ORDERS:
FINAL DECISION
97-ALJ-17-0501-CC, Rabiit Point Farm Limmited vs. Charleston County Ass'r [17.33]
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter came before me upon request of the Petitioner, Rabbit Point Farm
Limited ("Taxpayer"), for a contested case hearing pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §12-60-2540(A)(Supp. 1996). Petitioner is contesting the decision of the Charleston County Board of
Assessment Appeals ("Board"). The Board upheld the Charleston County Assessor ("Assessor")
in its classification of PID # 069-00-00-004, owned by Petitioner, as agricultural use property for the
tax year 1996, and affirmed the Assessor's classification of a portion thereof containing
approximately one acre and the house situate thereon as non-agricultural. Petitioner argues that the
entire 300.3 acre tract which includes the one acre and the house should qualify for agricultural
assessment.
After exhaustion of its prehearing remedies with the Assessor and the Board, Taxpayer has
requested a contested case hearing before the Administrative Law Judge Division ("Division"). The
hearing was conducted on November 18, 1997 at the Division's offices in Columbia, South Carolina.
I find and conclude that the entire 300.3 acre tract qualifies for special assessment as
agricultural real property.
ISSUE
The sole issue in dispute is whether the totality of Taxpayers' 300.3 acre tract, including the
acre containing a house, is entitled to an agricultural use classification, valuation, and assessment
for the tax year 1996.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon the evidence presented, I make the following findings of fact, taking into
consideration the burden of the parties to establish their respective cases by a preponderance of the
evidence and taking into account the credibility of the witnesses:
1. This Division has personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
2. Notice of the date, time, place and nature of the hearing was timely given to all
parties.
3. Rabbit Point Farm Limited ("Farm") is a corporation which owns a 300.3 acre tract
of land at 2206 Highway 174, Edisto Island, Charleston County, South Carolina. The owners of the
Farm are listed on the tax returns as Anthony P. Cecil and T. Ashton Phillips. Jessica C. Moe and
John Cecil, children of Anthony P. Cecil, also have ownership interest in the Farm.
4. A portion of the tract, containing 269.7 acres, is considered high land and the
remaining portion, containing 30.6 acres, is considered marsh.
5. Much of the property has been accepted into the Conservation Reserve Program
("CRP"). The agricultural stabilization and conservation service is a federally sponsored program
that pays farmers to take their land out of production primarily to prevent soil erosion. Farmers enter
into a program contract with the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") for a ten to
fifteen year period whereby they agree to take the eligible land out of annual crop production and put
it into perennial grass, wildlife plantings, wind breaks and/or trees. The farmers are paid by the
USDA. Property placed into the CPR Program is considered agricultural property.
6. The subject property is designated by the Charleston County Assessor as PID#
961069-00-00-004. It contains parcel numbers 131-3, B5C and B5B and is located on South
Carolina Highway 174. It is bounded by Russell Creek on the north.
7. Located on the Farm is a residence to which is attached a wooden ramp leading to a
boat house and boat dock. The one acre lot on which this house is situate together with the wooden
ramp and boat house has been denied classification as agricultural by the Assessor for the tax year
1996. The remainder of the 300.3 acre farm has been qualified by the Assessor for agricultural
assessment for 1996.
8. The residence, together with the wooden walkway and dock, were built by Mr. Cecil
approximately twelve (12) years ago. The entire tract of land has been owned by Mr. Cecil for the
last twenty-five (25) years, more or less. It has been utilized for farming purposes during this entire
period and is presently operated as a farm.
9. The house was constructed for business purposes. It is used as a farm office. From
time to time Mr. Cecil meets therein with employees, contractors and others to conduct business
related to the farm and its maintenance.
10. This farm house/office received the 4% agricultural assessment ratio until the year
1995, when the Assessor classified it as residential and assessed it at the 6% residential assessment
ratio. In 1996 the Assessor again assessed the farm house/office at the 6% ratio. Assessor contends
it is used as a residence and/or for recreational purposes.
11. Mr. Cecil is a resident of the State of Florida and spends his time there. Mrs. Moe
is married and lives with her husband and family in downtown Charleston, South Carolina. She is
employed part time with the law firm of Turner, Padget, Graham & Laney in its Charleston office.
Mr. John Cecil is self-employed as a painter in Charleston, South Carolina and lives with his mother
at her home on Church Street, Charleston, South Carolina.
12. Mrs. Moe and her husband utilize a beach house owned by his family as a secondary
home for recreational purposes.
13. Occasionally Mrs. Moe will go to the house located on the Farm on Wednesdays and
spend the night with her children. However, these visits are infrequent and do not exceed two nights
during any given month. She utilizes the house for business purposes two to ten hours each month.
14. Mr. John Cecil utilizes the house or the facilities very infrequently.
15. Neither the house nor the farm is rented for hunting or recreational purposes.
16. Neither the Farm nor any of its owners keep any boats at the dock at the Farm. Mrs.
Moe and her family do own a boat which they keep at the Yacht Club in Charleston, South Carolina.
17. An employee of the Farm, Roy Mandell, works on the farm part-time and uses the
farm house for business purposes. Normally, he works on Wednesdays and Sundays. He makes
telephone calls from the farm house and meets contractors there. From time to time several other
individuals are hired to work on the farm property.
18. The farm house/office is used primarily for the maintenance and upkeep of the farm.
Any other usage of the farm house/office is negligible and is only incidental to the farm business
which is conducted therein.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, I conclude, as a matter of law, the following:
1. S.C. Code Ann. §12-60-2540 (Supp. 1997) authorizes the South Carolina
Administrative Law Judge Division to hear contested cases pursuant to Chapter 23 of Title 1 of the
1976 Code, as amended.
2. Agricultural real property is any tract of real property which is used to raise, harvest
or store crops, feed, breed or manage livestock, or to produce plants, trees, fowl or other animals
useful to man. S.C. Code Ann. §12-43-230(a) (Supp. 1997).
3. An agricultural use classification is granted to agricultural real property "actually used
for agricultural purposes." S. C. Code Ann. §12-43-220(d)(1) (Supp. 1997).
4. S. C. Code Ann. § 12-43-232 (3)(c) (Supp. 1997) provides that real property idle
under a federal or state land retirement program is agricultural real property if the property would
have qualified as such property subject to satisfactory proof to the assessor.
5. This property was classified for agricultural purposes for the tax year 1994 and has
been owned by Taxpayer and its stockholders for approximately the last twenty-five years.
6. S. C. Code Regs. 117-114 defines "agricultural real property" as real property used
for agricultural purposes. Real property which is used as the residence of the owner or others is not
included within the definition of agricultural real property. Also, this regulation provides that real
property that is used for recreation, such as a hunting club or fishing club, or for any other similar
use does not qualify for agricultural assessment purposes.
The evidence is totally supportive of Taxpayer's position that the farm house has been used
almost exclusively for farm purposes. There is no evidence that it has ever been used as a residence.
Further, there is no evidence that any of the entire tract, including the farm house and the small lot
on which it is situate, has been utilized for recreational purposes or as a hunting or fishing club. The
overwhelming evidence in the record is that the farm house has been and is used almost exclusively
in conjunction with the agricultural usage of the property. I therefore conclude that this entire tract
of land is used for and committed to agricultural purposes and activities.
7. S. C. Code Ann. § 12-43-232 (3)(d) (Supp. 1997) provides that unimproved real
property subject to a perpetual conservation easement as provided in Chapter 8 of Title 27 must be
classified as agricultural real property. In John R. Lindsay, Charleston County Assessor vs. John S.
Templeton, Charles M. Huff, Thomas Savage, Jr., 96-ALJ-17-0216-CC, this court held that the
platting and staking of real property into lots, together with the construction of roads and the
placement of underground electrical and phone lines, transformed a "raw property" into improved
realty. The Assessor argues that this case is similar to the Lindsay case in that the construction of
the farm house in this case constitutes an "improvement" which would disqualify it from the
agricultural classification. However, this situation is different from that in Lindsay. Here, the court
is faced with the application of a separate statutory provision. S. C. Code Ann. § 12-43-232 (3)(c),
rather than § 12-43-232 (3)(d), is applicable herein. Moreover, the farmhouse in this case is an
improvement similar to a barn or outbuilding, which does not change the essential agricultural
character of the property. Each is part and parcel of a farming enterprise. Each is utilized for
agricultural purposes. However, improvements such as those at issue in the Lindsay case, i.e., the
subdivision of a tract into lots for sale, constitute a change in the character of the real property from
agricultural to commercial. Even though the construction of a building or house on a property
constitutes an improvement to the real property, unless it changes the character of the property and
the usage of the property, as it did in Lindsay, the property retains its agricultural classification for
tax purposes.
The construction of the farm house, without any supportive evidence that it is used for
commercial, recreational or residential purposes, is not sufficient to change the character of the
property from agricultural to residential for tax assessment purposes. The argument of the Assessor
lacks merit.
8. In construing a statute, its words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning
without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. First
Baptist Church of Malden v. City of Malden, 308 S.C. 226, 417 S.E.2d 592 (1992). Statutory
construction is within the province of the courts. Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S.C. 314, 20 S.E.2d 865
(1942). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that a court is to ascertain and effectuate the
actual intent of the Legislature; to ascertain this intent, statutes which are part of the same act must
be read together. Burns v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 297 S.C. 520, 377 S.E.2d 569
(1989). When interpreting a statute, legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered
in the language used, which must be construed in light of the intended purpose of the statutes.
Gambrell v. Travelers Insurance Company, 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d 814 (1983).
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby,
ORDERED that the Taxpayers' property containing 300.3 acres, specifically including the
farm house and attachments, identified as PID# 961-969-00-00-004, being parcels 131-3, B5C, and
B5B, located on 2206 Highway 174, Edisto Island, Charleston County, South Carolina must be
classified as agricultural real property for the tax year 1996.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
Marvin F. Kittrell
Chief Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
February 10, 1998
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DIVISION
Rabbit Point Farm Limited, )
) Docket No: 97-ALJ-17-0501-CC
Petitioner, )
)
vs. )
)
Charleston County Assessor, ) FINAL DECISION
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
APPEARANCES: Jessica C. Moe, Esquire: Pro Se for the Petitioner
Samuel W. Howell, IV, Esquire: Attorney for the Respondent
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter came before me upon request of the Petitioner, Rabbit Point Farm
Limited ("Taxpayer"), for a contested case hearing pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §12-60-2540(A)(Supp. 1996). Petitioner is contesting the decision of the Charleston County Board of
Assessment Appeals ("Board"). The Board upheld the Charleston County Assessor ("Assessor")
in its classification of PID # 069-00-00-004, owned by Petitioner, as agricultural use property for the
tax year 1996, and affirmed the Assessor's classification of a portion thereof containing
approximately one acre and the house situate thereon as non-agricultural. Petitioner argues that the
entire 300.3 acre tract which includes the one acre and the house should qualify for agricultural
assessment.
After exhaustion of its prehearing remedies with the Assessor and the Board, Taxpayer has
requested a contested case hearing before the Administrative Law Judge Division ("Division"). The
hearing was conducted on November 18, 1997 at the Division's offices in Columbia, South Carolina.
I find and conclude that the entire 300.3 acre tract qualifies for special assessment as
agricultural real property.
ISSUE
The sole issue in dispute is whether the totality of Taxpayers' 300.3 acre tract, including the
acre containing a house, is entitled to an agricultural use classification, valuation, and assessment
for the tax year 1996.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon the evidence presented, I make the following findings of fact, taking into
consideration the burden of the parties to establish their respective cases by a preponderance of the
evidence and taking into account the credibility of the witnesses:
1. This Division has personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
2. Notice of the date, time, place and nature of the hearing was timely given to all
parties.
3. Rabbit Point Farm Limited ("Farm") is a corporation which owns a 300.3 acre tract
of land at 2206 Highway 174, Edisto Island, Charleston County, South Carolina. The owners of the
Farm are listed on the tax returns as Anthony P. Cecil and T. Ashton Phillips. Jessica C. Moe and
John Cecil, children of Anthony P. Cecil, also have ownership interest in the Farm.
4. A portion of the tract, containing 269.7 acres, is considered high land and the
remaining portion, containing 30.6 acres, is considered marsh.
5. Much of the property has been accepted into the Conservation Reserve Program
("CRP"). The agricultural stabilization and conservation service is a federally sponsored program
that pays farmers to take their land out of production primarily to prevent soil erosion. Farmers enter
into a program contract with the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") for a ten to
fifteen year period whereby they agree to take the eligible land out of annual crop production and put
it into perennial grass, wildlife plantings, wind breaks and/or trees. The farmers are paid by the
USDA. Property placed into the CPR Program is considered agricultural property.
6. The subject property is designated by the Charleston County Assessor as PID#
961069-00-00-004. It contains parcel numbers 131-3, B5C and B5B and is located on South
Carolina Highway 174. It is bounded by Russell Creek on the north.
7. Located on the Farm is a residence to which is attached a wooden ramp leading to a
boat house and boat dock. The one acre lot on which this house is situate together with the wooden
ramp and boat house has been denied classification as agricultural by the Assessor for the tax year
1996. The remainder of the 300.3 acre farm has been qualified by the Assessor for agricultural
assessment for 1996.
8. The residence, together with the wooden walkway and dock, were built by Mr. Cecil
approximately twelve (12) years ago. The entire tract of land has been owned by Mr. Cecil for the
last twenty-five (25) years, more or less. It has been utilized for farming purposes during this entire
period and is presently operated as a farm.
9. The house was constructed for business purposes. It is used as a farm office. From
time to time Mr. Cecil meets therein with employees, contractors and others to conduct business
related to the farm and its maintenance.
10. This farm house/office received the 4% agricultural assessment ratio until the year
1995, when the Assessor classified it as residential and assessed it at the 6% residential assessment
ratio. In 1996 the Assessor again assessed the farm house/office at the 6% ratio. Assessor contends
it is used as a residence and/or for recreational purposes.
11. Mr. Cecil is a resident of the State of Florida and spends his time there. Mrs. Moe
is married and lives with her husband and family in downtown Charleston, South Carolina. She is
employed part time with the law firm of Turner, Padget, Graham & Laney in its Charleston office.
Mr. John Cecil is self-employed as a painter in Charleston, South Carolina and lives with his mother
at her home on Church Street, Charleston, South Carolina.
12. Mrs. Moe and her husband utilize a beach house owned by his family as a secondary
home for recreational purposes.
13. Occasionally Mrs. Moe will go to the house located on the Farm on Wednesdays and
spend the night with her children. However, these visits are infrequent and do not exceed two nights
during any given month. She utilizes the house for business purposes two to ten hours each month.
14. Mr. John Cecil utilizes the house or the facilities very infrequently.
15. Neither the house nor the farm is rented for hunting or recreational purposes.
16. Neither the Farm nor any of its owners keep any boats at the dock at the Farm. Mrs.
Moe and her family do own a boat which they keep at the Yacht Club in Charleston, South Carolina.
17. An employee of the Farm, Roy Mandell, works on the farm part-time and uses the
farm house for business purposes. Normally, he works on Wednesdays and Sundays. He makes
telephone calls from the farm house and meets contractors there. From time to time several other
individuals are hired to work on the farm property.
18. The farm house/office is used primarily for the maintenance and upkeep of the farm.
Any other usage of the farm house/office is negligible and is only incidental to the farm business
which is conducted therein.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, I conclude, as a matter of law, the following:
1. S.C. Code Ann. §12-60-2540 (Supp. 1997) authorizes the South Carolina
Administrative Law Judge Division to hear contested cases pursuant to Chapter 23 of Title 1 of the
1976 Code, as amended.
2. Agricultural real property is any tract of real property which is used to raise, harvest
or store crops, feed, breed or manage livestock, or to produce plants, trees, fowl or other animals
useful to man. S.C. Code Ann. §12-43-230(a) (Supp. 1997).
3. An agricultural use classification is granted to agricultural real property "actually used
for agricultural purposes." S. C. Code Ann. §12-43-220(d)(1) (Supp. 1997).
4. S. C. Code Ann. § 12-43-232 (3)(c) (Supp. 1997) provides that real property idle
under a federal or state land retirement program is agricultural real property if the property would
have qualified as such property subject to satisfactory proof to the assessor.
5. This property was classified for agricultural purposes for the tax year 1994 and has
been owned by Taxpayer and its stockholders for approximately the last twenty-five years.
6. S. C. Code Regs. 117-114 defines "agricultural real property" as real property used
for agricultural purposes. Real property which is used as the residence of the owner or others is not
included within the definition of agricultural real property. Also, this regulation provides that real
property that is used for recreation, such as a hunting club or fishing club, or for any other similar
use does not qualify for agricultural assessment purposes.
The evidence is totally supportive of Taxpayer's position that the farm house has been used
almost exclusively for farm purposes. There is no evidence that it has ever been used as a residence.
Further, there is no evidence that any of the entire tract, including the farm house and the small lot
on which it is situate, has been utilized for recreational purposes or as a hunting or fishing club. The
overwhelming evidence in the record is that the farm house has been and is used almost exclusively
in conjunction with the agricultural usage of the property. I therefore conclude that this entire tract
of land is used for and committed to agricultural purposes and activities.
7. S. C. Code Ann. § 12-43-232 (3)(d) (Supp. 1997) provides that unimproved real
property subject to a perpetual conservation easement as provided in Chapter 8 of Title 27 must be
classified as agricultural real property. In John R. Lindsay, Charleston County Assessor vs. John S.
Templeton, Charles M. Huff, Thomas Savage, Jr., 96-ALJ-17-0216-CC, this court held that the
platting and staking of real property into lots, together with the construction of roads and the
placement of underground electrical and phone lines, transformed a "raw property" into improved
realty. The Assessor argues that this case is similar to the Lindsay case in that the construction of
the farm house in this case constitutes an "improvement" which would disqualify it from the
agricultural classification. However, this situation is different from that in Lindsay. Here, the court
is faced with the application of a separate statutory provision. S. C. Code Ann. § 12-43-232 (3)(c),
rather than § 12-43-232 (3)(d), is applicable herein. Moreover, the farmhouse in this case is an
improvement similar to a barn or outbuilding, which does not change the essential agricultural
character of the property. Each is part and parcel of a farming enterprise. Each is utilized for
agricultural purposes. However, improvements such as those at issue in the Lindsay case, i.e., the
subdivision of a tract into lots for sale, constitute a change in the character of the real property from
agricultural to commercial. Even though the construction of a building or house on a property
constitutes an improvement to the real property, unless it changes the character of the property and
the usage of the property, as it did in Lindsay, the property retains its agricultural classification for
tax purposes.
The construction of the farm house, without any supportive evidence that it is used for
commercial, recreational or residential purposes, is not sufficient to change the character of the
property from agricultural to residential for tax assessment purposes. The argument of the Assessor
lacks merit.
8. In construing a statute, its words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning
without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. First
Baptist Church of Malden v. City of Malden, 308 S.C. 226, 417 S.E.2d 592 (1992). Statutory
construction is within the province of the courts. Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S.C. 314, 20 S.E.2d 865
(1942). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that a court is to ascertain and effectuate the
actual intent of the Legislature; to ascertain this intent, statutes which are part of the same act must
be read together. Burns v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 297 S.C. 520, 377 S.E.2d 569
(1989). When interpreting a statute, legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered
in the language used, which must be construed in light of the intended purpose of the statutes.
Gambrell v. Travelers Insurance Company, 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d 814 (1983).
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby,
ORDERED that the Taxpayers' property containing 300.3 acres, specifically including the
farm house and attachments, identified as PID# 961-969-00-00-004, being parcels 131-3, B5C, and
B5B, located on 2206 Highway 174, Edisto Island, Charleston County, South Carolina must be
classified as agricultural real property for the tax year 1996.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
Marvin F. Kittrell
Chief Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
February 10, 1998 |