ORDERS:
South Carolina is not alone in limiting the usage of unused leave in the calculation of
retirement benefits. Some states exclude the usage of unused leave altogether from the calculation
for the retirement benefit or limit its inclusion in the calculation. See generally 91 A.L.R.5th 225,
What Constitutes “Salary,” “Wages,” “Pay” or the Like Within Pension Law Basing Benefits Thereon
at § 5 (citing Kennedy as authority for the forty-five day limit in South Carolina).
Petitioner argues that the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that leave benefits are part
of compensation earned for services rendered, citing Bales v. Aughtry, 302 S.C. 262, 395 S.E.2d 177
(1990). Petitioner apparently contends that Bales supports his claim to include excess annual leave
in his retirement calculation. As a preliminary matter, the Bales decision does not, in any way,
address retirement benefits. In that case, the employer had refused to provide any leave benefits to
elected officials. The court held the employer must provide those benefits to its employees. Rather
than supporting Petitioner’s claim, Bales is supportive of the Retirement System’s position since it
held that a “payment for accrued leave benefits does not constitute extra compensation after services
rendered.” Bales, 395 S.E.2d at 179. Additionally, Bales predates Kennedy, which expressly limits
application of any unused annual leave to forty-five days in the retirement formula.
The question in this case is not whether Petitioner had some right to compel his employer to
pay accrued leave benefits.
The question is whether Petitioner or his employer, the Municipal
Association, may manipulate his retirement benefits by characterizing excess annual leave payments,
made prior to retirement, as salary or compensation. As stipulated in Petitioner’s pre-trial brief, the
amount of $57,997.76 paid to Petitioner for excess annual leave prior to his retirement was not a part
of his regular salary base. Morever, if these monies were included in his “average final compensation,”
Petitioner’s retirement basis would increase by approximately $ 21,000.00. The effect would be an
increase in Petitioner’s monthly retirement benefit of $948.47, raising the benefit from $6,524.00 to
$7,472.00.
Petitioner argues that the retirement act must be construed liberally construed in favor of
those who are to benefit from it, citing King v. South Carolina Retirement Systems, 319 S.C. 822,
461 S.E.2d 822 (1995). In that case, the deceased, Joan King, became disabled and was enrolled in
her employer’s short term disability plan and later the long term disability plan. Her employer
continued to make retirement contributions for her. Subsequent to her death on April 11, 1993, the
employer filed a claim with the Retirement System which was denied on the basis that the deceased
had no earned service credit within 90 days of her death. The Supreme Court held that the
legislature, by changing the term “active service” to “earned service credit” in 1984, intended to give
broader coverage than just for employees engaged in actual service. It is obvious that in the King
case, the court was required to construe the meaning of a statute. In this instance, however, the
wording of the statute is clear that only forty-five days of unused annual leave can be included in the
computation of average final compensation. Thus, there is no room for construction by the trier of
fact and King is inapposite.
Peggy G. Boykin, the Director of the Retirement System since March 2002 and an employee
there since 1991, testified at the hearing. She noted that S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1020 (Supp. 2003)
provides that special payments such as sick leave, single special payments at retirement, bonus and
incentive-type payments, as well as other payments not considered a part of the regular salary base
of an employee are not compensation for which contributions are deductible. Such sums do not
qualify for inclusion in the average final compensation since contributions to the Retirement System
based on such payments are not authorized.
Ms. Boykin opined that the Retirement System is a defined benefit system which must remain
actuarially strong. To do so, it must receive contributions based upon a defined formula and must
pay them out based on that same formula. Finally, Ms. Boykin stated that if the two payments made
by the Municipal Association to Petitioner for excess unused annual leave were used in the
computation for his retirement benefit, it would in effect create a “spike” in the salary of Petitioner,
an event the Retirement System did not plan for. She stated that to authorize Petitioner’s request
would result in a detrimental impact on the soundness of the Retirement System.
Notwithstanding the action of the board of the Municipal Association to characterize the
payments as additional salary, it is clear they were paid to Petitioner for his unused excess
accumulated annual leave. There is absolutely no evidence in the record that Petitioner provided any
personal services to his employer for these payments, in excess of those services he provides on a
normal basis for his regular salary. Appropriately, the Retirement System included only forty-five
days of Petitioner’s unused leave time in computing his “average final compensation.” Any additional
excess accrued leave benefits do not constitute salary or compensation for purposes of determining
the final retirement benefit for a member of the Retirement System. The law is clear that only an
employee’s regular salary and up to forty-five days of unused annual leave paid at retirement can be
used in the computations to determine the “average final compensation” of a member of the
retirement system.
A court should reject an interpretation of a statute when to accept the interpretation would
lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not have been intended by the legislature. Kiriakides
v. United Artists Communication, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 440 S.E.2d 364(1994). In this case, it is absurd
for Petitioner to argue that this court can impute to the General Assembly an intent to allow public
entities, other that state agencies, the opportunity to provide a windfall retirement benefit to their
employees.
The Supreme Court stated in Kennedy that since 1978 all members of the Retirement
System have been restricted to the forty-five day cap, which before that date only applied to state
employees. Petitioner asks this court to ignore Kennedy and the 1978 amendment, urging this court
to adopt the proposition that public entities can manipulate the contribution formula used for
calculating the average final compensation by defining salary to include monies received for unused
leave in excess of forty-five days. This argument is not supported by law or logic and is totally
without merit.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, applicable law, and the evidence, this court
conclude, as a matter of law, the following:
General
1.The South Carolina General Assembly has established various procedures which members
must follow to seek resolution of disputes and claims with the Retirement System. A member may
ask the Director to review an initial decision by the Retirement System which is unfavorable. The
claimant has the opportunity to present his or her claim in writing. The Director, or a person
designated by the Director, may conduct a conference concerning the claim prior to the issuance of
a final agency determination by the Director. The Director must make a final agency determination
concerning the claimant’s appeal, which must be in writing. The written decision by the Director is
the final decision of the Retirement System and the State Budget and Control Board concerning the
claimant’s appeal. If the final agency determination is unfavorable to the member, he or she may
request a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge. See S.C. Code Ann. § 9-21-10 et seq. (Supp.
2003).
2.The Administrative Law Judge Division assigns each case as filed to an Administrative Law
Judge who hears the case de novo in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Division. S.C.
Code Ann. § 9-21-60 (Supp. 2003).
3.The Administrative Law Judge Division is an agency as defined in S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-
310 (2) (Supp. 2002).
4.After conducting a hearing, the assigned Administrative Law Judge issues a final decision
in a written order containing separate findings of fact and conclusions of law as defined in S.C. Code
Ann. § 1-23-350 (1976) and ALJD Rule 29(c).
5.The standard of proof in weighing the evidence and making a decision on the merits of a
contested case hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence. Anonymous v. State Board of Medical
Examiners, 329 S.C. 371, 796 S.E.2d 17 (1998); National Health Corp. v. South Carolina
Department of Health and Environmental Control, 298 S.C. 373, 380 S.E.2d 841 (Ct. App. 1989).
6.An agency decision must be reached utilizing reasoned judgment and must be based upon
adequate determining principles and a rational basis. City of Columbia v. Bd. of Health and
Environmental Control, 292 S.C. 199, 355 S.E.2d 536 (1987).
7.The trier of fact must weigh and pass upon the credibility of the evidence presented. S.C.
Cable Televison Ass’n v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 308 S.C. 216, 417 S.E.2d 586 (1992). The
trial judge who observes a witness is in the best position to judge the witness’ demeanor and veracity
and evaluate his testimony. McAlister v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 481, 299 S.E.2d 322 (1982).
Retirement System Provisions
8.An “active member” of the Retirement System is an employee who is compensated by an
employer participating in the system and who makes regular retirement contributions to the system.
The Municipal Association is a participating employer and the Petitioner has made regular retirement
contributions to the Retirement System. S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-10 (2) (Supp. 2003).
9.“Accumulated contribution” is the sum of all the amounts deducted from the compensation
of a member and which is credited to the member’s individual account, together with interest. S.C.
Code Ann. § 9-1-10 (1) (Supp. 2003).
10.“Average final compensation, with respect to those members retiring on or after July 1, 1986,
means the average annual earnable compensation of a member during the twelve consecutive quarters
of his creditable service on which regular contributions as a member were made to the system
producing the highest such average. . . .” S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-10 (4) (Supp. 2003).
11.An amount up to and including forty-five days’ termination pay for unused annual leave at
retirement may be added to the average final compensation. S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-10 (4) (Supp.
2003).
12.“Earnable compensation” means the full rate of the compensation that would be payable to
a member if the member worked the member’s full normal working time; when compensation includes
maintenance, fees and other things of value the board shall fix the value of that part of the
compensation not paid in money directly by the employer.” S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-10 (8) (Supp.
2003).
13.“Employer” is defined in S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-10 (14) as “a county, municipality, or other
political subdivision of the State, or an agency or department of any of these, which has been admitted
to the system under the provisions of Section 9-1-470, a service organization referred to in item
(11)(e) of this section. . . .”
14.The Retirement System is a creature of statute and, as such, can only exercise that authority
expressly delegated to it or delegated by necessary implication. Fowler v. Beasley, 322 S.C. 463,
472 S.E.2d 630 (1996). In construing statutes, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the
courts must seek to ascertain the legislative intent which, once determined must prevail. Gardner v.
Biggart, 308 S.C. 331, 417 S.E.2d 858 (1992). In ascertaining the legislative intent of a statute, the
courts look to the clear and unambiguous language of the statute. Defender Properties, Inc. v. Doby,
307 S.C. 336, 415 S.E.2d 383 (1992). When such terms are clear and unambiguous, there is no
room for construction and courts are required to apply them according to their literal meaning.
Citizens for Lee County, Inc. v. Lee County, 308 S.C. 23, 416 S.E.2d 641, 644 (1992).
15.In construing statutes it is understood that statutory provisions do not stand alone but must
be read in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole. A statute is passed as a whole and not in
parts or sections is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section
should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious
whole. Koenig v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety, 325 S.C. 400, 480 S.E.2d 98 (Ct. App.
1996).
A court should reject an interpretation of a statute when to accept the interpretation would
lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not have been intended by the legislature. Kiriakides
v. United Artists Communication, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 440 S.E.2d 364(1994). Further, when the
terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, and the courts must
apply the terms of the statute according to their literal meaning. Ex parte Polk, 354 S.C. 8, 579
S.E.2d 329 (Ct. App. 2003). Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of S.C. Code Ann.
§ 9-1-10 (4), the Retirement System is authorized to compute the “average final compensation” of
a member of the system, including in that computation unused annual leave up to forty-five days if
paid to the member by his employer at retirement. In this case, the Retirement System included in
the computation of Petitioner’s average final compensation an amount of forty-five days of unused
annual leave. It did not have statutory authority to include the payments for additional unused annual
leave which Petitioner had accumulated.
16.Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, statutory provisions and discussion, this court
concludes that “average final compensation” only includes up to forty-five days of unused annual
leave and the regular compensation a member received in the twelve quarters used to arrive at the
highest compensation amount. Any characterization by an employer of payments made to a member
as “salary” or an “addition to salary” is not controlling. The court must strictly construe the statutes
and give them their plain meaning. To do otherwise would ignore the legislative mandate and would
threaten the integrity of the Retirement System, leading to an absurd result that the General Assembly
could not have intended. See Kennedy v. S.C. Retirement System, supra, 345 S.C. at 351, 549
S.E.2d at 249.
Accordingly, this court concludes and finds that the payment in the amount of $57,776 which
was made to Petitioner in the first half of 2003 for excess unused annual leave does not constitute
compensation or salary for the purpose of computing the “average final compensation” of Petitioner,
and that the decision of the Retirement System to exclude that amount from the calculation of
Petitioner’s average final compensation was correct.
ORDER
For all the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the determination of the Retirement System excluding $57,997.76 from the
Petitioner’s average final compensation calculation is hereby affirmed.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________________
Marvin F. Kittrell
Chief Administrative Law Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
March 5, 2004 South Carolina is not alone in limiting the usage of unused leave in the calculation of
retirement benefits. Some states exclude the usage of unused leave altogether from the calculation
for the retirement benefit or limit its inclusion in the calculation. See generally 91 A.L.R.5th 225,
What Constitutes “Salary,” “Wages,” “Pay” or the Like Within Pension Law Basing Benefits Thereon
at § 5 (citing Kennedy as authority for the forty-five day limit in South Carolina).
Petitioner argues that the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that leave benefits are part
of compensation earned for services rendered, citing Bales v. Aughtry, 302 S.C. 262, 395 S.E.2d 177
(1990). Petitioner apparently contends that Bales supports his claim to include excess annual leave
in his retirement calculation. As a preliminary matter, the Bales decision does not, in any way,
address retirement benefits. In that case, the employer had refused to provide any leave benefits to
elected officials. The court held the employer must provide those benefits to its employees. Rather
than supporting Petitioner’s claim, Bales is supportive of the Retirement System’s position since it
held that a “payment for accrued leave benefits does not constitute extra compensation after services
rendered.” Bales, 395 S.E.2d at 179. Additionally, Bales predates Kennedy, which expressly limits
application of any unused annual leave to forty-five days in the retirement formula.
The question in this case is not whether Petitioner had some right to compel his employer to
pay accrued leave benefits.
The question is whether Petitioner or his employer, the Municipal
Association, may manipulate his retirement benefits by characterizing excess annual leave payments,
made prior to retirement, as salary or compensation. As stipulated in Petitioner’s pre-trial brief, the
amount of $57,997.76 paid to Petitioner for excess annual leave prior to his retirement was not a part
of his regular salary base. Morever, if these monies were included in his “average final compensation,”
Petitioner’s retirement basis would increase by approximately $ 21,000.00. The effect would be an
increase in Petitioner’s monthly retirement benefit of $948.47, raising the benefit from $6,524.00 to
$7,472.00.
Petitioner argues that the retirement act must be construed liberally construed in favor of
those who are to benefit from it, citing King v. South Carolina Retirement Systems, 319 S.C. 822,
461 S.E.2d 822 (1995). In that case, the deceased, Joan King, became disabled and was enrolled in
her employer’s short term disability plan and later the long term disability plan. Her employer
continued to make retirement contributions for her. Subsequent to her death on April 11, 1993, the
employer filed a claim with the Retirement System which was denied on the basis that the deceased
had no earned service credit within 90 days of her death. The Supreme Court held that the
legislature, by changing the term “active service” to “earned service credit” in 1984, intended to give
broader coverage than just for employees engaged in actual service. It is obvious that in the King
case, the court was required to construe the meaning of a statute. In this instance, however, the
wording of the statute is clear that only forty-five days of unused annual leave can be included in the
computation of average final compensation. Thus, there is no room for construction by the trier of
fact and King is inapposite.
Peggy G. Boykin, the Director of the Retirement System since March 2002 and an employee
there since 1991, testified at the hearing. She noted that S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1020 (Supp. 2003)
provides that special payments such as sick leave, single special payments at retirement, bonus and
incentive-type payments, as well as other payments not considered a part of the regular salary base
of an employee are not compensation for which contributions are deductible. Such sums do not
qualify for inclusion in the average final compensation since contributions to the Retirement System
based on such payments are not authorized.
Ms. Boykin opined that the Retirement System is a defined benefit system which must remain
actuarially strong. To do so, it must receive contributions based upon a defined formula and must
pay them out based on that same formula. Finally, Ms. Boykin stated that if the two payments made
by the Municipal Association to Petitioner for excess unused annual leave were used in the
computation for his retirement benefit, it would in effect create a “spike” in the salary of Petitioner,
an event the Retirement System did not plan for. She stated that to authorize Petitioner’s request
would result in a detrimental impact on the soundness of the Retirement System.
Notwithstanding the action of the board of the Municipal Association to characterize the
payments as additional salary, it is clear they were paid to Petitioner for his unused excess
accumulated annual leave. There is absolutely no evidence in the record that Petitioner provided any
personal services to his employer for these payments, in excess of those services he provides on a
normal basis for his regular salary. Appropriately, the Retirement System included only forty-five
days of Petitioner’s unused leave time in computing his “average final compensation.” Any additional
excess accrued leave benefits do not constitute salary or compensation for purposes of determining
the final retirement benefit for a member of the Retirement System. The law is clear that only an
employee’s regular salary and up to forty-five days of unused annual leave paid at retirement can be
used in the computations to determine the “average final compensation” of a member of the
retirement system.
A court should reject an interpretation of a statute when to accept the interpretation would
lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not have been intended by the legislature. Kiriakides
v. United Artists Communication, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 440 S.E.2d 364(1994). In this case, it is absurd
for Petitioner to argue that this court can impute to the General Assembly an intent to allow public
entities, other that state agencies, the opportunity to provide a windfall retirement benefit to their
employees.
The Supreme Court stated in Kennedy that since 1978 all members of the Retirement
System have been restricted to the forty-five day cap, which before that date only applied to state
employees. Petitioner asks this court to ignore Kennedy and the 1978 amendment, urging this court
to adopt the proposition that public entities can manipulate the contribution formula used for
calculating the average final compensation by defining salary to include monies received for unused
leave in excess of forty-five days. This argument is not supported by law or logic and is totally
without merit.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, applicable law, and the evidence, this court
conclude, as a matter of law, the following:
General
1. The South Carolina General Assembly has established various procedures which members
must follow to seek resolution of disputes and claims with the Retirement System. A member may
ask the Director to review an initial decision by the Retirement System which is unfavorable. The
claimant has the opportunity to present his or her claim in writing. The Director, or a person
designated by the Director, may conduct a conference concerning the claim prior to the issuance of
a final agency determination by the Director. The Director must make a final agency determination
concerning the claimant’s appeal, which must be in writing. The written decision by the Director is
the final decision of the Retirement System and the State Budget and Control Board concerning the
claimant’s appeal. If the final agency determination is unfavorable to the member, he or she may
request a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge. See S.C. Code Ann. § 9-21-10 et seq. (Supp.
2003).
2. The Administrative Law Judge Division assigns each case as filed to an Administrative Law
Judge who hears the case de novo in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Division. S.C.
Code Ann. § 9-21-60 (Supp. 2003).
3. The Administrative Law Judge Division is an agency as defined in S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-
310 (2) (Supp. 2002).
4. After conducting a hearing, the assigned Administrative Law Judge issues a final decision
in a written order containing separate findings of fact and conclusions of law as defined in S.C. Code
Ann. § 1-23-350 (1976) and ALJD Rule 29(c).
5. The standard of proof in weighing the evidence and making a decision on the merits of a
contested case hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence. Anonymous v. State Board of Medical
Examiners, 329 S.C. 371, 796 S.E.2d 17 (1998); National Health Corp. v. South Carolina
Department of Health and Environmental Control, 298 S.C. 373, 380 S.E.2d 841 (Ct. App. 1989).
6. An agency decision must be reached utilizing reasoned judgment and must be based upon
adequate determining principles and a rational basis. City of Columbia v. Bd. of Health and
Environmental Control, 292 S.C. 199, 355 S.E.2d 536 (1987).
7. The trier of fact must weigh and pass upon the credibility of the evidence presented. S.C.
Cable Televison Ass’n v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 308 S.C. 216, 417 S.E.2d 586 (1992). The
trial judge who observes a witness is in the best position to judge the witness’ demeanor and veracity
and evaluate his testimony. McAlister v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 481, 299 S.E.2d 322 (1982).
Retirement System Provisions
8. An “active member” of the Retirement System is an employee who is compensated by an
employer participating in the system and who makes regular retirement contributions to the system.
The Municipal Association is a participating employer and the Petitioner has made regular retirement
contributions to the Retirement System. S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-10 (2) (Supp. 2003).
9. “Accumulated contribution” is the sum of all the amounts deducted from the compensation
of a member and which is credited to the member’s individual account, together with interest. S.C.
Code Ann. § 9-1-10 (1) (Supp. 2003).
10. “Average final compensation, with respect to those members retiring on or after July 1, 1986,
means the average annual earnable compensation of a member during the twelve consecutive quarters
of his creditable service on which regular contributions as a member were made to the system
producing the highest such average. . . .” S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-10 (4) (Supp. 2003).
11. An amount up to and including forty-five days’ termination pay for unused annual leave at
retirement may be added to the average final compensation. S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-10 (4) (Supp.
2003).
12. “Earnable compensation” means the full rate of the compensation that would be payable to
a member if the member worked the member’s full normal working time; when compensation includes
maintenance, fees and other things of value the board shall fix the value of that part of the
compensation not paid in money directly by the employer.” S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-10 (8) (Supp.
2003).
13. “Employer” is defined in S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-10 (14) as “a county, municipality, or other
political subdivision of the State, or an agency or department of any of these, which has been admitted
to the system under the provisions of Section 9-1-470, a service organization referred to in item
(11)(e) of this section. . . .”
14. The Retirement System is a creature of statute and, as such, can only exercise that authority
expressly delegated to it or delegated by necessary implication. Fowler v. Beasley, 322 S.C. 463,
472 S.E.2d 630 (1996). In construing statutes, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the
courts must seek to ascertain the legislative intent which, once determined must prevail. Gardner v.
Biggart, 308 S.C. 331, 417 S.E.2d 858 (1992). In ascertaining the legislative intent of a statute, the
courts look to the clear and unambiguous language of the statute. Defender Properties, Inc. v. Doby,
307 S.C. 336, 415 S.E.2d 383 (1992). When such terms are clear and unambiguous, there is no
room for construction and courts are required to apply them according to their literal meaning.
Citizens for Lee County, Inc. v. Lee County, 308 S.C. 23, 416 S.E.2d 641, 644 (1992).
15. In construing statutes it is understood that statutory provisions do not stand alone but must
be read in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole. A statute is passed as a whole and not in
parts or sections is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section
should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious
whole. Koenig v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety, 325 S.C. 400, 480 S.E.2d 98 (Ct. App.
1996).
A court should reject an interpretation of a statute when to accept the interpretation would
lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not have been intended by the legislature. Kiriakides
v. United Artists Communication, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 440 S.E.2d 364(1994). Further, when the
terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, and the courts must
apply the terms of the statute according to their literal meaning. Ex parte Polk, 354 S.C. 8, 579
S.E.2d 329 (Ct. App. 2003). Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of S.C. Code Ann.
§ 9-1-10 (4), the Retirement System is authorized to compute the “average final compensation” of
a member of the system, including in that computation unused annual leave up to forty-five days if
paid to the member by his employer at retirement. In this case, the Retirement System included in
the computation of Petitioner’s average final compensation an amount of forty-five days of unused
annual leave. It did not have statutory authority to include the payments for additional unused annual
leave which Petitioner had accumulated.
16. Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, statutory provisions and discussion, this court
concludes that “average final compensation” only includes up to forty-five days of unused annual
leave and the regular compensation a member received in the twelve quarters used to arrive at the
highest compensation amount. Any characterization by an employer of payments made to a member
as “salary” or an “addition to salary” is not controlling. The court must strictly construe the statutes
and give them their plain meaning. To do otherwise would ignore the legislative mandate and would
threaten the integrity of the Retirement System, leading to an absurd result that the General Assembly
could not have intended. See Kennedy v. S.C. Retirement System, supra, 345 S.C. at 351, 549
S.E.2d at 249.
Accordingly, this court concludes and finds that the payment in the amount of $57,776 which
was made to Petitioner in the first half of 2003 for excess unused annual leave does not constitute
compensation or salary for the purpose of computing the “average final compensation” of Petitioner,
and that the decision of the Retirement System to exclude that amount from the calculation of
Petitioner’s average final compensation was correct.
ORDER
For all the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the determination of the Retirement System excluding $57,997.76 from the
Petitioner’s average final compensation calculation is hereby affirmed.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________________
Marvin F. Kittrell
Chief Administrative Law Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
March 5, 2004 |
