ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. MCI 0080-03
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant
to the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d
742 (2000). Appellant Charles Chambers appeals the decision of the South Carolina Department of
Corrections (DOC or Department) to revoke ninety days of his “good-time” credit as punishment for
testing positive for the use of marijuana in violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.10. Having reviewed
the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision
of the Department must be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On April 9, 2003, Sergeant Zuan Cook administered an OnTrak drug test on Appellant based
upon reasonable suspicion that he was using drugs in violation of DOC policy. The test returned a
positive result for marijuana. A subsequent confirmation test also indicated the presence of marijuana
in Appellant’s system. Based upon these positive test results, Appellant was charged with violating DOC
Disciplinary Code § 1.13, Use or Possession of Narcotics, Marijuana or Unauthorized Drugs, Including
Prescription Drugs.
A hearing of this charge was held before a DOC Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) on April
18, 2003. At the close of the hearing, the DHO found Appellant guilty of the charge against him and
revoked ninety days of his good-time credit as punishment for the offense. Appellant appealed his
disciplinary conviction to the Department and then to this tribunal. On appeal, Appellant contends that
his disciplinary conviction was obtained in violation of his due process rights, as the Department did not
present sufficient physical evidence of the drug test at the disciplinary hearing.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final
decisions of the Department in certain “non-collateral” or administrative matters by appealing those
decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act. Al-Shabazz, 338
S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. The Court further found that the Division’s jurisdiction to hear such
matters is “typically” limited to cases where an inmate is disciplined and the punishment imposed affects
the inmate’s state-created liberty interests and cases where an inmate believes the Department has
erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status. Id. at 369-370, 527
S.E.2d at 750. Subsequently, in Sullivan v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrections, 355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124
(2003), the Court held that, under Al-Shabazz, the ALJD also has jurisdiction to hear cases where an
inmate challenges a condition of his confinement that implicates a state-created liberty interest.
Id. at
443, 586 S.E.2d at 127. In the case at hand, Appellant contends that the Department improperly
revoked ninety days of his good-time credit as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing; accordingly,
this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.
When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an
appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal’s
review of inmate appeals is confined to the record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is
primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has granted aggrieved inmates the process they
are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750; Sullivan, 355 S.C.
at 443, 586 S.E.2d at 127. Further, recognizing that prison officials are in the best position to decide
inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional “hands off” approach to internal
prison disciplinary policies and other internal prison affairs when reviewing inmate appeals under the
APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266
S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of South Carolina courts regarding
internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this deferential standard of review, this
tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department’s actions to ensure that inmate grievances
are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at
757.
In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department’s decision to revoke his good-time
credit was made in violation of his due process rights. Because inmates have a protected liberty interest
in their earned statutory good-time credits under the Fourteenth Amendment, they are entitled to
“minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process clause to
insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557
(1974). Thus, where, as here, an inmate faces the revocation of good-time credits as punishment in a
disciplinary hearing, prison officials must provide that inmate with certain procedural safeguards. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 370, 527 S.E.2d at 750.
These procedural safeguards include:
(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four
hours before the hearing; (2) that factfinders must prepare a written statement of the
evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the inmate should be
allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue
hazard to institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow
inmate or a prison employee) should be allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex
cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the matter, who
may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial.
Id. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (paraphrasing Wolff). Beyond these procedural requirements, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the revocation of an inmate’s good-time credits does not comport
with Due Process unless “there [is] some evidence from which the conclusion of the [prison official]
could be deduced.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Thus, if the
Department affords the inmate a Wolff-type hearing and has at least some evidence in the record to
support its decision, the Department’s revocation of an inmate’s good-time credits satisfies the
requirements of due process.
In the disciplinary proceedings underlying the instant appeal, Appellant was afforded all the
process due him pursuant to Wolff and Al-Shabazz. The record indicates that Appellant received written
notice of the charges against him in excess of twenty-four hours prior to a hearing that was held before
an impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. On the notice form, Appellant indicated that he did not want
his accuser to be present at the hearing of the charge. At the hearing, Appellant was given the
opportunity, through a counsel substitute, to offer evidence and call witnesses in his defense. The record
reflects that Appellant was found guilty of using marijuana in violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.10,
based on the written report of Sergeant Cook, including the written report of the results of the OnTrak
drug test, and a written statement to that effect was prepared by the hearing officer. After his
conviction, Appellant filed a grievance and received a prompt response from his warden, which
Appellant then appealed to the Department. In its denial of his appeal, the Department informed
Appellant of his right to appeal the Department’s final decision under the APA.
Further, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the decision reached by the
Department. The Department’s failure to produce physical evidence of Appellant’s drug test at the
hearing does not render the conviction invalid. The written report of Sergeant Cook, the person who
administered the drug test, is sufficient evidence to support the DHO’s finding that Appellant tested
positive for using marijuana. Moreover, the production of physical evidence is generally not required
at an inmate disciplinary hearing. See, e.g., Barker v. State, 437 So. 2d 1375 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983).
The Department provided Appellant with the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment
before revoking his sentence-related credits as punishment in a disciplinary proceeding. Accordingly,
the Department’s decision to deny Appellant’s grievance is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department’s denial of Appellant’s grievance is
AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
March 5, 2004
Columbia, South Carolina |