ORDERS:
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division (Division) pursuant to the
Petitioner's objection to the valuation placed on her property at 1619 Charleston Drive, Burton,
South Carolina, by the Beaufort County Assessor (Assessor) for the tax year 1997. Upon careful
review of the documentary evidence submitted in this case, I conclude that this case must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The Petitioner first made a Request for Review of the Assessor's valuation of her property
by completing and submitting to the Assessor's office an "Objection to Real Property
Appraisal/Assessment" form on July 3, 1997. By letter dated July 14, 1997, the Assessor denied
Petitioner's objection due to its untimely filing. Petitioner then filed an appeal with the Beaufort
County Tax Equalization Board, which also denied the objection due to untimeliness. Thereafter,
the Petitioner filed a request for a contested case hearing with the Division.
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2510 (Supp. 1997) sets forth the proper procedure for objecting to
the assessor's valuation of property. It provides in pertinent part:
In years when there is no notice of property tax assessment, [as is the
case here] the property taxpayer must, by March first, give the
assessor written notice of objection to one or more of the following:
the fair market value, the special use value, the assessment ratio, and
the property tax assessment. The failure to serve written notice of
objection by March first is a waiver of the taxpayer's right of protest
for that tax year, and the assessor may not review any request filed
after March first.
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2510(A)(4)(Supp. 1997). Therefore, by statute, the Assessor could not
review Petitioner's request for the 1997 tax year, since it was not filed until July 3, 1997.
An administrative law judge has no authority to revive a defective appeal. The authority of
reviewing officers is strictly confined to the limits set by the statutory provisions that give them
existence, and any actions that exceed their jurisdiction are void. S.C. Tax Comm'n v. S.C. Tax Bd.
of Review, 278 S.C. 556, 299 S.E.2d 489 (1983). In general, time limits for appeals are considered
jurisdictional limitations. Mears v. Mears, 287 S.C. 168, 337 S.E.2d 206 (1985); Burnett v. S.C.
Hwy. Dep't, 252 S.C. 568, 167 S.E.2d 571 (1969); S.C. Hwy. Dep't v Spann, 239 S.C. 437, 123
S.E.2d 648 (1962). Moreover, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and
can be raised sua sponte by the court. Ex parte Reichlyn, 310 S.C. 495, 427 S.E.2d 661(1993);
Hallums v. Bowens, 318 S.C. 1, 428 S.E.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1993). Since Petitioner failed to file her
objection by March 1, 1997, this Division lacks jurisdiction to conduct a contested case hearing in
this matter.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Marvin F. Kittrell
Chief Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
March 30, 1998 |
