ORDERS:
ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter is before me pursuant to S.C. Code Ann.
12-47-420 (1976) for a contested case hearing on the
Petitioners' claim for a refund of taxes paid upon alleged
illegal assessments issued by the Beaufort County Tax Assessor
on time share condominium units located in Hilton Head Island,
South Carolina. This matter was originally heard by the
former Tax Commission on Respondent's motions to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and for the expiration
of the applicable statute of limitations on the taxpayers' claim
for a refund for tax years 1986-1990. The Tax Commission
held that it had subject matter jurisdiction because the
taxpayers properly alleged that the properties were "erroneously,
improperly and illegally assessed" in violation of S.C. Code Ann.
27-32-240 (Rev. 1991) and the allegations, if true, would
constitute a proper basis for a refund pursuant to S.C. Code Ann.
12-47-420 (1976). See Tax Commission Decision 94-87.
With respect to the statute of limitations issue, the Tax
Commission determined that there "appears to be a question as
to when the taxpayers originally filed their claims for the
refunds. The parties may need to present some proof with
regard to the time when the requests were filed....We believe at
this point, it would be appropriate to go forward with this
action, and address the question of when the claims were filed
and the appropriate statute of limitations at the time of
the hearing on the merits of the case." Tax Commission Decision
94-87.
Thereafter, pursuant to Government Restructuring, the Tax
Commission was abolished and its jurisdiction was
transferred to the Administrative Law Judge Division. S.C. Code
Ann. 12-4-30(D) (Supp. 1995). Since this case was not
docketed for a hearing prior to the Commission's abolition, it
was transferred to the Division for a contested case hearing.
The Department of Revenue and Taxation transmitted the case to
the Division on April 19, 1995. At the time the case was
transferred to the Division, subject matter jurisdiction existed
pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. 12-47-420 (1976). The Tax
Commission Decision 94-87 was res judicata as to jurisdictional
matters. The action was properly before the Division with
respect to the taxpayers' request for a refund, pursuant to
Section 12-47-420, claiming that the Assessor erroneously,
improperly, and illegally assessed the time share condominiums in
violation of S.C. Code Ann. 27-32-240 (Rev. 1991).
After notice to the parties, part one of a bifurcated
hearing was conducted on November 13 and 14, 1995. The
sole issue at this hearing was whether the Beaufort County Tax
Assessor improperly valued time share condominiums in
violation of S.C. Code Ann. 27-32-240 (Rev. 1991). If the time
share units were improperly valued, then the appropriate
value to be placed on the property and the amount of a refund, if
any, were issues to be determined at a later hearing.
Based upon the evidence presented, I conclude that the
method of valuation by the Beaufort County Assessor
was proper and not in violation of S.C. Code Ann. 27-32-240
(Rev. 1991) and therefore, the parties are not entitled to
a refund for taxes paid.
Prior to and during the hearing, several issues were
raised
including subject matter jurisdiction which was
addressed by the Tax Commission and the applicable statute of
limitations. The parties submitted briefs on the issues
and motions raised during the November hearing. The briefs were
submitted throughout December 1995 and January 1996.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented, I make
the
following findings of fact, taking into consideration
the burden on the parties to establish their respective cases by
a preponderance of the evidence and taking into account
the credibility of the witnesses:
1. The Petitioners are the representatives for
taxpayer
owners of several time share condominium projects
located on Hilton Head Island in Beaufort County, South Carolina.
These developments are Player's Club, Port O'Call,
Brigantine Quarters, Spinnaker, Sunset Pointe, Harbour Pointe,
Monarch, Southwind, Spicebush, Heritage Club, Harbour Club,
and Swallowtail.
2. The Petitioners also represent the owners of Adventure
Inn. Adventure Inn is a vacation time share lease
project. The rooms or units are leased on a long term basis.
The Assessor valued this project the same as hotels.
3. In 1988, Beaufort County conducted a county-wide
reassessment program in which all properties in the
county were reassessed.
4. The Assessor conducted a mass appraisal of the
properties by using the market sales approach to
appraise the property.
5. Of the 635 units which are the subject of this appeal,
only 414 existed at the time of the 1988
reassessment. Units at Sunset Pointe, Harbour Club, Heritage
Club, and Southwind were not in existence during the time
of the 1988 reassessment.
6. The Assessor did not utilize the computer assisted mass
appraisal program to appraise the condominiums
on Hilton Head Island. The computer was used to record and store
the data collected by the appraiser.
7. The appraiser from the Assessor's office began to
collect data for the appraisals between 1985 and 1987.
The appraiser obtained property record cards, appraisal sheets to
record the information, maps of the properties, and sales
data in order to appraise the property. In addition, he
inspected the property appraised.
8. Property record cards contain information regarding the
unit, including the physical description, any
improvements, the type of construction materials, and the value
of the unit. Property record cards are used primarily
for vacant land and residential or commercial property. The card
is not a valuation tool but a record the taxpayer may
view to obtain information about his property.
9. The property record card for a condominium shows the
results of the valuation process based upon data
entered into the computer. Condominiums are listed on a sheet by
unit number for each project. The sheets would
contain information about the sales date and price, unit size,
and square footage.
10. Property record cards were not used in valuing
condominiums in the 1988 reassessment.
11. During an inspection of the property, data relating to
the units was recorded. This data included the
number of the unit, the location/view of the unit, square
footage, condition, and number and type of rooms.
12. After the property was inspected, the appraiser
collected the sales data to appraise the property
according to the comparables.
13. The condominium projects, including time share units,
were appraised based upon comparable sales data
in the 1988 reassessment.
14. The comparable sales data utilized by the appraiser was
not written and maintained in any file or form.
There is no written record of any of the comparable sales data
utilized during the 1988 reassessment.
15. The appraiser for time share units did not have access
to the sales or purchase information on time
share units.
16. Weekly sales data was not used in computing or
determining the value of time share units.
17. The data entry operators in the Assessor's office were
given the handwritten property values, as
determined by the appraiser, on all condominiums. The data
operators were required to enter the information in the
computer system and make adjustments as necessary so the values,
as determined by the appraiser, were shown on the
computer.
18. As a result of that reassessment, the Petitioners were
notified of the assessed value of their property.
Based upon a single unit in each project, the assessed values
stated in the 1988 assessment notices were as follows:
Player's Club | $106,100
|
Port O'Call | $157,300
|
Brigantine Quarters | $148,400
|
Spinnaker | $146,900
|
Monarch | $237,100
|
Southwind | $170,300
|
Spicebush | $216,400
|
Swallowtail | $309,100
|
19. The taxpayers selected what they determined were
representative samples of condominium units from
all of the developments located on Hilton Head Island. The
taxpayers then made a comparison of the assessed value before
the 1988 reassessment and the 1988 assessed value as indicated on
the assessment notices mailed in July 1988. The
taxpayer then compared the single owner projects with the time
share projects.
20. Based upon the representative sample, the value of the
single owner condominium units located in 40
projects in Sea Pines Plantation decreased an average of 17.6
percent from the 1987 value to the 1988 value as shown on
the assessment notices. Only two single owner projects increased
in value.
21. Based upon the representative sample, the value of the
time share condominium units located in three
projects which are the subject of this action (Swallowtail,
Spicebush, and Monarch) in Sea Pines Plantation increased an
average of 61.2 percent from the 1987 value to the 1988 value as
shown on the assessment notices. Two projects (Harbour
Club and Heritage Club) were not in existence in 1988.
22. Based upon the representative sample, the value of the
single owner condominium units located in 11
projects in Shipyard Plantation decreased an average of 17.6
percent from the 1987 assessed value to the 1988 value as
shown on the assessment notices. Only one single owner project
increased in value.
23. Based upon the representative sample, the value of the
time share condominium units located in three
projects which are the subject of this action (Brigantine,
Spinnaker, Port O'Call and Cottages at Port O'Call) in Shipyard
Plantation increased an average of 19.1 percent from the 1987
value to the 1988 value. One project (Southwind) was not
in existence in 1988.
24. Based upon the representative sample, the value of the
single owner condominium units located in 29
projects in Forest Beach decreased an average of 20.1 percent
from the 1987 assessed value to the 1988 value as shown
on the assessment notices. Only one single owner project
increased in value.
25. Based upon the representative sample, the value of the
time share condominium units located in two
projects (Players Club and Sea Crest) in Forest Beach increased
an average of 29.8 percent from the 1987 assessed value
to the 1988 value as shown on the assessment notices.
26. The average fair market value of the taxpayers' time
share units stated on the assessment notices were
higher than the average fair market value of the single owner
units.
27. However, the value on one of the taxpayers' selected
time share unit in the Cottage at Port O'Call
remained virtually the same. The value of Unit 304 Phase II in
1987 was $170,200. In 1988 its value, according to the
assessment notice, was $170,000. In addition, the value on
another selected time share unit in Port O'Call decreased.
The value of Unit 105 Phase I in 1987 was $186,400. In 1988 its
value, according to the assessment notice, was $168,600.
28. Many of the 1988 reassessment notices generated by the
Assessor were incorrect. The incorrect notices
affected not only the time share condominiums but also the single
owner condominiums.
29. If the assessed value as stated on the reassessment
notice was changed, the Assessor did not send a
notice stating the adjusted value.
30. Subsequently, the assessed value of the time share
units in Swallowtail, Spicebush, Monarch, Harbour
Club and Heritage Club located in Sea Pines Plantation were
reduced an average of 41 percent. Some of the single owner
condominium projects in Sea Pines Plantation were reduced and
some were increased.
31. Likewise, the assessed value of the time share units in
Brigantine, Spinnaker, Port O'Call and Cottages
at Port O'Call located in Shipyard Plantation were reduced an
average of 42.9 percent. One of the single owner
condominium projects in Shipyard Plantation was reduced and one
was increased.
32. Likewise, the assessed value of the time share units in
Players Club and Sea Crest located in Forest
Beach were reduced an average of 55.3 percent. Some of the
single owner condominium projects in Forest Beach were
reduced and one was increased.
33. Upon receipt of the 1988 assessment notice, the
representatives for Swallowtail, Spicebush, Port O'Call,
and Monarch sought review of the assessed value of the units.
34. On some properties, the corrected assessed values were
reflected on the tax bill sent to the taxpayer.
35. The taxpayers' expert tried to determine the
methodology used by the Assessor in valuing the time
share units. He reviewed documents from the Assessor's office
(specifically, the property record cards), contacted other
appraisers in the area who had experience with the various
projects, and reviewed real estate multiple listing service
information for descriptions of the property.
36. The taxpayers' expert expected that the data in the
Assessor's office on single owner condominiums and
similar time share condominiums would coincide. He also expected
that, from the data on single owner units, calculations
could be made to determine the value of time share units.
37. The taxpayers' expert was not able to determine from
the property record cards the methodology
utilized by the Assessor in determining value.
38. The Assessor's expert criticized the taxpayer for using
the assessment notices to make comparisons.
His view is that the final assessed value, as reflected on the
auditor's books or the tax bill, is the appropriate value to
use.
39. The Assessor's expert also determined that it was
inappropriate to use a representative sampling to
compare the time share units with the single owner units because
there are different types of units, often varying
significantly in value. His belief is that all the units should
have been reviewed to compare the assessed values.
40. Both experts agreed that the comparable sales approach
was the appropriate method to determine value
for the time share condominiums for tax purposes.
41. The taxpayers presented evidence that the appraiser
from the Assessor's office attempted to recreate
the single owner sales comparables he would have used to
determine the value of the time share units. The comparables
were selected in 1991 or 1992 to try to recreate what he may have
used during the 1988 reassessment process. The
appraiser selected a unit in each of three single owner projects
to compare with a unit in each of the time share projects
in the same development.
42. In each instance, the 1988 assessed value for the
single owner units as stated in the reassessment
notice, decreased from the 1987 assessed value. The 1988
assessed value of the time share unit, as stated in the
reassessment notice, increased from the 1987 assessed value.
43. In opposition to the taxpayers' evidence, the Assessor
presented a representative sample of a time share
unit in each project and compared the corrected assessed value
with the value as determined by the cumulative purchase
price reflected in adding the weekly sales. The values were as
follows:
Subdivision
Market Value
Weekly Sales Value
Swallowtail Unit 2871 | $127,300 | $263,210
| (45 weeks) |
Spicebush (no unit given) | $ 74,200 | $142,216
| (27 weeks) |
Brigantine Unit 268 | $ 68,600 | $223,000
| (4 quarters) |
Monarch Unit 3743 | $126,000 | $571,401
| (49 weeks) |
Heritage Club Unit 3111 | $169,800 | $513,711
| (50 weeks) |
Harbour Club Unit 3111 | $197,500 | $461,825
| (38 weeks) |
Port O'Call Unit 102 | $ 79,000 | $250,636
| (35 weeks) |
Southwind Unit 440 | $118,800 | $249,769
| (4 quarters) |
Southwind II Unit 2003 | $ 98,250 | $211,567
| (23 weeks) |
Southwind II Unit 2110 | $ 93,000 | $213,782
| (24 weeks) |
Spinnaker Unit 105 | $ 67,500 | $259,123
| (44 weeks) |
Sunset Point Unit 6402 | $108,600 | $486,203
| (36 weeks) |
44. Data from the 1988 tax rolls reveals that the assessed
value on at least 221 of the 414 time share units
reassessed decreased from the 1987 value.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the findings of fact, I conclude, as a matter
of
law, the following:
S.C. Code Ann. 12-47-420 authorizes claims for refunds
only in those cases of "erroneous, improper or illegal"
assessments. Whenever it appears that "any tax has been paid
under an erroneous, improper or illegal assessment, the
[Tax] Commission shall order the officer having custody of the
tax so erroneously, improperly or illegally paid to refund
it to the person from whom it has been unjustly collected...."
S.C. Code Ann. 12-47-420 (1976). The administrative
law judge as successor to the Tax Commission has the authority to
grant relief from erroneous, improper or illegal
assessments. If the taxpayer can establish by competent evidence
that the underlying assessment is erroneous, improper,
or illegal then he is entitled to a refund of property taxes
paid.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has narrowly construed
the
provisions of Section 12-47-420 and has limited
the terms "erroneous, improper, or illegal" to those instances in
which the assessment has been proven to be
jurisdictionally defective.
The phrase erroneously or illegally charged', as used
in the statutes providing for a refund
of taxes so exacted, is held to refer to a
jurisdictional defect as distinguished from a mere
error of judgment, and it is generally held that no
recovery of taxes paid under protest can
be had under such statutes on the theory that there has
been a mistake in valuation of the
property, which resulted in an excessive assessment.
. . .
The term erroneous assessment,' as used (in the
statute) refers to an assessment
that deviates from the law and is therefore invalid, and is a
defect that is jurisdictional in its
nature, and does not refer to the judgment of the
assessing officer in fixing the amount of the
valuation of the property.
Meredith v. Elliott, 247 S.C. 335, 147 S.E.2d 244 at 248
(1966). What the taxpayer must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence is that the assessment was violative of some
statute or law. A mistake in valuation, including the
overvaluation of the property, not amounting to an error of law
is not sufficient to establish grounds for relief pursuant
to Section 12-47-420. A mere error in judgment resulting in an
excessive assessment is not a basis for a refund.
American Hardware Supply v. Whitmire, 278 S.C. 607, 300 S.E.2d
289 (1983).
The taxpayers alleged that the Assessor illegally
assessed
their property by not valuing the time share
condominium units in the same manner as a unit singly owned in
violation of S.C. Code Ann. 27-32-240 (Rev. 1991).
Based upon the evidence presented, the taxpayers have failed to
demonstrate that the Assessor violated Section 27-32-240
and therefore are not entitled to relief under S.C. Code Ann.
12-47-420.
The applicable provision of S.C. Code Ann. 27-32-240
(Rev.
1991) states:
(1) For purposes of property taxation, each time
share
unit, operating under a "vacation time
sharing ownership plan" as defined in item (8) of
27-32-10, must be valued in the same
manner as if the unit were owned by a single owner.
The total cumulative purchase price
paid by the time share owners for a unit may not be
utilized by the tax assessor's offices as
a factor in determining the assessed value of the unit.
A unit operating under a "vacation
time sharing lease plan" as defined in item (9) of
27-32-10, may, however, be assessed the
same as other income producing and investment property.
Under this statute, the Assessor, in determining the
taxable
value of the time share units, must use the same
manner or method used to value the units owned by a single owner.
The Assessor is specifically prohibited from adding
the purchase price from the weekly sales of time share units to
determine the taxable value of those units.
The crucial issue is the determination of the "manner"
utilized in the valuation of the subject time share units.
The methodology is the sole issue. In this case, the evidence
revealed that the Assessor valued the time share units in
the same method as the single owner units. The comparative sales
approach was used, comparing the time share units
to similar single owner units. The various characteristics of
the time share units were compared to the single owner units
and appropriate adjustments were made resulting in a fair market
value. The fair market value was recorded by the
appraiser and entered into a computer by a data processor in the
Assessor's office. The weekly sales cost of the time
share units was not the basis for determining the value of the
units.
For some reason, the value placed upon the units by the
appraiser was not the value stated on the assessment
notices sent to the taxpayers. Many of the 1988 assessment
notices were incorrect. The Assessor immediately changed
several values. In some instances, the error was pointed out by
the taxpayer. If the change resulted in a reduction of
the assessed value as contained on the notice, the Assessor did
not notify the taxpayer of the error and the change. S.C.
Code Ann. 12-43-300 (Supp. 1995) only requires that the
Assessor notify the property owner when the assessed value
is fixed at a sum greater by $1000 or more. There is no
requirement in the law that any decrease in assessed value be
noticed to the property owner. Perhaps the Assessor should have
notified the taxpayers that there were errors on the
assessment notices. However, the failure to send correct
notices does not amount to an error in valuation. At best, the
evidence simply shows that a mistake in the valuation of the
properties occurred which resulted in excessive assessments.
The taxpayers have the burden of producing evidence on
the
issue of whether the Assessor used the correct
methodology in valuing the time share condominiums. They also
have the burden of persuading the finder of fact that
the evidence produced establishes those facts. If the trier of
fact is in doubt, the issue must be decided against the
party having the burden of persuasion. Strong, McCormick on
Evidence 4th ed. 336 at 568 (1992).
The taxpayers have failed to persuade this tribunal that
the
evidence establishes that the Assessor valued the
properties using another methodology. The evidence presented by
the taxpayers raises many inferences but none of them
establish, by the greater weight of the evidence, that the
Assessor improperly valued the units. The evidence does not
show that the Assessor valued the vacation time share units in a
manner not consistent with the valuation of the single
owner units. The direct evidence establishes that the
methodology utilized by the Assessor in valuing the condominiums
was the same. The evidence reveals that there was a pattern in
which the time share units generally were valued higher
than the single owner units. It is odd that mostly the time
share units were affected but a review of the evidence also
reveals that the value reached by adding the weekly sales was
still less than the original assessed value stated in the 1988
reassessment notices.
The evidence clearly establishes, however, that there
was a
great disparity between the values of the single
owner units and the time share units. This disparity created a
systematic overvaluation of the time share units. Relief
from systematic overvaluation of property is afforded under the
provisions of S.C. Code Ann. 12-43-300 (Supp. 1995).
The taxpayers have an adequate administrative remedy to determine
whether there had been an overvaluation of their
property for taxation purposes. The taxpayers are precluded from
seeking relief in the form of refund of taxes paid
because their property was overvalued.
Adventure Inn is not operating as a "vacation time
sharing
ownership plan" as defined in Section 27-32-10 (8)
(Rev. 1991). Rather, it is a "vacation time sharing lease plan"
as defined by Section 27-32-10 (9) (Rev. 1991), which means
a plan, whether by "membership agreement, lease, rental
agreement, license, use agreement, security, or other means,
whereby the purchaser receives a right to use accommodations or
facilities, or both, but does not receive an undivided
fee simple interest in the property, for a specific period of
time during any given year ..." The evidence revealed that
Adventure Inn is owned by one entity and units are leased for
long term periods. It is valued by the Assessor's office the
same as a hotel. Section 27-32-240 permits time share leasing
plans to be assessed the same as other income producing
property. There is no evidence that the method of valuation for
Adventure Inn is violative of the statute. The taxpayer
has shown no basis for entitlement to a refund under Section
12-47-420 on Adventure Inn.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The taxpayer representatives for the condominium projects
have requested a refund of taxes paid of certain tax
years. With the exception of Player's Club, all parties have
requested a refund for taxes paid for the tax years 1990, 1991,
and 1992. Player's Club has requested refunds for tax years
1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992. The Assessor
contends that the claims of the taxpayers, in particular the
owners of time share condominiums in Player's Club, are
barred by the applicable statute of limitations because the
taxpayers failed to timely commence these proceedings for
a refund for tax years 1986 to 1989.
Player's Club first sought a refund by letter dated March
25, 1991 addressed to Mary Ann Gray, Beaufort County
Auditor. In that letter, Player's Club asserts that the Beaufort
County Assessor incorrectly assessed the property based
upon the sales price of time share units and that pursuant to
S.C. Code Ann. 12-47-70, an incorrect tax assessment
or collection must be refunded if a request is made within five
years. The letter requested refunds for the tax years 1986,
1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990. The request was renewed for tax years
1988, 1989 and 1990 by letter dated June 25, 1991.
In the June letter, the taxpayer provided a copy of the tax bill
upon which it based its claim that the assessed value of
the property was illegal.
S.C. Code Ann. 12-47-70 (Supp. 1994) for tax years
prior
to January 1, 1993 stated:
An incorrect property tax assessment or collection
by a
county, municipality, or other political
subdivision must be abated or refunded by the county,
municipality, other political subdivision
when a claim for abatement or refund is made within
five years from the date of the
assessment or collection. This section does not apply
to an abatement or refund claim that
is based upon the property's valuation, it being
specifically intended that the value of
property for tax purposes be resolved by the Assessor
for real or personal property and the
boards or commissions established therefor.
Claims for abatement or refund "shall be submitted to the
auditor of the county upon forms furnished and
prescribed by the auditor and shall contain all information
necessary to establish that the assessment or collection
resulted from an error other than the property's value. Upon
receipt of the claim, the auditor shall notify the county
treasurer and tax assessor ... all of whom shall examine and
review the claim." S.C. Code Ann. 12-47-80 (Supp. 1994).
If the officers are not satisfied that an error has been made,
they shall notify the claimant and the claimant shall have
an opportunity to be heard by the officers on the refund claim.
None of the county officers responded to the letters
submitted by the taxpayer.
The taxpayer also filed a request for a refund with the
Tax
Commission in a letter dated December 22, 1993.
In that letter, the taxpayer requested refunds on all properties
for tax years 1990, 1991, and 1992 alleging that the
properties had been taxed illegally. The letter also indicated
that a claim for a refund was pending on Player's Club for
prior tax years. In a subsequent letter dated March 14, 1994,
the taxpayers outlined specific reasons they believed that
the taxes were paid under erroneous, improper, and illegal
assessments by the Assessor. It specifically seeks relief from
the Tax Commission under S.C. Code Ann. 12-47-420.
The Assessor claims that the applicable statute of
limitations for a refund pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. 12-47-420
is three years, based upon S.C. Code Ann. 15-3-530(2) (Supp.
1995). The taxpayer claims it is entitled to a refund
pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. 12-47-70 et seq. which allows
recovery for a five year period.
The taxpayer followed the procedure outlined in Section
12-47-80. The taxpayer timely requested the refund
by sending notice to the appropriate county officer. The county
did not act upon the request. The taxpayer repeated
its request for relief and still nothing was done. Once the
county failed to act it was the taxpayer's responsibility to
demand and secure action by mandamus. Jet Park International v.
Thomas, 288 S.C. 408, 343 S.E.2d 33 (Ct. App. 1986).
The taxpayer failed to exhaust its administrative remedy.
Instead, two years later, the taxpayer sought relief
from
the former Tax Commission pursuant to Section 12-47-420. Section
12-47-420 provides authority for the Tax Commission to order the
refund of a property tax paid by reason
of an improper, erroneous, or illegal assessment. Unlike most
tax refund statutes, Section 12-47-420 does not set forth
the periods for which the refund can be ordered, therefore, we
must consider other statutes that prescribe limitations.
Section 15-3-530(2) (Supp. 1995) states that an action
upon
a liability created by statute must be brought within
three years. The applicable language is that no action can be
instituted after three years, "... upon a liability created
by statute other than a penalty or forfeiture; ..." The former
Tax Commission considered this issue several times and
declared that the applicable statute of limitations for the
issuance of a refund initiated pursuant to Section 12-47-420
was three years based upon Section 15-3-530(2). See Tax
Commission Decisions 90-17; 91-33; and 92-75. These
longstanding administrative interpretations by the Tax Commission
are entitled to great deference.
The taxpayer initiated the present action under Section
12-47-420 seeking a refund of taxes paid under an illegal
assessment in December 1993. Based upon the applicable statute
of limitations contained in Section 15-3-530(2), any
claims for a refund must be initiated within three years.
Therefore, claims for refunds for tax years prior to 1990 are
barred.
Having disposed of the merits of the case, the remaining
issues raised in the briefs of the parties need not be
addressed.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of
Law, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the Petitioners-Taxpayers' request for a refund
pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. 12-47-420 (1976) is DENIED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________
ALISON RENEE LEE
Administrative Law Judge
October ______, 1996
Columbia, South Carolina. |