ORDERS:
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a contested case brought by the Petitioner pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-43-220 and 12-60-2540 (Supp. 1998)
concerning the valuation of Parcel No. 293-05-01-020 for the 1999 tax year. The Petitioner exhausted his prehearing
remedies with the Oconee County Assessor and the Oconee County Board of Assessment Appeals (Board) and sought a
contested case hearing before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD). The Petitioner's request was filed with the
ALJD on September 30, 1999. A contested case hearing was held on April 4, 2000, at the offices of the Administrative
Law Judge Division in Columbia, South Carolina.
On October 29, 1999, Karen F. Ballenger, attorney for the Oconee County Assessor, filed a Motion to Dismiss. Prior to
the commencement of the hearing on the merits into this matter, Ms. Ballenger's motion was heard. The grounds Ms.
Ballenger asserted in her Motion to Dismiss were:
1. The Petitioner is not the owner of the subject property under appeal;
2. The Petitioner represented in this notice of appeal that he is appearing on behalf of his son, Lee Bryson, who is not the
owner of the subject property. There is no deed of record in Oconee County transferring ownership of the subject property
to Lee Bryson; and
3. The true owner of record of the property is R. Raymond Wilds. There is no power of attorney or other document
indicating Mr. Bryson has the authority to file this appeal on Mr. Wild's behalf.
In other words, Ms. Ballenger contends Mr. Bryson did not possess the proper standing with which to bring this case.
In response to the Respondent's motion, Mr. Bryson set forth that he was a certified public accountant and could therefore
represent the interests of R. Raymond Wilds and/or his son, pursuant to Rule 9 of the ALJD Rules of Procedure
(ALJDRP). However, Mr. Bryson did not submitted proof that he was either the owner of Parcel No. 293-05-01-020 or
that he was authorized by Mr. Wilds to act on his behalf before the ALJD. In fact, Mr. Wilds, the property owner of
record, did not even appear at the hearing. Furthermore, the Notice of Appeal in this matter is neither signed by Mr. Wilds
nor does it refer to Mr. Wilds in any manner. To the contrary, the Notice was framed as an appeal by either Mr. Bryson,
personally, or on behalf of Mr. Bryson's son.
Standing is a concept utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected so as to insure that a justiciable controversy is
presented to the court. The requirement of "standing" is satisfied if it can be said that the plaintiff has a legally protectible
and tangible interest at stake in the litigation. Black's Law Dictionary 1405 (6th ed. 1990). To have standing, a party must
have a personal stake in the subject matter of a lawsuit, and must be a real party in interest. A real party in interest is "one
who has a real, actual, material or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, as distinguished from one who has
only a nominal, formal, or technical interest in, or connection with, the action." Huff v. Jennings, 319 S.C. 142, 147, 459
S.E.2d 886, 890 (Ct. App. 1995).
Based on the foregoing, I find that Mr. Bryson did not possess the proper modicum of standing with which to bring this
contested matter. Therefore, I hereby ORDER that this matter is dismissed.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Ralph King Anderson, III
Administrative Law Judge
April 10, 2000
Columbia, S.C. |