ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter is a contested case brought by the Petitioner concerning a homestead exemption for the tax years 1994, 1995,
1996 and 1997 for property located in Spartanburg County, South Carolina. The Petitioner exhausted his prehearing
remedies and sought a contested case hearing before the Administrative Law Judge Division. A hearing was held at the
office of the Administrative Law Judge Division (Division) on September 21, 2000.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Having observed the witnesses and exhibits presented at the hearing and closely passed upon their credibility, taking into
consideration the burden of persuasion by the parties, I make the following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of
evidence:
1. Notice of the date, time, place, and nature of the hearing was timely and properly given to all parties.
2. The Petitioner owns property at 44 Lake Forest Drive in Spartanburg, South Carolina, identified as Tax Map Reference
Number 7-13-16-010.00. The Petitioner has lived in a house located on this property since 1984. He turned 65 on
December 24, 1986. On April 15, 1987, the Petitioner applied for and received a homestead exemption from Spartanburg
County on this property.
3. On May 28, 1993, the Petitioner granted a "one-half undivided interest" in the property to his wife, Margaret H.
Hutcheson. Thereafter, Spartanburg County dropped the homestead exemption on the property for the tax years 1994
through 1998 without notifying the Petitioner.
After the Petitioner discovered the removal of the homestead exemption on this property for the tax years 1994 through
1998, he reapplied for the exemption in 1999. Spartanburg County replaced the homestead exemption on the property but
only reimbursed the Petitioner for the 1998 tax year. This appeal is for the reimbursement of monies paid in excess of the
exemption for the tax years 1994 through 1997.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the above Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:
1. S.C. Code § 12-60-460 (Supp. 1996) authorizes the Division to hear this contested case pursuant to Chapter 23 of Title I
of the 1976 Code of Laws, as amended.
2. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-250 (Supp. 1996) sets forth the standard for a homestead exemption: "The exemption includes
the dwelling place when jointly owned in complete fee simple or life estate by husband and wife, and either has reached
sixty-five years of age . . . ." (emphasis added).
3. A deed which unambiguously conveys a one-half undivided interest to another party creates a tenancy in common.
Vause v. Mikell, 290 S.C. 65, 348 S.E.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1986). Therefore, when the Petitioner granted a one-half
undivided interest in the property to his wife, he retained a one-half interest for himself. In doing so, the Petitioner
remained eligible for a homestead exemption on the portion of the property that he still owned, at the most.
4. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-255 (Supp. 1996) determines the continuation of a homestead exemption. Section 12-37-255(a)
sets forth:
When the homestead exemption is initially granted pursuant to § 12-37-250 of the 1976 Code it shall continue to be
effective for successive years in which the ownership of the homestead or the other qualifications for the exemption remain
unchanged. Notification of any change affecting eligibility shall be given immediately to the county auditor.
(emphasis added). Therefore, when the one-half undivided interest was granted to Margaret H. Hutcheson, Section 12-37-250 required the Petitioner to notify the Spartanburg County Auditor of this change in ownership. When the county was
made aware of the change in title of the property through a routine check of deeds filed in Spartanburg County, the county
removed the homestead exemption from the Petitioner's property.
5. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-250 (Supp. 1996) also provides that "The application for the exemption must be made to the
auditor of the county . . . and a failure to apply constitutes a waiver of the exemption for that year." (emphasis added).
6. "The first rule of construction in the interpretation of statutes is that of intention on the part of the legislature and where
the terms of a statute are clear and not ambiguous, there is no room for construction, and courts must apply them according
to their literal meaning." Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 247 S.C. 132, 136, 146 S.E.2d 166, 168
(1966). Since, the language in S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-37-250 and 12-37-255 is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for
interpretation. Furthermore, statutory language creating a tax exemption is not liberally construed in favor of the taxpayer
claiming exemption. Citadel Development Foundation v. Greenville County, 279 S.C. 443, 447, 308 S.E.2d 797, 799
(S.C. Ct. App.1983). When the Petitioner deeded a one-half undivided interest to Margaret Hutcheson, he was required to
notify the Spartanburg County Auditor thereby, in essence, reapplying for his homestead exemption. Upon reapplication,
the Petitioner would have been eligible for the exemption on his one-half undivided interest only. Therefore, because
Section 12-37-250 sets forth that failure to apply for the exemption acts as a waiver for that tax year, I find that the
Petitioner waived his homestead exemption for the tax years 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 by not reapplying.
ORDER
Based upon the above Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law, it is hereby:
ORDERED that the Spartanburg County Auditor's denial of a refund to Richard C. Hutcheson for the tax years 1994,
1995, 1996 and 1997 be affirmed.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED
____________________________
Ralph King Anderson, III
Administrative Law Judge
February 6, 2001
Columbia, South Carolina
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