ground that the
Committee committed an error of law in allowing the previously dismissed allegations to be
presented as evidence at the revocation hearing. Furthermore, the Decision was clearly erroneous
in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence of the whole record.
Respondent argues that collateral estoppel does not apply to this case because a state agency
cannot be impeded from carrying out its police powers. In support of its position, Respondent
relies on South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Parker, 275 S.C. 176, 268 S.E.2d 282
(1982). After giving due consideration to Respondent's argument, I find it to be manifestly
without merit. While Parker makes a general statement regarding the State's immunity from
estoppel, case law illustrates that this exemption does not apply where its officers or agents act
within the proper scope of their authority. South Carolina Coastal Council v. Vogel, 292 S.C.
449, 357 S.E.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1987). Additionally, it is undisputed that estoppel is an equitable
doctrine, essentially flexible, and should be applied or denied as equities between the parties may
preponderate. Landing Dev. Corp. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 285 S.C. 216, 329 S.E.2d 423
(1985).
Clearly, an agency is prohibited from "forum shopping," calculated only to obtain a more
favorable result in a different court, as Respondent has done in this case. The issue is not whether
the ALJD is bound by the earlier decisions in this matter, but instead, whether Respondent is so
bound. While agencies are granted broad latitude in these situations, that latitude clearly has its
limitations. Otherwise, review by the ALJD would be no more than a "rubber stamp" for the
agency's decision, and would be unnecessary. Respondent has obviously exceeded its authority in
this case.
After reviewing the entire record, this Division finds that the Decision of the Foster Care Hearing
Committee should be reversed and the foster family home license of the Appellants be reissued,
effective upon receipt of this Order. In view of this finding, it is unnecessary to address the
remaining issues Appellants raise on appeal.
The judgment is reversed with the following instructions:
1) Appellants shall be issued a foster family home license.
2) Respondent shall issue Appellants a foster family home license immediately upon receipt
of this Order.
Reversed, with instructions.
_____________________________
Marvin F. Kittrell
Chief Administrative Law Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
May ___, 1995 |